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Preface
The intention of this thesis is to show that there appear to be
critical flaws in the assumptions and constructs used by school
psychologists.

Basic theoretical flaws have produced a profession whose

resulting practices are also flawed.

However, there are undeveloped

opportunities and possibilities in the school psychology profession
which stem from the personal commitments, moral leadership, and
potential impact school psychologists can have on students and the
educational system at large.
This paper will examine some very fundamental philosophical and
theoretical questions about the discipline of school psychology, present
a rationale for an alternative model of school psychology, and examine
the implications of this model for the discipline.

It will be argued

that school psychologists very seldom discuss their most basic
assumptions about the nature of reality, about what counts as knowledge,
and about the values and virtues important to the practice of school
psychology.

Such inattention, however, should not be construed to mean

that there are no shared, basic beliefs and assumptions.

On the

contrary, it will be argued that the literature of school psychology
yields by inference a number of common assumptions about reality,
knowledge, and values.

It will be proposed that the common basic

assumptions of the discipline exert very powerful influences on what
takes place in the practice and training of and the explicit
communications among school psychologists.
McGraw (1964) called for a re-examination of the philosophy
underlying all educational issues.

She believed that our leading
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spokespersons for educational reform have avoided discussion of the
first principles which determine our educational goals and values.

She

stated further that, "the mistake has been to view education primarily
in terms of social science and then, further, to view it primarily in
terms of what can be verified through quantitative measurement" (p. 41).
She quoted Boyer (1984) who believed that "the social and moral
imperative of education is to help all students see the connectedness of
things, an insight that touches the very foundation of morality— social,
personal and religious" (p. 41).
Heshusius (1989a; 1989b) and others (Adelman, 1989; Iano, 1989;
Poplin, 1987) challenged the mechanistic view of the human being which
has influenced traditional special education training and practice.
Their arguments clarified how the paradigm of mechanistic science has
greatly limited and distorted our views about what occurs in special
education classrooms.

Smith (1988) and Smith and Blase (1989) have

similarly criticized many of the basic assumptions underlying most
educational research and pointed out the resulting flaws in educational
practice.
Just as psychology does not make sense without teleology (Robinson
1985), neither does education.

The mechanistic view of the person has

eliminated, or at least ignored, the teleos of humankind.

Worse yet,

historically recent philosophical and scientific views of humankind have
stripped it of a soul (Barrett, 1986).

Thus, it should not be too

surprising that the goals and purposes of education have not been
seriously considered in the recent very critical reports of American
education.

Perhaps the teleos of education should be the reunification
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of Spirit with Mind as so aptly expressed in The Secret, a novel by
Adrian Malone (1984):
The founding of civilization! Abel was the first Grandfather. He
was a nomad, a wanderer, a man like your friends the Sioux, who
live in harmony with heaven and earth and are bound only by the
seasonal rhythms of the herds, because they know that in Spirit
they are related to all things. Abel knew this; and because he
did, Cain murdered him. Cain murdered Abel to destroy the
knowledge of Spirit, for no other who knows it can make war, as
Cain did, against heaven and earth. And when Abel died the Fall
was complete. The children of Cain saw only an alien planet of
inert materials, of soils and minerals and metals, to be possessed
and exploited. They knew only of distant, fearful gods,
perpetually angry with them for their sins, placated endlessly by
their priests. They knew no more of Spirit. When Cain murdered
Abel he murdered one half of their minds— the loving, creative,
mystical half, in which they knew themselves to be at one with all.
Since the crime of Cain his children have known only the intellect,
cold logic, which divides itself from the universe and then drives
to conquer it. They have lived ever since estranged from Spirit,
in terror of time and death. That is their inheritance from Cain;
and they have not squandered it. They have gained dominion over
the earth. But in every sad generation, a few of them hear someone
calling in their dreams, and they yearn for the murdered Abel
within them, and the secret that he knew. (pp. 80-81)
The above interpretation of the Cain and Abel myth provides a metaphor
of what some see as the problem of Western civilization (Barrett, 1986).
The recent criticisms of contemporary education in the United States
(e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) have
focused almost exclusively on the potential economic consequences of the
achievement problems of American students, with little or no debate
about what are the ultimate life goals of the students.

These reports

appear to assume that the purpose of education is to prepare our
students for economic warfare with other nations over the material
resources of the world.
If the view presented so far of our current concerns in education
is reasonable, then it is pertinent to ask whether domination over the
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world's resources, or at least obtaining our fair share, should be the
primary goal of education.

Classical philosophies of education have

taken a much broader view of the purposes and functions of education.
Aristotle (1953; Frankena, 1965), for example, along with many of his
contemporary Greek philosophers, was concerned about excellence, a word
we hear in many debates about American education today.

However, in

defining excellence and the good Aristotle did not avoid talking about
the student's soul.

Aristotle was not inhibited about taking a

teleological view of education.

He saw the purpose of education as

promoting the contemplation of God.

We rarely hear any discussion about

the souls of students in contemporary discussions about educational
philosophy, nor is there any discussion of the soul or spirit in the
criticisms of contemporary education.
Kant's summum bonum, or supreme good, is good will, which he
sometimes spoke of as the whole end of man and creation (Frankena,
1965).

The implication in Kant's thought was that mankind is to be the

embodiment and recipient of good will because of some special destiny or
capacity to achieve perfection.

In other words, there is something

special about humanity which requires our attention.
surprising that " . . .

Thus, it is not

he also holds that morality requires us to

'postulate,' not only the freedom of the will, but also the immortality
of the soul and the existence of God, the former because it is necessary
for us to attain perfection, the latter because it is necessary for the
existence of the summum bonum" (Frankena, 1965, p. 128).

It is through

education that mankind is to achieve perfection, which is, ultimately,
good will.

So here, again, we see a teleological philosophy of
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education which emphasizes a non-materialistic aim for education, unlike
the philosophies implied in the current educational debates.
Two hundred years after Kant, empirical science had a distinguished
record of accomplishments and had yielded numerous technologies which
contributed to the industrial revolution and made various aspects of
human life more productive and efficient.

Around this time the

pragmatic, experimentalistic philosophy of John Dewey (1961) made a
rather large impact upon the rapidly expanding public school system in
the United States (Bergan, 1985).
Dewey's (1961) philosophy was a reflection of the time, place, and
culture from which it emerged.

The United States was engrossed in the

industrial revolution and objective science was the intellectuals'
religion (Feyerabend, 1987).

Thus, in Dewey's philosophy we find

concerns about controlling consummatory experiences, an unshakable
belief in empirical science, and a denial of the immortal spirit of each
person (Frankena, 1965).

This materialistic bias continues in American

education today.
Perhaps C. G. Jung (1933) came closest of the early twentieth
century psychologists to recognizing humankind's core problem.

He

recognized the alienation of spirit from the living person and
articulated an ideal of personal wholeness.

Progoff (1973) told us,

however, that even Jung was fearful of the scientific establishment and,
therefore, very cautiously presented his ideas regarding certain
concepts which hint at mysticism, such as synchronicity (Jung, 1960).
But in his private communications with others, according to Progoff, it
was evident that Jung saw the limitations of the mechanistic determinism
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of modern psychology and saw possibilities which could not be
encompassed by modern science.
School psychologists tend to implicitly subscribe to the
mechanistic view that reality is independent of the observer, that
knowledge of reality can be discovered to reveal laws from which strong
predictions can be made, and that facts and values are independent
constructs.

These and other basic positions and related beliefs in

school psychology will be criticized in this thesis and a different set
of basic assumptions, and their implications, will be proposed.
It will be shown that the profession of school psychology is
undergoing change which is related to educational reform in general and
to a number of critical failures of school psychology in particular.
School psychologists were originally invited into the schools to
administer IQ tests and, later, to assist in remediating the
educationally relevant problems of students.

In recent years, however,

the use of IQ tests has been criticized legally and conceptually.
Placement of children into special remedial programs has not fulfilled
the promises of special education.

The concepts of learning styles,

educational diagnosis, and educational remediation have been questioned
and found wanting.

Thus, the most basic conceptual tools of the school

psychologist have been severely challenged and are leading to reform in
some parts of the United States.

The outstanding feature of this and

past reforms in school psychology is that there are no signs that the
basic notions about reality, knowledge, and values are being examined.
Without a re-examination of the philosophical assumptions which underpin
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the constructs and practices of school psychology the current cycle of
reform is likely to be futile.
Because the contemporary problems of school psychology make only
limited sense taken out of the historical context in which education and
psychology have become associated, a brief view of the philosophical and
social past of each discipline will be provided.

This backdrop will

help to give meaning to some of the recurrent problems in both education
and psychology as they impinge upon the current practice of school
psychology.
If it can be documented that scientific knowledge of human
psychology has advanced only modestly beyond folk psychology, and it
will be argued that this is the case, then school psychologists are in
the embarrassing position of having little special knowledge to offer.
Some would argue that the neurosciences have enriched our understanding
of human psychology, others would argue that human psychology is not
reducible to brain events.

If the latter point of view is accepted,

then we can argue that scientific psychology has little to offer beyond
folk psychology.

If the former is accepted then the proponents of the

thesis that the mind just is brain states are obliged to demonstrate how
knowledge of brain events can further our understanding of human
motives, intentions, behavior, and social relations.

The difficult

question for school psychologists is, how can we explain the phenomena
of human psychology in terms of nervous system (physical) events in a
way which can be useful to our clients?
The answer to the above question turns out to be crucial in
deciding whether or not psychology will be judged to be a science, in

L

_

_______
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the same sense that physics is a science, and will be unified with the
other physical sciences.

Either psychology will not be judged to be a

science or the notion of a science must be expanded to include the human
sciences which function, it will be argued, without a solution to the
mind/body problem and which, therefore, may have to utilize some
assumptions and methods different from the physical sciences.
Briefly, the following basic positions will be put forward:
reality is an undivided whole; knowledge is constructed; social
knowledge is a function of social consensus; personal knowledge exerts a
major influence on one’s behavior; humans are intentional beings; things
matter to persons; the purpose of education is to facilitate the
student's search for a personal meaning for life.

These assumptions are

not new in the history of human thinking, but they are alien to
mainstream school psychology, a modern invention of psychologists and
educators.

A model for the practice of school psychology, based upon

these fundamental concepts, will be presented.

Since change in a human

institution or practice develops out of a history and tradition, if
school psychology is to change it will change as an outgrowth of current
traditions and practices.

Thus, some of the ways in which current

school psychology practices might change as a result of an acceptance of
these reformulated basic assumptions and the related model will be
presented in a series of case studies.

It will be asserted that one of

the more important virtues of school psychology in the future will be
that of humility.
Concerning the title of this thesis, the reader should not think of
the term "foundational" in the metaphorical sense of a structural
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foundation, as in the foundation of a building.

Rather, consider the

assumptions presented at the beginning of Chapter 4 as the inauguration
of a new way of viewing the practice of school psychology, as in the
foundation of an intentional social group or movement.

Also, the reader

is discouraged from taking the term "model" literally or in its use in
science as a preliminary construction of how something works.

On the

contrary, the reader is advised to think of this model in the sense of a
standard of excellence to be imitated.

It is a challenge to other

school psychologists to rationally debate the values stressed in Chapter
4, and to join in the author's efforts to live and practice the
standards which evolve from this dialogue.
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ABSTRACT
A major crisis in the profession of school psychology has emerged
from the body of recent empirical studies in psychology and education.
Research on school psychology assessments has suggested that little, if
any, data are produced in these evaluations which is useful for the
remediation of students' educational problems.

Likewise, psycho-

educational treatments of the behavior and learning problems of school
children have empirically shown only weak, if any, efficacy.
An examination of some of the fundamental philosophical,
theoretical, and practical foundations of school psychology yielded
reasons for the crisis in the profession.

The underlying assumptions of

externalism and resulting faulty notions about objectivity and value
neutrality were shown to be major contributors to the problems of school
psychology.

The failure to find any relatively exceptionless laws of

behavior from which psychological practice can be based was presented as
another of the reasons for the crisis.

Mechanistic theories of the

person, which are prevalent in experimental psychology, have invaded the
thinking of school psychologists and other educators with unfortunate
results.

Semantic, diagnostic, research, and measurement problems in

school psychology have evolved from these underlying philosophical and
theoretical errors.
The following alternative foundational concepts were offered for
the practice of school psychology: (a) reality is an undivided whole;
(b) reality is constructed through the dialectical process by the
community of observers; (c) shared knowledge is developed out of social
consensus; (d) personal knowledge exerts a major influence on the
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person's behavior; (e) human beings possess purposes and intentions; (£)
human beings have moral status; and (g) the overriding purpose of
education should be to facilitate the student's search for personal
meaning for her/his life.
From this set of basic concepts a model for the practice of school
psychology was developed.

The model designated (a) the purpose of

school psychology, (b) the ways in which the school psychologist
enriches her/his clients, (c) a democratic approach to decision making,
(d) the expansion of what counts as knowledge in the profession, and (e)
the virtuous school psychologist as less of an expert and more of a
moral leader.

A series of case histories was presented to demonstrate

the model in action.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ORIGINS OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
A Brief History
Mass Education
If one of the purposes of this thesis is to examine some of the
fundamental problems in the practice of school psychology, then it will
be helpful for the reader to have a brief exposure to the history of the
profession and some of the basic movements in psychology and education
which have shaped its practices.

While reviews of the history of school

psychology may be found in various introductory texts (which will be
cited throughout this chapter), these are largely traditional,
uncritical backward looks at the profession.

In this chapter a more

critical review of the history and influences will be offered than can
be found in most school psychology textbooks.

Such a critical review is

needed in order to facilitate the dialogues which are currently shaping
the profession, especially in light of the current school psychology
"revolution” (Reschly, 1988) and the crises of the discipline of
psychology (Westland, 1978).

These criticisms will be more fully

developed in a subsequent chapter.
Most persons who have grown up in an educational system in the
United States take compulsory and mass education for granted.

However,

the attempt to educate all children in this country began only about 140
years ago.

It started earlier and developed faster in the United States

than in other countries (Carrier, 1986).

A number of problems and

philosophical developments within the compulsory and mass education
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movement converged to result in the

conception

of

school psychology as a

profession (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1985).
One of the most significant of
the schools of students with a very

these problems was the influx into
wide range

whom were thought to be incapable of learning.

of

abilities, someof

From the

reinterpretation of social Darwinism by Lester Ward (1893/1954) and his
colleagues (as cited in Kaplan & Kaplan, 1985) emerged a philosophy in
which mind was believed capable of mastering nature and ameliorating
social ills.

This philosophy of improving humankind fostered the

development of various specialists in the schools to assist in solving
social and educational problems.

Thus, the birth of school psychology

was necessarily preceded by the move, in the United States, to mass
education.
The Development of Intelligence Tests
School psychology is also indelibly linked to the history of
special education and the development of intelligence testing (Gray,
1963).

Although most contemporary textbooks on psychological testing

give a brief history of the testing movement, ijt is rare to find
reference to the philosophical and political beliefs of the test
developers and the historical context within which intelligence testing
was born.

Anastasi (1976) and Sattler (1982), for example, briefly

examined the history of mental testing without mentioning the eugenics
movement with which many of the early psychological test advocates were
involved (Blum, 1978; Gould, 1981).

Both Anastasi and Sattler presented

the rise of testing as though it evolved from an apolitical interest in
the psychology of individual differences (Anatasi, p. 8; Sattler,

jr.

h
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p. 30) or in the problems of identifying and helping mentally retarded
school children (Anastasi, p. 6; Sattler, p. 29).

While Cronback (1984)

devoted approximately two pages (pp. 197-198) to the tendency of many of
the early test developers to confuse IQ scores with an individual's
innate worth, he failed to elaborate on the social climate of the times
and the social consequences of the movement.
It would appear that writers outside the field of psychology have
been needed to illuminate the origins of intelligence testing.

Gould

(1981), a paleontologist and a science historian, provided an extensive
socio-historical examination of the developments of mental measurement
in psychology as did Blum (1978), whose major field was sociology.
Gould found Alfred Binet, the creator of the first practical scale of
intelligence, to be a rather sympathetic character who refused to
believe that his scale truly measured intelligence, who thought that it
should be used for identifying children who needed help in school and
not for ranking children, and who believed that the scores on his scale
were for practical uses and did not represent anything innate.

Gould,

however, was not as sympathetic with those who followed Binet, the
American hereditarians such as H. H. Goddard, L. M. Terman, R. M.
Yerkes, C. C. Brigham, and Arthur Jensen, and the British general
factorists, Charles Spearman and Cyril Burt.
Gould (1981) found in his research an incredible amount of
falsifying of data, sloppy research methods, and acceptance of clearly
unreliable data in the early development of the IQ testing movement in
the United States and England.

Une example is that of Goddard's work

with the infamous Kallikak family, often cited in introductory

*>.

[,
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psychology textbooks as an instance of familial retardation (Boring,
Langfeld, & Weld, 1948; Cruze, 1951; Goddard, 1914; Harlow, McGough, &
Thompson, 1971; Taylor & Manning, 1975).

Gould suspected that the

photographs of this family had been altered.

Therefore, he submitted

the originals to experts who verified that the photographs had been
retouched in order to make the facial characteristics more depraved and
simian in appearance.
Another example of sloppy research was reported by Gould (1981)
regarding the work of Yerkes in his supervision of the mass intelligence
testing of millions of army recruits during World War 1.

Gould found

documented evidence that Yerkes' attempts to standardize the
administration of the test were frequently violated.

The Beta, or

nonverbal, form of the test was supposed to be administered to
immigrants and illiterates, but this directive was often ignored in the
testing stations across the United States.

The frequency of zero scores

was high on both forms of the test, but they were especially high on the
Alpha test which was the verbal form.

The quantity of zero scores on

this test indicated (or should have) that a large number of recruits
could not read or write well enough, or that they did not understand the
instructions adequately, to answer any of the questions correctly.
Among those examined it was found that more recent immigrants, largely
from southern and eastern Europe, scored lower on these tests.

Of

course these lower scores were primarily the result of the cultural,
language, and educational differences among these groups.

In spite of

the obvious (from our perspective today) bias and invalidity of these
tests, they provided the scientific basis for immigration policies which
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restricted southern and eastern Europeans from emigrating to the United
States.
Gould (1981) intimated that the unscientific development of the
Army Alpha and Beta tests and the resulting test data on immigrants to
the United States after World War I supported the eugenicists1 views.
This unscientific, biased data, in turn, was used to fashion immigration
laws which provided quotas for each country based upon the performance
of those immigrants tested during World War I.

The quotas favored

northern and western Europeans over southern and eastern Europeans.
Thus, Gould suggested, these test data may have contributed to the
Holocaust of World War II by denying the emigration of millions of Jews
from southern and eastern Europe who were attempting to escape the
Nazis.
A more recent example of the falsifying of data regarding the
heritability of IQ is the case of Sir Cyril Burt.

Burt (1971, 1972) was

a world renowned British psychologist who argued strongly for the
position that IQ is mostly determined by genetic factors.

However, it

was later discovered by Kamin (1974) that some of Burt's data were
faked.

Indeed, much of the argument for heritability of IQ was based

upon Burt's data (Gould, 1981), but nowhere in Jensen's (1980)
voluminous work, in which Burt is cited frequently, was the fakery
acknowledged.
Blum's (1978) analysis of the history of intelligence testing began
with early nineteenth century imperialism and slavery.

He emphasized

the historical importance of attempts by many thinkers during the era of
rampant imperialism and slavery to justify these practices on biological

L
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and racial supremacy grounds.

Galton searched— in vain— for many years

for physical and sensory measures which would verify the hereditarian
position.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that both the British and

American hereditarians began their research on mental testing with the
assumption that there were (are) biological, inherited differences
between the dominant classes (white, protestant, Northern European) and
the dominated classes (white, non-white, non-protestant, Southern and
Eastern European, African, Asian, etc.).

Blum viewed the invention of

IQ tests by Binet and Simon as a moderate advance for the field of
educational psychology, and as a " . . . tremendous, revolutionary
advance for the development of Galtonian pseudoscience” (p. 55).
Binet tried and rejected many of the physical and sensory measures
previously used by Galton in trying to construct a test of mental
abilities, but Binet's conception of intelligence was different from
Galton's (Blum, 1978).

Whereas Galton and other hereditarians were

looking for objective measures of inherited mental capacities, Binet was
searching for a predictor of school success.

Binet eventually

constructed his tests of items which were refleptive of the knowledge
which was taught in school and, thus, was able to find reasonably good
predictors of school success.

However, he viewed his test not as a

measure of innate capacity but as one which described behavior at a
particular time and in a particular place.

Because Binet, and others,

found his measure useful for practical, educational purposes (because it
had criterion validity) it rapidly became the accepted measure of
intelligence against which other measures were compared (and, thus,
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became one of the criteria against which other IQ tests were, and
continue to be, compared, as pointed out by Gould, 1981),
An interesting and revolutionary approach to studying the matrix of
correlations among mental tests, factor analysis, was first used by
Charles Spearman (Gould, 1981).

He was searching for a causal factor

underlying performance on these tests and found a substantial principal
factor, referred to as j*, which could account for much of the variance
among the tests (Gould; Jensen, 1980).

He and his successors emphasized

the importance of g as a unilinear form of intelligence; such a view is
justified primarily by the process from which it was derived, factor
analysis.

It should be noted that Gould argued that the principal

components method of factor analysis is only one way of extracting
factors from multiple correlations and that L. L. Thurstone had pointed
out the kind of rotation one employs has no theoretical, mathematical,
or psychological necessity.

Gould (1987) summed up his argument this

way:
Where you place the axes depends upon what you want to learn.
Given our deep and subtle prejudices for unilinear ranking and
notions of progress, and our not so subtle preferences for ordering
people by inferred "value" (with one's own'group invariably most
worthy), it is not surprising that principal components seemed the
most "natural," indeed the only proper way to perform factor
analysis, (p. 136)
Moreover, Spearman and his successor, Burt, strongly believed that
g was innate and they inferred a physical substrate for it (Gould,
1981).

Jensen (1980) is the most recent of general factor theorists who

reified g when he stated that " . . .

it is as much a biological

reality, fashioned by evolution, as the morphological features of the
organism" (p. 182).

Thus, Jensen joined the ranks of many earlier
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theorists in converting the hypothetical construct of intelligence into
a thing, a view which was predominant in psychology during the
inauguration and early development of school psychology.

Jensen's

position was similar to those who subscribed to the identity hypothesis
wherein "brain state" is equivalent to "mind state" (Bungs & Ardilla,
1987).
School Psychology and Special Education
The development of special education and mental testing paralleled
one another for many years (Gray, 1963).

Likewise, the growth of school

psychology in the twentieth century has closely followed the growth and
funding of special education programs (Reschly, 1983).

Classes for the

mentally retarded may have begun in Europe as early as 1859, but did not
commence in the United States until 1896 (Frampton & Rowell, 1938, as
cited in Gray).

In this same year Lightner Witmer began his

psychological clinic at the University of Pennsylvania.

Much of the

focus of this new clinical psychology, until World War II, was on
children (Gray).
Carrier (1986) presented a sociologist's view of the history of
special education in England and the United States.

While this view is

certainly not the only version and not the most flattering one, it does
make an attempt to locate the events in the history of special education
within the social context, including the prevailing educational
philosophy of the time.

He defined the purpose of education as that of

reproducing, justifying, and reflecting the social order.

Thus, one of

the main functions of the school in advanced societies was, and
continues to be, " . . .

to sort students, to differentiate them, and to
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allocate them to different educational treatments" (p. 290).

The school

psychologist has been instrumental in this sorting process.
Carrier's (1986) version of U.S. educational history presented the
majority of educators in the early nineteenth century as ideologically
egalitarian.

They also subscribed to substantialism, the belief that

there are different types or sorts of students whose differences are
substantive, real, and internal to the individual.

However, near the

end of the nineteenth century American educational ideology changed,
under the influence of John Dewey and his followers, as it became more
child-centered and recognized that all children did not learn the common
curriculum at the same pace.

"This encouraged the development of

educational psychology to help determine just what those individual
attributes were . . . "

(p. 300).

According to Carrier, this

represented a change from the egalitarian and substantialist position to
that of the egalitarian and contractualist ideology.

The contractualist

agreed that students may indeed be different, but these differences are
. . . superficial and artifactual, generated by unjust, inegalitarian
social forces that educators ought to counter and correct" (p. 291).
This ideological shift furthered the sorting process in the schools in
order to provide the education appropriate to the individual child.

As

a part of this sorting process special education in the United States
grew more rapidly than in Great Britain, where the egalitarian,
contractualist movement developed several decades later.
The egalitarian, substantialist doctrine was reflected in the
"separate but equal" doctrine which applied to American blacks until the
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.

It was shortly after this Supreme
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Court ruling that special education programs for the mildly retarded
were begun in various places in the United States, for example,
Washington, D. C. and California.

Carrier (1986) saw a parallel between

the emerging contractualist philosophy in education at the turn of the
century and the changes evident in special education after racial
segregation was outlawed; "thus, the relationship between mass
education, contractualist ideology, and special education is repeated in
miniature in the ending of racial segregation in the schools" (pp. 302303).

Special education has continued to grow in the United States,

especially with the impetus of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975.

However, the effects of special education,

especially for the mildly handicapped, have been criticized (Blatt &
Garfunkel, 1973; Carlberg & Kavale, 1980; Cegelka & Tyler, 1970; Glass,
1983; Milofsky, 1974).

The utility of diagnostic and prescriptive

testing has also been found lacking (Arter & Jenkins, 1979; Ysseldyke
Mirkin, 1982).

&

Carrier's comments about these failures of special

education are pertinent:
This focus on differentiation and allocation situates special
education in a broader framework of educational practices and
relates it systematically to the focus of interactionist concerns:
classroom life, pupil careers, deviance, and handicap. And it does
so without losing sight of the institutional nature of special
education and the role it and other forms of sorting play in the
school and the society at large, for it links sorting directly to
reproduction. Just as reproduction can take place without the
conscious intent of educators, so special education solidifies and
perpetuates poor educational performance in spite of the desire of
special educators to help the child, (pp. 290-291)
Educational Roots
Textbooks and articles from the field of school psychology which
deal with the history of the profession tend to take a narrow,

w:
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psychological view while ignoring the social and philosophical context
of school psychology.

While Kaplan and Kaplan (1985) also noted the

tendency of school psychologists to ignore the social context of the
student, and briefly acknowledged the importance of ideology and the
social environment, their exploration of the impact these variables have
had on the development of school psychology was very limited.

Thus, in

this section an attempt will be made to contrast the typical history of
education presented in school psychology literature with that of
educational historians and sociologists who tend to take a broader view.
The intention here is to demonstrate that school psychology as a
discipline has emerged from a rich, complex socio-historical background
and based its practices on some assumptions which are rarely explicated
or discussed.
Psychological Assumptions of Educators
Kaplan and Kaplan (1985) traced the development of school
psychology and found that the psychological beliefs of educators in the
late nineteenth century, and an available technology of psychological
testing, were the precursors to bringing psychologists into the schools.
Thus, educators were already thinking with psychological constructs when
school psychology was invented.

School psychology "became a means of

translating educational theory into practice and, beyond that, a means
of implementing societal values" (p. 319).

The Kaplans also emphasized

the importance of individualism in education and psychology in the turn
of the century schools:
Thus, to the extent that school psychologists assumed traditional
psychological views, they ignored social history, social order, and
the social context, and they underscored the focus on the
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individual organism, placing success and failure within the
individual, relatively independent of context. . . . School
psychology provided a rationale for schools already oriented to
finding problems in children. In part for this reason, school
psychologists adjusted comfortably to the structure of a
conservative social organization— if problems were in the child,
there was little reason for the system to be altered. . . .
Individualism in the United States is understood to mean that
advancement, achievement, and success should rest primarily on
merit and talent and not on heredity, (p. 323)
In their review of the historical ties between psychology and
education Goldstein and Krasner (1987) mentioned the traditionally
recognized early psychologists (e.g., Munsterberg, Scully, Witmer,
Gesell, Hall, Thorndike, etc.) who took an interest in educational
issues.

However, they devoted only two paragraphs to the controversial

philosophical issues which influenced the early intentional application
of psychology to education.

One of the issues which will be discussed

at length later was Thorndike's belief that the psychologist's task was
to discover laws of behavior which could be applied in any situation
involving human beings.

The other controversial issue mentioned was

that of the predominance of nature or nurture in the determination of
human behavior.
The decline of Social Darwinism and a national reform movement were
mentioned in a more contemporary text (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, &
Witt, 1984), as parts of the historical context in which school
psychology developed.

However, these authors did not define "Social

Darwinism" or "national reform", nor did they elaborate upon just how
these movements affected education and the origins of school psychology.
The list of publications which briefly mention historical events without
exploring the social and philosophical contexts and their impact on

F----
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current practice can go on and on (e.g., Bergan, 1985; Curtis & Zins,
1981; Gray, 1963; Hynd, 1983; White & Harris, 1961).
A task in which school psychologists have demonstrated little
interest, then, is the analysis of the historical and philosophical
roots of their profession.

Furthermore, without such an analysis any

debate regarding the underlying assumptions of the practice of school
psychology is liable to make no sense.

It will be argued later that

such a debate is critical to the understanding and shaping of the
effects which school psychologists have on their clients.

Now, however,

a brief review of the history and philosophy of education will be
conducted in order to further understand the context in which school
psychology developed.
History and Philosophy of Education
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the basic structures
and systems which make up modern American education were formed (Meyer,
1965).

Of course, the system of education in the United States was

locally controlled and highly varied, but there were a number of common
elements to this variability.

Two elements relevant to the origins of

school psychology were (a) compulsory, mass education, and (b) a
philosophical movement known as progressivism.
Compulsory education laws were passed in each of the states between
1852 and 1918 out of a perceived need to "Americanize" the enormous
influx of immigrants to the United States (Cremin, 1961).

Before 1880

most immigrants to the U. S. were from northwestern Europe and settled
in the middle Atlantic, raidwestern, and northwestern parts of the
country (Meyer, 1965).

After 1880, however, the number of immigrants
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from southern and eastern Europe began to increase and their patterns of
settlement were largely urban.

They tended to stay in segregated slums

and cling to the "old ways" of life.

Education became the instrument

for Americanizing the children of these immigrants (Cremin).
In Spring's (1986) analysis of the history of American education,
it was in the last two decades of the nineteenth century that
educational systems adopted broad social and economic roles:
Of profound importance to the future of American education was the
decision to organize the school system to improve human capital as
a means of economic growth. In fact, the development of human
capital as a means of solving problems in the labor market became a
major educational goal of the twentieth century.
Complementing the goal of developing human capital was the
evolution of the science of education, an important part of which
was the measurement of intelligence, interests, and abilities.
Also, the political structure of schooling changed as
corporate models of organization became popular. The modern school
bureaucracy emerged as educators emulated factories and businesses,
(pp. 149-150)
The promise of economic development as a reward for educational
development can be traced back to Horace Mann's arguments for the common
school.

This expectation may have contributed to the development of

segregated education, vocational education, vocational guidance, and the
modern high school.

"In fact, one could argue that schooling as a means

of developing human capital has become the most important goal of the
educational system in the twentieth century" (Spring, p. 185).
In the belief that economic efficiency would be served, equality of
opportunity (to allow the most productive a chance to rise to the top)
became an important part of the thinking among educators in the last
century (Spring, 1986).

Even today evidence can be seen of this strong

conviction and its economic connections in the reform document A Nation

jr.
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at Risk:

The Imperative for Educational Reform (National Commission on

Excellence in Education, 1983).
Early in the twentieth century, schooling was seen as providing the
opportunity which would prepare all students equally for the economic
race in adult life.

However, as the century continued the attitude

about equality of opportunity began to shift.

The school soon became

the track, on which the race would be run (Spring, 1986).

In order to

make the competition more fair, the determination of merit was to take
place in the schools using the science of educational measurement.
"Scientific measurement of intelligence, abilities, and interests was to
serve as an objective means of providing equality of opportunity" (p.
217).
Needless to say, the tremendous influx of children into the
available public schools strained the educational resources, primarily
in creating a shortage of available teachers (Meyer, 1965).

The result

of teacher shortages was a kind of regimented pedagogical approach in
which " . . .

teaching in the public school was reduced to drumming

knowledge into pupils . . . "

(p. 468).

In reaction to these

ineffective methods, F. W. Parker combined his background of New England
individualism, his faith in democracy, and the thinking of Pestalozzi,
Herbart, and Froebel to produce a pedagogical approach which became
known as progressivism.

While Parker's efforts were fruitful in Quincy,

Massachusetts, he met with much resistance in Chicago.

He retreated to

the University of Chicago a year before he died (in 1902), but his
friend and colleague, John Dewey, took up the torch of progressivism
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which influenced American education until the middle of the twentieth
century.
Cremin (1961) aptly described Dewey's role in the early progressive
education movement:
All about him, a cacophony of voices was demanding educational
reforms of every sort and variety. Businessmen and labor unions
were insisting that the school assume the classical functions of
apprenticeship. Settlement workers and municipal reformers were
vigorously urging instruction in hygiene, domestic science, manual
arts, and child care. Patriots of every stripe were calling for
Americanization programs. And agrarian publicists were pressing
for a new sort of training for country life that would give
youngsters a sense of the joys and possibilities of farming— and
incidentally, keep them from moving to the city. Now note the
common implication running through these proposals: educational
functions traditionally carried on by family, neighborhood, or shop
are no longer being performed; somehow they must get done; like it
or not, the school must take them on. (pp. 116-117)
Cremin understood Dewey's form of progressivism as an attempt to have
the school reflect the changes that had taken place in the nation,
rather than isolating itself from the newly evolving industrialism.
"The school, as an institution, should simplify existing social life;
should reduce it, as it were, to an embryonic form" (Dewey, 1954, p.
631).

Further, the school should attempt to improve the larger society.

Dewey believed that the student should be actively involved in
discovering the social and material worlds and how they worked.

The

student's psychological aspects, the natural and individual impulses,
should be directed toward the desirable social aims.
Dewey's followers and proselytizers, who had to translate Dewey's
writings and teachings to make them generally comprehensible, made many
converts and developed progressivism as a dissent from what they
perceived to be stagnating educational approaches (Meyer, 1965).

In

f.
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reaction to some of the extremes of progressivism, however, the
Essentialists of the 1940s criticized most of the elements of
progressivism and argued for a return to the basics in education.

This

conservative spark was fanned into flame after the Russians successfully
beat the United States in the race to launch a satellite into space.
Conant's (1959) book, The American High School Today, roundly criticized
high schools for their inferior programs and lack of scholarship.
Cremin (1961) analyzed a number of reasons why the progressive movement
collapsed in the 1950s, but asserted that many of the changes wrought in
American education as a result of the progressive movement were
irreversible and continue to be felt in the schools.
American Progressivism was a response to industrialization and was
applied in the schools to improve the lives of individuals.

Much of its

program was pertinent to the introduction of psychologists (and other
specialists) into the schools:
First, it meant broadening the program and function of the
school to include direct concern for health, vocation, and the
quality of family and community life.
Second, it meant applying in the classroom the pedagogical
principles derived from new scientific research in psychology and
the social sciences.
Third, it meant tailoring instruction more and more to the
different kinds and classes of children who were being brought
within the purview of the school.
Finally, Progressivism implied the radical faith that culture
could be democratized without being vulgarized, the faith that
everyone could share not only in the benefits of the new sciences
but in the pursuit of the arts as well. (Cremin, 1961, pp. viiiix)
Thus, school psychology owes much to the progressive movement.

The

progressives' focus upon the individual, with a view to the individual's
ability to contribute to the social good, and their faith in the
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psychological and social sciences helped to prepare the way for a
psychological specialty in the schools.
Schools of Philosophy
Marler (1975) undertook the difficult task of defining and
characterizing the schools of philosophy which have been predominant in
American education.

He admitted to the difficulty of analyzing

educational theories and practices by the schools of philosophy
approach:
Assumptions are grouped under "schools" or "systems" of philosophy.
So many assumptions— sometimes not all that consistent one with
another— are included under a label such as "Idealism" that even
the basic generalizations to which the label was designed to refer
become blurred. Furthermore, given the pluralistic nature of
culture, it is difficult to identify twophilosophers whose belief
systems are identical, (p. 20)
Nevertheless, there are enough commonalities to group some metaphysical,
epistemological, and axiological beliefs into schools of philosophy,

and

briefly to examine the basics of each school, and to examine the
influences of each school on the development of American education.
Idealism.

According to Power (1979) the founders of the American

colonies based their lives on theological rather than formal
philosophical grounds.
reason.

Their lives were ruled more by belief than by

Though reason was certainly not rejected, it was, however,

secondary to theological guidance.

Doubts and fragmentation began to

creep into theological belief by the end of the colonial period sparked,
possibly, by the rise in scientific interests.

It took until the early

years of the nineteenth century for the first philosophical interests to
blossom into Transcendentalism.
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This first, widely recognized school of philosophy in the United
States borrowed heavily from German Idealism (Power, 1979).

Marler's

analysis of this movement was as follows:
Its theological overtones softened by the Enlightenment, Idealism
absolutely dominated American thought in the nineteenth century—
first with the Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William
Channing and Bronson Alcott, and then with the New-Hegelianism of
Wm. Torrey Harris, Bordon P. Browne and Josiah Royce. (1975, p.
370)
As summarized by Marler, the metaphysical beliefs of the Idealists were
based upon a creative, purposeful, spiritual view of reality.

They

believed that human nature contains both good and evil and that some
persons are, by virtue of their natural gifts, inherently superior to
others.

The Idealists aligned themselves with the notion of free will

rather than determinism in reference to human action.

Regarding God and

faith, the Idealists generally expressed belief in an orthodox, JudeoChristian God, which can be contrasted with the humanistic conception of
God, and with atheism.
The epistemology of the Idealists was founded upon their belief in
mind or soul as an immaterial entity.

Ideas were seen as archetypes of

existence grasped intuitively by the mind.

Experience was seen as

contact with, and objectivity as alignment with, a given, antecedent
reality.

The Idealist frame of reference (frame of reference is defined

here as the sum total of one's assumptions) was that our conditioned
perceptions are but limitations to be overcome by various methods.

This

position is in contrast to those philosophies which view the frame of
reference as the self-in-becoming, that is, the view that the self is
the frame of reference (Marler, 1975, pp. 123-124).

For the Idealist,
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knowledge and truth were consistent with the immaterial, archetypal
ideas.

Knowledge could be gained either through contemplation or

through more complex cognitive activities of a conscious nature,
including experiment and theory building.
Taking axiology to be the theory of value, the axiology of the
Idealists can be summarized from Marler (1975) in the following way.
Value is a property which resides in the objects of reality.

While

values can not be validated directly through experimentation, they can
be known through more traditional modes, such as emotional intuition,
revelation, and authority.

It is through emotional intuition that one

is able to discover the nature of values and classify and arrange them
in hierarchies of relative importance.

In the Idealist's view, morality

was the process of seeking the objective good and striving to conform
one's behavior to it.

Conscience was believed to be the guide which

aids one in discerning the correct moral choice and it was conscience
which obligated one to follow the correct choice.

Finally, the Idealist

believed that life entails growth toward an ultimate goal, usually
expressed as self realization.
The influence of Idealism on education in the nineteenth century
was quite extensive, yet its influence waned at the end of the century
for several reasons according to Power (1979):
The main reason for Idealism's loss of influence was the temper of
America and a decline in devotion to religion, for Idealism, even
without denominational allegiance, was intensely spiritual and
regarded man, on whom any educational theory would have to
concentrate, as an extension of an absolute or divine spirit.
Idealism, moreover, departed from a common-sense explanation of
metaphysics when it described reality as being spiritual rather
than material. In twentieth century America, when materialism came
close to being a way of life, it was hard to be convincing about
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spiritual reality. But the metaphysics of Idealism, while an
important obstacle to its acceptance among teachers and educational
theorists, was not the only deterrent: Idealists doubted the
possibility of securing valid knowledge through the usual channels
of sensory experience, for knowledge had an intuitive and cultural
component immunizing it from the ordinary processes of discursive
learning, (p. 326)
Another problem with Idealism which contributed to its loss of
influence in American education was its relative lack of concern for the
human body in the so-called mind/body problem (Power, 1979).

Americans

were becoming more aware of their bodies by the end of the nineteenth
century and concerns about disease, nutrition, and physical development
were emerging.

The Idealist's focus on mind ran counter to these

developments.

Interestingly, as will be shown, Behaviorism later

carried the mind/body problem to the other extreme by virtually ignoring
the mind.

The revival of Pragmatism in America at this time fulfilled

the need for a philosophy which more adequately addressed new social
concerns.
Pragmatism.

Pragmatism was introduced to American thought by

Charles Sanders Pierce, popularized by William James, and thoroughly
developed by John Dewey (Power, 1979).

Although Pragmatism and

Progressivism were not synonymous, the latter was heavily influenced in
its early development by the former.

Again, taking Marler's (1975)

interpretation, the basic metaphysical assumption of Pragmatism was that
a human being can know things only through experience which is
influenced by that person's assumptions.

Experience is defined as " . .

. those accidental and planned encounters between all objects in the
environment through which each is defined, ordered and given meaning"
(p. 34).

Human nature was taken as a given, and was constructed through
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transactions between the organism and the objects of its experience.
Evaluations of human nature were seen to be the result of social or
cultural interactions.

The Pragmatists believed in basic determinism

and that if there is free will, it is a kind of freedom of choice within
a limited set of conditions, not apart from them.

The Pragmatists

admitted to a God which represents mankind's highest ideals and
strivings for perfected knowledge.
In the Pragmatic philosophy, mind was taken to be that complex set
of purposeful, problem solving behaviors stimulated by some
disequilibrium or discomfort.

Thus, mind was not identified as an

immaterial entity nor was it seen strictly as a physical manifestation
of the brain.
for action.
could be.

In Pragmatic epistomology, ideas were human created plans
Ideas and thoughts were the links between what is and what

Experience was seen as the transactions between the person

and the objects of reality as the person thought and did and reacted to
the effects of the thinking and doing.
the self-concept and the other-concepts.

It was a dynamic construction of
Marler (1975) described the

nature of objectivity from the Pragmatist’s view as follows:
"Objectivity is the product of sharing and, when possible, reconciling
subjective perceptions of a given phenomenon in a specified context" (p.
119).

The frame of reference of the Pragmatist was described as the

self-in-becoming.

The basic assumptions of the person, and the self,

were seen to be equivalent, both of which were dynamically evolving out
of experience.

Since the person is dynamic, in flux, always becoming,

then it followed that, for the Pragmatist, truth and knowledge were
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constructed and were situation specific.

Knowledge claims were seen to

be public, testable, and awaiting confirmation by others.
The axiology of the Pragmatist, according to Marler (1975), began
with the view that value is a product of contextual inquiry.

Value

existed in the relationships between the person and the object in the
context of other, often competing, values and other variables.
Pragmatists did not make a strong fact-value distinction; thus,
hypotheses about values were as subject to experimentation as are those
of facts.

Any rank ordering or hierarchical arrangement of values,

then, would depend upon a particular context or situation.

Morality in

the Pragmatic account was the result of a critical inquiry regarding the
context and relationships involved in the choice of action.

Regarding

obligation and conscience, the Pragmatists were committed to application
of intelligence to all contextual factors which are relevant in a
situation calling for moral choice.

Quoting Dewey (1922), Marler

explained the Pragmatist's views of means, ends, and progress, "Means
and ends are two names for the same reality.

The terms denote not a

division in reality but a distinction in judgment" (p. 218).

Thus, the

distinction between means and ends was a judgment, not an absolute.
Ends and means to those ends influence one another as one progresses
toward the temporary end-in-view.

The ends change as one progresses and

they become the means to new ends.
Realism.

Although the philosophy of Realism has a long history,

its influence in American education developed out of a dissatisfaction
with the propositions of Pragmatism (Power, 1979).

The metaphysics of

the Realists were close to the common sense version of reality and,
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thus, had historically received wide support.

Marler (1975) described

the axiology of the Realists as widely divergent, ranging from the
objective to the subjective to the contextualist positions.

Because no

general consensus regarding axiology can be found among the Realists no
summary of their positions will be presented in this paper.
The basic metaphysical position of the Realists was that reality
consists of an orderly, knowable, and sensible world.

The world exists

independently of the knower, it is discovered not constructed.

Realists

were divided over the issue of whether or not human nature is basically
good or basically evil.

Most Realists held that humans are inherently

either superior or inferior depending upon their innate qualities.
Although they believed that much of human behavior is determined, many
Realists generally believed that the self is free to choose among
alternatives at critical junctures in life.

Other Realists believed

that human nature was determined by heredity and/or environment.
According to Marler (1975), Realists have taken all three of the
possible positions regarding belief in God.

Some have held a

traditional view of an orthodox God, others have believed God to be a
representation of mankind's highest ideals (the Humanistic God), while
other Realists have denied the existence of God.
The Realist's epistemology began with an assumption that the mind
is a function of bodily transactions which process data from an
external, independently existing reality.

Ideas, then, were seen to be

the reflections of a natural, external reality.

Experience was seen to

be that contact with the objects of reality, which exist independently
of the one having the experience, and which can result in a knowledge of

K.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

25

that reality.

Objectivity consisted of aligning oneself with the

independently existing reality.

While admitting to the pervasive errors

in perception and reasoning, the Realist's frame of reference viewed
these as limitations to be transcended by meticulous methodology.

For

the Realist, truth was knowledge which corresponded to the objective,
independently existing reality.

It was mankind's role to discover and

conform to the truth.
In summary, current notions of free will and remnants of the
spiritual beliefs of the Idealists can be seen, if one looks closely
enough, in the schools today.

Emphasis upon the importance of

experience in education and the constructed nature of truth and
knowledge are associated with the Pragmatists.

Materialism,

determinism, the God's Eye View of an independently existing reality,
and predominant notions of objectivity are influences in education which
are aligned with the Realist philosophy.

These fundamental

philosophies, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism, have, according to
Marler (1975), had the most profound effects on American education since
the late nineteenth century.

It is this time frame which is of most

interest in understanding the influences upon school psychology and the
assumptions with which most school psychologists have practiced their
profession in American schools.
Psychological Roots
As important as IQ testing and special education were in the
development of school psychology, the parent discipline for this
relatively new profession was psychology.

Early twentieth century
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psychological theory was developed out of, or a direct descendent of,
nineteenth century psychology.

According to Robinson (1986):

The record of the century [nineteeth] is particularly commendable
in regard to psychology. When we examine the topics now filling
the literature in professional psychology, we are hard pressed to
find one that was not put forth— often in a form still to be
improved upon— by those whose efforts we have examined in this
chapter [which deals with the last half of the nineteenth century].
. . . Our sense of what an experimental science is and ought to be
is taken over, with only the slightest modifications, from J. S.
Mill, and the general attitude toward the status of science remains
largely the one advocated by Auguste Comte and his positivist
disciples. . . . Contemporary psychology then is largely a footnote
to the nineteenth century, (pp. 390-391)
This section will address the philosophies dominant in psychology,
school psychology's parent discipline, at the time of the creation of
school psychology.

As Robinson's (1986) above quote tells us, very few

significant changes have occurred in the major questions to which
psychologists address themselves or in their views of the scientific
approach to psychological questions since the nineteenth century.

Thus,

an examination of the philosophies and approaches of psychologists from
the late nineteenth century on may be very revealing about some of the
inherited and current practices of school psychologists.
Perhaps the most profound philosophical influence on nineteenth
century psychology was the development of positivism in the twentieth
century (Robinson, 1986).

Supporters of positivism held science to be

the savior of mankind, the only way in which humanity's physical,
social, and personal problems could be solved.

Robinson summarized this

severe attack on rationalism as follows:
According to the logical positivists— and they might just as well
be called radical empiricists— the facts of the world are
sensations, and all the laws of science are ultimately reducible to
empirical propositions. Once we have exhausted the data of sense,
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there is nothing else that can be said either of the world or
ourselves, (p. 333)
In examining the influence of the psychologist E. L. Thorndike on
education, Goldstein and Krasner (1987) declared that it was his efforts
which established that research in psychology would become the basis of
classroom application.

It was through Thorndike that positivism made a

major assault on education.

Thorndike believed that every aspect of

education would be touched by psychology.

Goldstein and Krasner quoted

from Cremin (1961) regarding Thorndike's widespread influence on early
twentieth century education.
. . . no aspect of public-school teaching during the first quarter
of the twentieth century remained unaffected by his influence. . .
. Ultimately, Thorndike's goal was a comprehensive science of
pedagogy in which all education could be based. His faith in
quantified methods was unbounded, and he was quoted ad nauseum to
the effect that everything that exists exists in quantity and can
be measured. Beginning with the notion that the methods of
education could be vastly improved by science, he came slowly to
the conviction that the aims, too, might be scientifically
determined. (p. 114)
Robinson (1986), too, saw Thorndike as highly influential in his
effect on the development of scientific psychology.

Thorndike's law of

effect stated, basically, that we tend to do those things which we find
satisfying, while his law of exercise can be paraphrased as our tendency
to get better at those things which we practice.

As Robinson pointed

out, however, we do not see laws of this sort in psychology any more.
Actually, the notions expressed by Thorndike's laws were not new, but
the experimental evidence he offered in their support was new and
reflected the contemporary faith in the ability of science to solve
human personal and social problems.

■r.
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There is little in either of these "laws" that could not be gleaned
from Locke and Hume or Bentham or, for that matter, Aristotle.
They are the classical laws of association with the addition of
Darwinian and Benthamist principles. The difference, of course, is
that the laws in Thorndike's case are supported by experimental
findings, (p. 409)
Thorndike influenced several thousand students in his more than
forty years at Columbia's Teachers College (Meyer, 1965).

He

contributed greatly to what came to be called the Measurement Movement
in education; his philosophy that "everything that exists, exists in
quantity, and is measurable" (Meyer, p. 482) continues to influence
research in education.
While agreeing with the methods, J. B. Watson disagreed with the
mentalistic terminology in Thorndike's formulations (Robinson, 1986).
Following the positivist path, Watson wanted to purge psychology of all
terms referring to inferred, mental phenomena.

He borrowed the

physiological terms used by I. Pavlov and zealously promoted
behaviorism, the prototypical science of objective psychology.

The

behaviorists exorcised mental phenomena from scientific psychology,
claiming that only observable behavior could count as data.

"Indeed,

radical behaviorists such as John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner generally
denied the scientific validity of conscious experience altogether"
(Baars, 1986, p. 7).

While for several thousand years philosophers have

been attempting to come to grips with the mind/body problem, the
behaviorists simply ignored the problem or declared it a nonproblera
(Baars; Robinson).
Behaviorism has certainly left its mark on school psychology in
concepts of learning (Gagne, 1970), behavior modification programs

--------
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(Bandura, 1969), behavioral objectives (Bloom, 1956; Gagnd-, 1970;
Gronlund, 1978), and many of the canons of scientific methodology.
These contributions have given school psychologists some scientific
credibility, but at the expense of creating a barrier between everyday
psychology understood by their clients and the "scientific" psychology
professed by the school psychologists.

Behaviorism will be examined in

more detail in a later section.
Scientism
Science and technology, according to Bernier and Williams (1973),
have developed in a mutually reinforcing way and have provided us with
new social classes of technocrats, managers, and technicians who
implement the technological products of science.

Some may conceptualize

school psychologists as essentially technicians who apply the knowledge
and techniques of psychological science in education.

Indeed the

ideology of scientism (explained below) is all pervasive in modern
education as evidence by the current dependence upon specialists
(guidance counselors, nurses, administrators, curriculum specialists,
consultants of various kinds, etc.) who possess scientific knowledge
which they apply to the problems of education.
Bernier and Williams (1973, p. 61) used the term scientism to
denote an ideological framework which shapes the perceptions of the
social group sharing this framework and which espouses the formal goal
of controlling the forces of nature, including the forces which control
human behavior.

Bernier and Williams' commentary about the extensive

influence science now has upon western culture followed the development
of this ideology from the early attacks by religious groups to the
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widespread support science now enjoys throughout Western culture, even
to the support of most religious thinkers.
In spite of David Hume's (1739, 1748) doubts about the certainty of
knowledge and the twentieth century development of the indeterminacy
principle in physics, Bernier and Williams (1973) credit the scientians,
adherents of scientism, with the belief that any limitations in
mankind's knowledge of an ordered universe are the result of human
limitations and not of the lack of an orderly, external universe (p.
66).

If the universe were not orderly then the scientians' hopes for

prediction and control would be dashed.
because ” . . .

But optimism has prevailed

Scientism is rooted in the belief that events can be

isolated, analyzed, and recorded, and that reliable inferences can be
derived from such observations" (p. 67).

With the proper methodology,

empirical testing, and objectivity the scientians are certain that
knowledge, prediction, and control of the external world are achievable.
In his analysis of the lives of some eminent scientists, Gardner
(1983) came to the following conclusion:
Even though the scientist's self-image nowadays highlights rigor,
systematicity, and objectivity, it seems that, in the final
analysis, science itself is virtually a religion, a set of beliefs
that scientists embrace with a zealot's conviction. Scientists not
only believe in their methods and themes from the depth of their
being, but many are also convinced it is their mission to use these
tools to explain as much of reality as falls within their power.
This conviction is perhaps one of the reasons that the great
scientists have typically been concerned with the most cosmic
questions, and that, particularly in the latter years of life, they
are often given to making pronouncements about philosophical
issues, such as the nature of reality or the meaning of life. (p.
150)
While not all scientists are scientians and most scientists are
committed to the tenuousness of scientific studies, those who apply

hi_ ~ _
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technology in education often uncritically accept the findings of
science (Bernier & Williams, 1973).

For example, because IQ tests are

purportedly developed from the science of measurement they have been
accepted almost without criticism by educators and applied
psychologists.

A brief background in the scientific evolution of IQ

tests was presented above and suggested that the uncritical acceptance
of IQ as the best measure of intelligence is quite premature.

However,

Bernier and Williams pointed out that it is the claim to objectivity and
the incredible success of the physical sciences which appears to have
made credible the scientific research of social scientists.

Those

researchers who do not adhere to the objective methods of science are
likely to have their research branded as "subjective", implying that it
cannot achieve the status of objective (acceptable) knowledge.

An

example of an attempt to intimidate disbelievers is evident in this
passage from Bunge and Ardila (1987):
The world exists by itself, whereas the maps of the world are
processes in brains. Whoever denies this realist thesis has no use
for the experimental checking of our conceptual models of things,
and cannot explain the history of science. Worse: He or she risks
being referred to a psychiatrist, (p. 175)
Behaviorism
Behaviorism played a ve/y important role in shaping the science of
psychology.

The assumptions, methods, and the epistemology of

behaviorism influenced experimental psychology in America in a lasting
way (Baars, 1986).

Experimental psychology in turn has had a tremendous

influence upon the practice of psychology, even though the relatively
few theories which have emerged from the behavioristic paradigm have
been quite weak.

However, as Baars pointed out, with the development of
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behavior therapy from the principles of behavioristic psychology,
clinical psychologists, in their battle with psychiatrists over the
market place, were able to claim greater scientific validity for their
methods than could psychiatrists who were unable to scientifically
defend psychoanalysis.
The role of J. B. Watson (1913) has already been mentioned and it
was pointed out that he made the claim that psychology should be
concerned with behavior and not with consciousness.

Early in its

development the new science of psychology had taken human consciousness
to be its subject matter (Stevenson, 1974).

Introspection was the

source of information about consciousness but was soon found to be
unverifiable and, therefore, inadequate for the description and
classification of sensations, imagery, and emotions.

Watson's proposal,

thus, met a need in the development of the science of psychology by
insisting that the data of psychology be the publicly observable
behavior of organisms.

Watson theorized that only the reflexes were

innate, that all other behavior was learned, and that learning was
mediated primarily by classical (or Pavlovian, or respondent)
conditioning.

He believed that environmental conditioning could account

for almost all human behavior.
Following Watson, B. F. Skinner (1953) carried on the behavioristic
thesis, expanded the constructs, and applied the principles of operant
and respondent conditioning to explain most behavior.

Skinner has been

recognized by his peers as "perhaps the most influential contemporary
psychologist" (Evans, 196b), certainly the most famous living
behaviorist (Baars, 1986).
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Behavior of Organisms:

An Experimental Analysis (1938) influenced

American experimental psychology as much as any other single source in
the history of the discipline.

Because of Skinner's influence on modern

scientific psychology, his statements will be examined as representative
of the basic assumptions and beliefs of the behaviorists' movement in
psychology.
Skinner (1953) viewed science as the salvation of mankind, and the
science of human nature as the only sensible solution to the problems of
modern man, including the problems associated with the misuse of
science.

He predicted resistance to the deterministic view of human

nature offered by a science of human behavior, a resistance which would
result from the common belief in personal freedom and autonomy.

The

mission of the behavioral scientist was, according to Skinner, to
discover the lawful relationships among events, to predict behavior from
laws, and, eventually to provide methods of controlling behavior based
upon lawful relationships.

Theories, he believed, are larger systematic

arrangements of laws and rules which come later in the development of a
science.

Technology, however, does not wait for theories.

In

psychology, postulates of unobservable events as determiners of behavior
were unacceptable to Skinner.

"Ily interest is in a science of behavior

which is part of biology; it deals with observable events, not with the
fictitious or metaphorical apparatus which Freudians feel they observe
in the organism" (Skinner as quoted in Evans, 1968, p. 7).

Skinner

(1953) adopted the assumption that human behavior is determined by that
which is outside the person.
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As Stevenson (1974) pointed out, there are two assumptions basic to
Skinner's views:

(a) there are scientific laws which govern human

behavior, and (b) these laws report causal connections between behavior
and environment.

These assumptions appear to be a part of Skinner's

generalized faith in science and in the enormous success of the methods
of science where they have been applied (Skinner, 1953).

He described

science as a set of attitudes, a search for order and lawful
relationships, and, eventually, a system of rules and laws.
The influence of the behavioristic paradigm on the way modern
experimental psychologists think is frequently taken for granted (Baars,
1986).

Furthermore, most modern psychologists have accepted the

behaviorists' methodological and epistemological views.

These include

the restriction of evidence to that which is observable, the requirement
of precision in specifying stimuli and responses, the general skepticism
of empirically untestable theories, and the practice of refusing for
consideration unsupported subjective reports.

The implications for

school psychologists are tremendous, as Phillips (1982) pointed out.
We must realize, for example that the meaning of scientific
concepts is given to us, and their validity is defined by others.
This represents a powerful source of control over the school
psychologist, since others determine what is valid information. . .
. To some degree, science, scientific methods, and research-inaction "programs" school psychologists and reduces their choices in
problem solving and decision-making. . . . And there is the
additional danger that the reality created by science and research,
which defines what is, may become the sole basis for defining what
ought to be. (p. 25)
Behavior modification became a major technology which emerged from
the behavioristic paradigm and has had a profound impact on American
psychology and society in general ’Goldstein & Krasner, 1987).

Behavior

F
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modification has been widely and extensively applied in school systems
and can be traced back to the operant conditioning research of B. F.
Skinner (Kazdin, 1982).

The focus in behavior modification is, of

course, observable behavior.

The antecedents and consequences of the

behavior of concern are manipulated in order to achieve the desired
outcomes.

Three assumptions are made by those who apply behavior

modification outside the laboratory setting:

(a) human behavior is at

least partially learned, (b) laboratory experiments have relevance to
real life problems, and (c) findings from experiments with animals can
be generalized to humans (Goldstein & Krasner, 1987).

The value neutral

position of the psychologist as experimenter, however, clearly could not
be true of the behavior modifier, who, among other things, must decide
which behaviors of value must be modified.

Thus, in one of the most

influential books on behavior modification, Bandura (1969) included an
entire chapter on the values and ethics of applying behavioral
technology to persons.
Behaviorism has had a tremendous influence on school psychology in
the recent past (Ysseldyke & Schakel, 1983).

Behavioral assessments and

behavioral interventions have become quite common in the arsenal of
school psychologists.

A survey of random samples of members of the

American Psychological Association’s Division 16 (Division of School
Psychology) and the National Association of School Psychologists found
that the highest percentage of respondents indicated that their primary
theoretical orientation was toward behavioral psychology (Anderson,
Cancelli, & Krathochwill, 1984).
percentages:

Specifically, they found the following

behavioral— 20%, other— 19%, cognitive-behavioral— 17%,
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reality-oriented— 11%, client-centered— 8%, neo-Freudian— 7%, Freudian—
3%, Gestalt— 3%, transactional analysis— 2%, multiple responses— 9%, and
no response— 2%.
There is a long tradition advocating for the scientist-practitioner
in clinical psychology (Raimy, 1950) and in school psychology (Bergan,
1985).

Martens and Keller (1987) have recently renewed the call for

school psychologists to be trained in objective empiricism so as to
facilitate knowledge development in the profession.
In summary, the behavioristic paradigm has profoundly influenced
the way psychologists think about what counts as knowledge in the
experimental setting.

Likewise, many psychologists have been influenced

by behaviorism regarding the kinds of clinical information which are
important.

Basically, the behaviorists, and most subsequent

experimental psychologists, have excluded private, introspective data
and count only that data which is publicly observable.

This position

represents the position of physicalistic monism in the long enduring
mind/body debate in philosophy and takes the view that all psychology is
reduced to the physical movements an organism makes in space (Baars,
1986).

Behaviorism represents the pinnacle of scientism in psychology.

Underlying the scientistic thesis is the belief that there is an
orderly, external reality which exists independently of the observer.
School Psychology Practice
School psychologists have been suffering from a prolonged identity
crisis (Brown, 1982; Grimley, 1981).

A number of "summit" conferences

(e.g., Bardon, 1964; Cutts, 1955; Ysseldyke & Weinberg, 1981) have dealt
with the roles, functions, and training of school psychologists, but to
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date there is little consensus among leaders in the discipline about
what a school psychologist is supposed to do.

Bardon (1982) observed

three levels of functioning among school psychologists which have
evolved over the last five decades.

The first level of functioning

involves the provision of psychometric assessments.

At the second

level, representing much current practice, is found the application of
more sophisticated assessments than level one and the emergence of
intervention services by school psychologists.

At the third level the

school psychologist has become influential in school policy and
practices via consultation with teachers, administrators, school board
members, and through involvement in program development and evaluation.
Services at level three are more talked about than actually realized in
current practice.
In this section the practice of school psychology will be examined
by organizing it into two loose categories labeled Psychological
Assessments and Psycho-Educational Treatments.

These categories are

intended to reflect the primary responsibilities and practices of the
school psychologist, diagnosis and intervention, yet they also suggest a
broader role for the practitioner than just testing and making
recommendations.

As will be seen, assessment in current school

psychology utilizes interviews, observations, and other techniques to
gather information about a child.

Likewise, remediation may include

consultation, individual counseling, group counseling, inservice
training, and other approaches in providing help for students.

L _____
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Psychological Assessments
A number of studies have assessed the kinds of services school
psychologists actually provide to schools by examining the individual
school psychologist (Fairchild, 1974), a local group of school
psychologists (Eitel, Lamberth, & Hyman, 1984), a statewide survey of
school psychologists (Winikur & Daniels, 1982), and national surveys of
school psychologists (Farling & Hoedt, 1971; Ramage, 1979; Lacayo,
Morris, & Sherwood, 1981).

Invariably, these studies found

psychological assessments of children to be the single most time
consuming category of professional activity.
These findings are not surprising when viewed in historical
perspective.

Cutts (1955) reviewed the history of school psychology and

described the initial function of the earliest school psychologists as
child study, primarily through the use of the newly developed tests of
mental ability.

The clinics which were founded beginning in the 1890s

at a number of universities had as their purpose the examination of
children whose educational development was retarded.

The first of these

clinics appears to have been at the University of Pennsylvania under the
direction of Lightner Witmer.

The Chicago Board of Education

established a district wide Department of Child Study under the
direction of Fred W. Smedley shortly after Witmer began his clinic.
Arnold Gesell may have been the first to receive the title of school
psychologist when the Connecticut State Board of Education appointed him
to make mental examinations of "backward and defective" children
throughout the state and to plan programs and methods for their improved
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care.

Interests in child study were also developing in several European

nations at this time (White & Harris, 1961).
A number of historical accounts of school psychology have
acknowledged the development of the individual intelligence test by
Binet and Simon as the launching of the individual testing movement
which has been so important to the development and current practice of
child evaluations (Bardon, 1982; Bergan, 1985; Cutts, 1955; Gray, 1963;
Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt, 1984; White & Harris, 1961).

As

special programs for students have increased over the years, the demand
for school psychologists has also increased.

In turn, the demand for

more and better diagnostic tools has increased since the early versions
of Binet's test were introduced.

By 1940 school psychologists had

available to them one or more tests of perceptual-motor development,
educational achievement, and personality functioning (Cutts, 1955).
These tests formed the basis of the psychological profile for child
study.

While the number and sophistication of tests has greatly

increased since 1940, the data gathering procedures in school psychology
have remained largely the same (Page, 1982).

In recent years there has

been an increased emphasis upon behavioral observations and evaluations,
environmental-cultural influences, and vocational assessments (National
Association of School Psychologists [MSP], 1984), although
administering and interpreting psychological tests for the purpose of
identifying handicapped students continues to be the single most
prevalent function of the school psychologist (Goldwasser, Meyers,
Christenson, & Graden, 1981, cited in Reynolds, 1983).

Likewise, the

school psychology research literature continues to be dominated by

..
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research on testing and assessment (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt,
1964).
Assessment continues to be the most stable and consistent day-today activity of most school psychologists (Gerken, 1985) and can be
defined as the systematic gathering of information to be used in
decision making (Cancelli & Duley, 1985).

The theoretical orientation

of the school psychologist determines the factors to be assessed and the
approaches to assessment.

However, most school psychologists have

developed a battery of tests the data from which are used in making
classification and placement decisions (Gerken, 1985).

This battery

usually includes an individual intelligence test, an achievement
battery, a perceptual-motor test,' and, often, a standardized measure of
behavioral/emotional functioning (Cancelli & Duley, 1985; Gray, 1963).
Data from standardized tests along with data from interviews,
observations, work samples, and diagnostic teaching may be integrated to
aid in diagnosing, classifying, and making recommendations for the
referred student.

Descriptive studies of how school psychologists

actually conduct assessments have yet to be reported.
Psycho-Educational Treatments
Following the identification and diagnosis of educational and
psychological problems one might expect some kind of remediation.

In

simplifying the clinical model prevalent in the practice of school
psychology, Lauer (1969) characterized the diagnostic process as an
attempt to describe and explain the problems, illnesses or
maladjustments of a child, and remediation as the efforts to attack or
treat the deficiencies of the individual child.

Failure to remediate

ST"....... .....
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the problems often result in a recommendation that the child be removed
from the regular classroom and sent to a different setting for more
intensive treatment.

This oversimplified model of school psychology

practice, however, does not give a clear picture of just what kind of
remediation is provided by school psychologists.
As late as the Thayer conference of 1954 the consensus of the
participants regarding the functions of the school psychologist
generally described remediation as planning educational programs for
exceptional students (Cutts, 1955).

One of the recurring questions at

this conference, however, was "should the school psychologist carry on
therapy?" (p. 46) and Cutts reported much insecurity among the school
psychologists addressing this question.

The participants of this

conference were divided over whether or not the psychologist should
provide psychotherapy as a direct intervention.

Contrast this

indecision with the unhesitating statement from the Standards for the
Provision of School Psychological Services (National Association of
School Psychologists, 1984), section 4.3.3.1, "School psychologists
provide direct and indirect interventions to facilitate the functioning
of individuals, groups and/or organizations."

Thus, in a span of 30

years professionals in school psychology have decided to offer a broad
array of remedial services in the schools.
Recent surveys (Hughs, 1979; Lacayo, Morris, & Sherwood, 1981;
Ramage, 1979) have suggested that contemporary school psychologists
spend between 20% and 58% of their time in providing some kind of
intervention service.

These services included consultation for planning

educational interventions, behavior management, individual counseling,

L
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and group counseling.

Grimes (1981) described the characteristics of

school psychology interventions as follows:

(a) they are based upon

sound psychological theory and research, (b) they do not include placing
students into special education programs, (c) they focus on the
systematic change of describable behaviors, and (d) they may focus upon
a wide range and numerous types of behaviors.

While his second

characteristic of school psychological interventions contradicts
traditional practice, it represents a goal toward which Grimes obviously
thinks the profession should move.
Meacham and Peckham (1978) found in their survey that consultation
was emerging as a central function in the provision of intervention
services.

Moreover, practicing school psychologists preferred

consultation over other, more time consuming direct interventions.

The

role of "change agent" was also seen as a developing function for school
psychologists, a role for which they had received little training.
Fuchs and Fuchs (1986) pointed out four ways in which recent laws
have pushed school psychologists into providing more intervention
services.

First, PL 94-142 requires that a diagnostician serve on the

committee which plans the individual educational plan for students
identified as needing special education services.

Second, the need for

consultation regarding regular classroom interventions has been
increased by the requirement for placement of handicapped students in
the least restrictive environment.

Third, prereferral intervention

strategies are being called for in response to the ever increasing
number of children who are being identified as handicapped and requiring
special education programming.

And fourth, litigation and legislation
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have called for unbiased assessments which can provide effective
educational remediation for students.
Summary
School psychology was born in the midst of the compulsory and mass
education movement.

Large variations in student learning aptitudes

quickly emerged as a pressing problem for educators who tried to teach
all children.

Attempts to quantify aptitudes or, some would say,

intelligence, and the provision of "special" education for mentally
slower students emerged as the prevailing solution to the problem of
heterogeneity of learning abilities in classrooms.

Intelligence testing

and identification of students in need of special education became a
process in which the school psychologist specialized.

This process of

student testing and placement was as much a product of ideology as it
was of a disinterested, impartial science.
Firmly embedded in the educational system, school psychology was
affected by movements in educational philosophy.

While remnants of

Idealism and Pragmatism can be found in the assumptions of today's
educators, Realism has strengthened the materialistic and deterministic
views which currently predominate in education and provides the
foundation for the testing and placement activities of most school
psychologists.
Developments in the science of psychology, especially the
experimental branch, also shaped the profession of school psychology.
School psychologists endorsed not only the methods but also the ideology
of scientific psychology.

Behavioristic psychology was, and continues

to be, a major influence on practicing school psychologists and what

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

44

they acknowledge as evidence.

Publicly observable behavior counts as

data, subjective reports do not.

Only recently have school

psychologists begun, as a group, to offer substantially more remedial
services such as counseling and consultation.

However, in spite of a

continuing sense of crisis among school psychologists, the prevailing
activity continues to be assessment with standardized tests.
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CHAPTER 2
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate a number of major
problems faced by the school psychology profession.

For convenience and

consistency these problems will be grouped under the two main categories
of school psychology practice, diagnosis and remediation.

The intent is

to review enough of the pertinent literature to show that there is not a
consensus of satisfaction with current assessment and intervention
practices in school psychology.

While the intent of this chapter is to

point out flaws in the professional practice of school psychology, space
limitations do not allow for the exposition of the successes and more
positive aspects of the practice of school psychology, of which there
are many.

An attempt will be made in the final chapter of this paper to

identify some of the positive aspects of school psychology practice and
to demonstrate how these positive aspects support the adoption of the
model proposed herein.
Psychological Assessments
Not only did the growth and development of school psychology follow
the expansion and funding of special education, but the creation of
mental tests made the profession possible.

Arnold Gesell may have been

the first to bear the label school psychologist and his primary function
was to test for mental retardation (Cutts, 1955).

It was previously

established that the administration and interpretation of tests
continues to be a major function of the school psychologist.

Prior to

that, however, a brief history of the development of intelligence tests
revealed some of the biases of the early test developers in their

e........................
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efforts to find some scale along which people could be ordered according
to merit*

Recall Gould's (1981, 1987) beliefs that the eugenicist

values of the early test developers influenced the development of the
empirical scales of intelligence and, to some extent, our notions of
what is Intelligence.
Intelligence tests are likely to be the most ubiquitous measures
used by school psychologists (Reynolds et al., 1984, p.. 137).

While

intelligence is a hypothetical construct, most intelligence tests in use
today were developed primarily from an empirical basis, without a sound,
underlying theory of intelligence.

The earliest tests of intelligence

were developed empirically to predict school success (Wallin & Ferguson,
1967), and as Blum (1978) pointed out, quickly became a boon to the
eugenicists in their search for a scale on which human value could be
measured.
Besides the historical problems and atheoretical development of IQ
tests, other problems concerning the validity of intelligence tests have
surfaced periodically.

While IQ tests are generally viewed as more

objective than teacher judgments, the objectivity of these and similar
tests, which purport to reliably and validly measure human
characteristics, has been found by some to be illusory (Arter & Jenkins,
1979; Heshusius, 1982; Ysseldyke & Salvia, 1974).

When it is recalled

that the validity of Binet's original scale was established by teacher
judgments (Wolf, 1969a, 1969b), and that the IQ test has become the
criterion against which other measures have been validated (Gresham,
Reschly, & Carey, 1987), the importance of the culture of the classroom
must be appreciated.

Since the criterion against which the IQ test is

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

compared, teacher judgments, is almost always available in a school one
must wonder whether the IQ test is serving its function of providing a
more efficient way of measuring student aptitude (Anastasi, 1976).

In

fact, Gresham et al. (1987) found teachers' judgments regarding
students' classroom performances were at least as accurate in predicting
the students' classification as non-handicapped or learning disabled as
were a combination of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for ChildrenRevised (WISC-R) and the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT).

Of

course this is not the first research to find that teacher ratings or
judgments were equal or superior to psychological tests (e.g., Ullman,
1957; Hoge, 1983).

Gerber and Semmel (1984) have advocated the return

to using regular classroom teachers as "tests" of the academic
achievement of their students.

Now, it appears we have come full

circle!
At this point, rather than deal with the issues concerning whether
or not tests are fair or whether or not they are used fairly (see Lutey
& Copeland, 1982, for a review), issues about which the empirical
research data are generally inconclusive, the foundational concept of
test validity will be examined.

The primary kind of validity which will

be scrutinized will be construct validity, which is an attempt to
persuade others of a certain interpretation of what a test measures;
this kind of validity is coming to be viewed by measurement experts as
the most basic kind of psychometric validity (Cronbach, 1984).
Gould (1981) examined the history and development of intelligence
testing and found that although Binet denied that his scale was a
measure of intelligence, he led the way in applying a variety of complex

L_
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tasks as indices of mental performance.

Because Binet, and others,

found his measure useful for practical, educational purposes (because it
had criterion validity) it rapidly became the accepted measure of
intelligence against which other measures were compared.
Charles Spearman was the first to use factor analysis for the
express purpose of studying the matrix of correlations among mental
tests (Gould, 1981).

He was searching for a causal factor underlying

performance on these tests and found a substantial principal factor
which could account for much of the test variance.

This general factor

was labeled g by Spearman who, along with his successor, Cyril Burt,
strongly believed that g was innate and they inferred a physical
substrate for it.

Jensen (1980) is the most recent of general factor

theorists who reified g when he stated that " . . .

it is as much a

biological reality, fashioned by evolution, as the morphological
features of the organism" (p. 182).
A major problem with using the first principal component of a
factor analysis, as is usually done in factoring out g, is that
nonsensical systems of positive correlations also have principal
components, as illustrated by Gould (1981).

Theoretically, any score

which correlates positively with another set of scores will also load on
the first principal component factor.

Thus, the reification of

intelligence (or any other "mental" construct for that matter) from a
principal component factor analysis cannot come from the mathematics or
the label given to the factor but must be supported by additional
biological data, which have not been forthcoming in the case of
intelligence.
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By using the same data gathered by Spearman and his followers,
Thurstone invented a new form of factor analysis which found no general
factor but a number of primary factors of intelligence (Gould, 1981).
Thus, a new abstraction of the data suggested an interpretation of
intelligence quite different from the g theory.

Perhaps Thurstone's

most important contribution was to demonstrate that the mathematics of
factor analysis can be legitimately interpreted from more than one point
of view.
Grover (1981) challenged a number of conclusions reached by g
theorists, Jensen (1980) in particular.

She cited a number of studies

that strongly suggest that temperament or personality factors affect
measures of IQ as much as any innate cognitive capacity.

Drawing from

neuropsychological literature she argued that the performance of an
individual on a test is largely a function of the structural features of
the assessment device rather than a measure of mental capacity.
(1981) explained " . . .

Grover

that instruments or measuring devices

presuppose the validity of the principles which they embody, and are in
fact an extension of theory” (p. 38).

Thus, a thermometer presupposes

the principle of uniform expansion of bodies as a result of the action
of heat, and a thermometer, then, is used to measure the uniformity of
thermic action.

Likewise, if an IQ test presupposes a unilinear general

factor or a normal distribution of scores it will then exhibit these
properties as a function of its design (Kohlberg, 1987).
In the early construction of intelligence tests the assumption that
intelligence is equally distributed between the sexes led to substantial
adjustments so that males could compete equally with females
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(McGuinness, 1985).

In the early pilot studies on the Binet and Simon

scales, boys were more likely to fail than girls (Varon, 1935).

This

led Binet and Simon to alter the scales until the performances of the
sexes were equal.

Wechsler encountered a female superiority on almost

all of his initial scales forcing him to search for scales and items
which would show a balanced performance between the sexes (Kipnis,
1976).

McGuinness (1985, p. 19) believed that since many of the items

were added to balance the sex effects, some of the subtests seemed
unrelated to intelligence (e.g., Coding) and have not shown much
correlation with other tasks of intelligence.

This, then, is a

pertinent example of how a preconception, that males and females develop
intellectually at the same rate, has affected the construction of a
measuring instrument.

Interestingly, McGuinness added that had boys

tended to score higher on the initial test tasks no changes would likely
have been made, for such a finding would have supported the attitudes
about females prevalent at that time.
Grover (1981) also asserted that IQ tests measure a restricted set
of learned skills and a number of information processing strategies.
These learned skills seem to be one particular set of logical thinking
aptitudes which are taught in and valued by traditional schools.
Gardner (1983) agreed with this view, stating that paper-and-pencil
tests and brief interviews almost guarantee that an examiner will tap
only the linguistic and logico-mathematical intelligences which are, of
course, prized by schools.

The implications are (a) that there are

other cognitive skills which are not tapped by IQ tests and (b) that the
skills measured by IQ tests are teachable.

Grover cited a number of

[.
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investigations which have demonstrated the modifiability of basic
cognitive skills.

She has rejected IQ as a measure of g because,

. . . intercorrelations among a set of tests do not at all
necessarily point to the existence of a general intelligence factor
. . . rather, this general factor may, as has been alluded to
previously, reflect general skills for dealing with
decontextualized material which for problem-solution requires a
particular "schooled" logic, (p. 123)
The basic question to ask seems to be:

Is g real in the sense that

it exists as some entity outside the mathematical procedures from which
it is induced, or is it a metaphor, or artifact, invented by human
consciousness?

If g exists as some real, physical thing then the,

supposedly, value-free methods of physical science may be the most
appropriate way to proceed in its investigation.

If, however, one

assumes that g, like other socially mediated concepts, is mind-dependent
then the methods of the physical sciences can best be viewed as only one
way, among many, of developing the arguments concerning this construct.
Value laden political discourse may, for example, be another way of
trying to settle differences about the nature of g.
Jensen (1980) spoke of g as both a hypothetical construct (p. 224)
and as a biological reality (pp. 182 & 251), whi'ch typifies the
scientific realist position regarding the validity of IQ tests.

He

carefully pointed out, however, that g is not to be equated with the
means used for measuring it (p. 247), to do so would violate the notion
of objectivity which is one of the basic premises of the scientific
realist's approach (Smith, 1985).

Gould (1981) demonstrated that

Spearman, Burt, and Jensen have all made the same fundamental mistake of
concluding that the mathematical abstraction of g is a thing, yet to be
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discovered, which has some fundamental existence in the same sense as
nerves and biochemicals.

Although a scientific realist himself, Gould

argued that absolute scientific objectivity is a myth, and that cultural
prejudices often predetermine the outcome of scientific research.

An

internal realist (Putnam, 1988) would carry this argument a step further
and propose that all social scientific objectivity is limited because
there is no conceivable way to separate the social scientist from that
which is observed (Smith, 1983).
The historical analyses of the development of the IQ movement made
by both Gould (1981) and Blum (1973) illustrated the strong motive to
find scientific justification for the existing social order.
Speculation about ways in which the concept of IQ could have developed
from other social motives is fueled by recent developments in thinking
about intelligence.

Gazzaniga (1985, 1988), coming from a

neuropsychological tradition, conceived of a number of independently
functioning mental abilities which influence our behavior, but which are
unified by reliance upon our verbal expressive ability to justify the
behaviors we emit.

Another similar approach is offered by Gardner

(1983) who presented a theory of multiple intelligences.

These are only

two of, possibly, an unlimited number of ways the construct of
intelligence can be, or could have been, developed.

Guilford (1967;

Guilford & lloepfner, 1971) preceded these multiple intelligences
approaches with his version of 120 vectors of the mind.
Iverson (1986) examined the ways in which the views of IQ test
construct validity have affected the practice of school psychology.

He

attacked Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) concept of the nomological network

■r.
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as it applies to psychological laws by showing that psychological laws
do not account well for intentions; argued that disconfirming
observations do not necessarily refute the construct being validated,
thus allowing a kind of circular reasoning; and, pointed out the
weaknesses in making generalizations about human actions apart from
human intentions.

Thus, the problem of treating human behavior as,

simply, movements in space determined by prior movements in space
ignores human intentions which often can make behavior unpredictable.
The problem with many of the tests used by school psychologists, then,
is that they are based upon deterministic thinking which ignores the
qualitative differences between human behavior and the behavior of other
physical events such as the movement of electrons, atoms, molecules, and
biochemicals.
Iverson (1986) went on to describe how school psychologists appear
to work from two incompatible models when conducting assessments.

The

first model is that of deterministic science (also referred to as
scientific realism) which has provided the basis from which "objective"
tests have been derived.

The second model is labeled the value-oriented

model, the assumptions of which are in conflict with those of
determinism, and underlie the more qualitative aspects of a
psychological evaluation including in-depth interviews, participant
observations, and diagnostic teaching.

Iverson believed that school

psychological evaluations were relatively ineffectual (a point to be
addressed below) primarily because of this conflict in basic
assumptions.

The conflicting assumptions which are concealed in the

deterministic and value-oriented models will be examined in Chapter 3
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(see p. 70).

The reasons why these models cannot be complementary

should become clear to the reader at that point.
One of the basic reasons school psychologists conduct psychological
and educational assessments is to gather information which will be
useful in planning educational programs for students who are not
succeeding.

However, a review which appeared in a major textbook on

school psychology, The School Psychology Handbook, by Ysseldyke and
Mirkin (1982), found that " . . .

there has been essentially no

empirical support for the beliefs that process dysfunctions cause
academic difficulties, can be reliably assessed, or can be remediated"
;p. 409).

They found no support for the practice of basing

prescriptions upon aptitude measures.

They quoted Mann, Proger, and

Cross (1973) who stated that methodological problems in the measurement
of aptitude are to blame for the lack of positive findings.

They also

quoted Arter and Jenkins (1977) who found a widespread belief among
educators in modality-instructional interactions in spite of the absence

V
of empirical support for such practices.

Ysseldyke and Mirkin summed up

their review with the following statement:
Assessment and decision-making practices are too often incongruent
with empirical findings, technically inadequate tests are used far
too often, decisions are significantly affected by nonobjective
data, and the process of using assessment data to make decisions is
both considerably varied and little understood, (p. 400)
Another major function of assessment in school psychology is to
diagnose handicapping conditions in students.

White and Harris (1961),

while they acknowledged that many psychologists felt that diagnoses were
unreliable, advocated for the diagnostic process and diagnostic
categories "because they require a summation of the pupil's

5T-----------
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difficulties” (p. 239).

However, in an introduction to an issue of

Exceptional Children exploring curriculum-based assessment, Tucker
(1985) concluded that there is no evidence that traditional, normreferenced testing, which most school psychologists provide, produces
data which is relevant to the remediation of a student's educational
problems.

School curricula are usually determined by local school

boards, and local traditions are what determine whether or not a student
is making satisfactory progress.

Thus, Tucker argued that assessment of

a student's functioning within the school curricula is essential in
determining just what are the student's educational needs.
Gittelman (1980) reviewed the literature on the validity of
projective tests in diagnosing emotional and behavioral disturbances in
children.

Projective tests usually consist of ambiguous stimuli

presented to a child who is asked to respond in some way.

The

responses, it is hypothesized, provide some information about the
child's intrapsychic dynamics.

Gittelman found very poorly done

research, but concluded that children with severe problems tend to
differ on some projective tests from normal children, but these tests
lack diagnostic specificity.

Also, there was no research support for

the belief that a certain kind of test response characteristic of a
group of abnormal children could be interpreted as having the same
meaning for normal children.
Gerken (1985) concluded in her review of academic assessment by
school psychologists that the reliance on objective tests of achievement
is no longer an acceptable approach.

Flaws in the instruments are only

part of the problem; another important part is the tendency of school
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psychologists to gather insufficient, inadequate, and/or irrelevant
information.

She presented a model for improving academic assessments

and recommended that interventions be based upon sound psychological and
educational theory, but she failed to provide examples of well
supported, sound theories which can guide the process of deriving
remediation from assessment.
Cancelli and Duley (1985) reviewed the data on psychological
assessments and advocated an approach that focused on the uses to which
assessment data were put.

While they rejected the traditional reliance

on objective, norm-referenced testing, neither did they fully embrace
the opposite position of doing away with traditional tests in favor of
behavioral assessments (a position favored by Trachtman, 1981).

"Both

intrapersonal functioning and behavioral assessment data are important
for aiding educational decisions in the schools" (Cancelli St Duley,
1985).

While presenting a rationale for greater reliance on behavioral

assessments they failed to provide evidence that meets the criteria of
the behavioral approach which they advocate, that behavioral assessments
result in more effective remediation.

This advocacy of new approaches

before gathering supporting empirical evidence is not unusual in school
psychology literature.
In his review of the sources of errors in the professional
judgments of school psychologists, Barnett (1988) reported that
standardized instruments with reliabilities and validities considered
acceptable lead to magnitudes of error that are difficult to defend.
Also, a study reported by Ilacmann and Barnett (1985) in which a computer
simulation designed to minimize classification errors by selecting tests

I*
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with high reliabilities, found that when reliability coefficients were
as high as .94 retest misclassifications reached 30%.

The error rates

were much higher when retesting was done with different, but highly
correlated, tests.
as follows:

Barnett (1988) concluded this portion of his review

"In summary, many problems associated with the technical

adequacy of tests and other assessment procedures actually have been
underestimated" (p. 663).
Summary of Assessments
To summarize the problems concerning assessment, it was found that
intelligence tests have developed empirically rather than from theory.
Their empirical development, however, reflects a preconception about the
unilinearity of human intelligence which has been subsequently verified
by the principal components approach to factor analysis.

Because there

are other approaches to factor analysis which support a multi-factor
view of intelligence and new theories of multiple intelligences, the
general factor theory of intelligence is being challenged (see Gardner,
1983, for a historical review of the single versus multiple factor
theories of intelligence).

School psychologists may have prematurely

adopted an approach to intelligence which does not tap all the
potentialities of students.

The construct validity of tests was also

criticized because of ontological assumptions which ignore
intentionality.

The practical problems of tests as they are currently

used by school psychologists were pointed out.

These problems included

the fact that aptitude measures have not resulted in useful treatments,
that the notion of modality preferences has no bearing on interventions,
that achievement measures are often invalid, and that achievement
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measures usually do not measure what the child is being taught.

While

alternatives to objective, psychometric assessments were illustrated,
what seems to be missing in school psychology is a theory explaining how
assessment information is linked theoretically to specific remedial
activities.

For example, knowing that a student with average abilities

and a "normal" intelligence test profile is unable to sound out medial
vowels does not point to any specific remedial strategy.

Even if a much

greater amount of assessment information about the student were
available either from traditional or curriculum-based assessments, there
are no empirical reasons to believe that a successful strategy for
teaching this youngster to sound out medial vowels could be derived from
such data.

This is reminiscent of the philosophical problem of

formalizing inductive logic.

The best we can do is, as Popper (1968)

suggested, conjecture and refute.

If this is the case, why conduct

expensive, time-consuming assessments?

Why not simply do practice

teaching with a student, experimenting with hypotheses, while gathering
many kinds of information?
Psychological Diagnoses
If it is assumed that diagnosis is based upon assessment
information, and the assessment information is suspect for the reasons
examined above, then one would expect, logically, that diagnostic
practices must also be suspect, which is what Barnett (1988) reported.
Reynolds et al. (1984) have made a number of interesting observations
about the diagnoses used by school psychologists.

First, the diagnostic

categories utilized have been generated by psychiatrists, special
educators, or government legislators or bureaucrats, with little or no
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input from school psychologists.

Second, the philosophical basis for

most diagnoses in school psychology has been the medical model with its
focus on intra-individual pathology.

And third, the diagnostic process

has been severely criticized as unreliable and invalid.
The criticisms of school psychological diagnoses are similar to
those of other child specialists.

McDermott (1980) found that school

psychologist diagnoses were lacking in congruence, but they were no
worse than those of clinical psychiatrists, clinical psychologists,
mental health agencies, public mental health workers, or special
education teams.

Frame, Clarizio, Porter, and Vinsonhaler (1982)

examined the congruence of school psychologists1 diagnoses and found phi
coefficients ranging from .30 to .53.

Epps, McGue, and Ysseldyke (1982)

reported that a group of school psychologists were unable to
differentiate between learning disabled and non-learning disabled when
presented with diagnostic data on each student.

In a study by Adelman

(1978) it was found that diagnostic labels were confusing, redundant,
and not differentiating.

In a similar vein, Barnett (1988) concluded

from his more recent review that the reliability of diagnoses in school
psychology is very poor.

Wang, Reynolds, and Walberg (1988) reviewed

the literature on evaluating and diagnosing special students and
concluded that at best the system is unscientific, inefficient, and
unhelpful, and at worst may actually harm some students.

Reynolds and

his colleagues (1984) concluded from their review of the literature
that, "taken as a whole, this body of research indicates inadequate,
reliability for most, if not ail, current systems of diagnosis in
frequent use" (p. 318).

This statement is a good summary of the state
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of the art of diagnosis in school psychology.

Thus, extensive reviews

of the literature suggest that a consensus is growing that the
diagnostic practices of school psychologists are quite deficient.
Summary of Diagnoses
Diagnostic procedures used by school psychologists have been
adopted from other professions and generally focus upon intra-individual
pathology.

These diagnoses, like those in other child specialty fields,

have been severely criticized as confusing, redundant, unreliable,
unscientific, and inefficient.

They are accused, in some cases, of

harming children.
Psycho-Educational Treatments
As previously stated, the intervention services offered by school
psychologists include consultation for educational remediation and
behavior management, individual counseling, and group counseling.

In

this section these categories will be grouped for convenience into two
parts, consultation and counseling, so as to examine the literature of
the effectiveness of each.

As Reynolds et al. (1984) pointed out,

however, there are an infinite number of possible problems a school
psychologist may encounter and very likely an equal number of possible
interventions which could be brought to bear on these problems.

Thus,

grouping of the typical kinds of interventions used by school
psychologists is necessary.

Likewise, the research on various

intervention techniques is voluminous (Reynolds et al., 1984);
therefore, an examination of research reviews should help to indicate
whether or not school psychologist interventions are considered to be
effective.
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Consultation
The first review of outcome studies of consultation was conducted
by Mannino and Shore (1975) who examined 35 research reports published
between 1958 and 1972.

They counted as positive effects any changes in

attitudes or behavior of consultees or improvements in behavior of
clients.

Twenty-nine, or 69%, of the studies reported at least one

positive outcome.

Of those studies which assessed the effectiveness of

consultation within school settings, 20, or 78%, reported at least
partial success.
Medway (1979) conducted a follow-up review and focused on school
consultation outcome studies from 1972 through 1977.

He defined

consultation as "collaborative problem solving between a mental health
specialist (the consultant) and one or more persons (the consultees) who
are responsible for providing some form of psychological assistance to
another (the client)" (p. 276).

Twenty-nine studies were found and of

these eight, or 28%, reported consistently positive results.

Another 14

studies obtained positive results on at least one of several dependent
measures.

Thus, the overall percentage of studies in which at least

some positive result was found turned out to be 76, a figure remarkably
close to that found for the school consultation studies by Mannino and
Shore (1975).
Medway (1979) cautioned, however, that many of the studies he
reviewed were flawed because of their failure to use control groups, or,
in some cases where comparison groups were used, to use comparable
subjects in the experimental and control groups.

Eleven studies, 10 of

which reported positive results, failed to include a control group.
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number and background characteristics of the consultants was also a
problem in several of the studies.

These characteristics have been

shown to be important in other outcome studies (Bergan & Tombari, 1976;
Rider, 1974; Schowengerdt, Fine, & Poggia, 1976).

Little or no attempt

was made in these studies to ensure that the consultees were a
homogeneous group.

The type of outcome data, the intervals between

treatments and gathering of outcome data, and the persons reporting the
outcome data were inconsistent from one study to another.

Also, Medway

had reason to believe that journal editorial policies may have limited
the number of outcome studies published which reported either negative
or no positive results.

For example, only three of the eight doctoral

dissertations included in his review reported any positive results.

In

chapter seven of his book, Westland (1978) discussed the "publication
crisis” in psychology.

He emphasized that the meaning of a positive

result in psychological research is not the same as a positive result in
the physical sciences.

Causing a substance to crystallize, for example,

once it happens, cancels out previous negative results in a chemical
experiment.

The significance of a positive result in psychology,

however, must be judged in light of previous negative results.

Westland

(1978) concluded that:
It is for this reason that if only the 'positive' result is
published, and nobody knows about the others (real or potential),
it can be said that publication practices can lead to totally
misleading conclusions, whereas the absence of knowledge about the
chemist's abortive trials makes no difference at all to the logical
status of the result he does publish. If a conclusion in physical
science is wrong, it is wrong for different, and usually internal,
reasons (internal to the experiment, that is), (p. 101)

r.
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Investigation of the effects of journal editorial policies on the
publication of all kinds of knowledge in school psychology might be an
important avenue of inquiry.
Counseling
The next aspect of school psychology practice to be examined in the
remediation category is counseling.

This term normally is used to

represent relatively short-term direct interventions with one or more
clients (Bardon & Bennett, 1974), and will be so understood in this
paper.

While the terms "counseling" and "psychotherapy" are often used

to denote differences in the client, the approach, the seriousness of
the problem, or the context of therapy, these differences are artificial
and provide no clear distinctions (Patterson, 1966).

Therefore,

following Patterson, no distinction will be made between counseling and
psychotherapy, both of which will be defined as "processes involving a
special kind of relationship between a person who asks for help with a
psychological problem (the client or patient) and a person who is
trained to provide that help (the counselor or the therapist)" (p. 1).
Counseling is one of the school psychology interventions most
preferred by teachers (Ford & Migles, 1979:
Christenson, & Thurlow, 1982).

Algozzine, Ysseldyke,

Teachers may prefer counseling for the

imnature or misbehaving child because they do not understand the
limitations of counseling (Bardon & Bennett, 1974), because teachers
have unrealistic ideas about the training of school psychologists
(Styles, 1965), and/or because teachers prefer interventions which do
not intrude on their prerogatives (Ford & Migles).
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One of the earliest, and most controversial, assessments of the
effects of psychotherapy was reported by Eysenck (1952).

He reviewed

the literature of outcome studies and found that there was little reason
to think that psychotherapy was effective.

Eysenck reviewed the

literature again in 1966 and reached the following similar conclusion:
With the single exception of the psychotherapeutic methods based on
learning theory, results of published research with military and
civilian neurotics, and with both adults and children, suggest that
the therapeutic effects of psychotherapy are small or non-existent,
and do not in any demonstrable way add to the non-specific effects
of routine medical treatment, or to such events as occur in the
patients' everyday experience, (pp. 39-40)
Furthermore, a similar review of psychotherapy studies with children as
the clients was conducted by Levitt (1963) with results which were very
similar to those found by Eysenck.
Meehl

(1966), and others, were invited torespond to Eysenck's

(1966) findings of generally nonpositive effects of psychotherapy.
Meehl estimated that in his experience perhaps only one-fourth of the
people seeking psychotherapy can profit from the experience, the
remainder either would not benefit or would improve without help.

He

also believed that only one-fourth of the therapists in practice are
effective in helping clients.
calculated

Given these estimates, Meehl then

the probability that the appropriate

from an effective therapist at only

clientreceiving therapy

about .06. He concluded that until

psychotherapists could identify appropriate clients, and the
effectiveness of individual therapists could be identified, further
outcome studies would be futile.

This argument appears to beg the

question, as did most of the replies to Eysenck's analysis.

5.............

*
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Strupp and Hadley (1979) conducted an interesting experiment
comparing the effectiveness of experienced psychotherapists with
university professors who had no formal training or experience in
counseling, but who were known to form caring relationships with their
students.

Each group was randomly assigned a rather homogeneous group

of students with indications of anxiety or depression based upon the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory scores.
control group was also formed.

A minimal treatment

Outcome measures found that the clients

in both treated groups achieved the same amount of gain on the multiple
outcome measures.

While the control group also improved, their gains

were not as large as those of the treated groups.

All groups maintained

their improvements at a one year follow-up assessment.
Smith and Glass (1977) reported a meta-analysis of psychotherapy
outcome studies.

They conducted a large number of analyses of client,

therapist, method, and temporal variables.

In general, they found that

the average treated client is better off than about 75/. of untreated
clients.

Their major conclusions were as follows:

The results of research demonstrated the beneficial effects of
counseling and psychotherapy. Despite volumes devoted to the
theoretical differences among different schools of psychotherapy,
the results of research demonstrate negligible differences in the
effects produced by different therapy types. Unconditional
judgments of superiority of one type or another of psychotherapy,
and all that these claims imply about treatment and training
policy, are unjustified. Scholars and clinicians are in the
embarrassing position of knowing less than has been proven, because
knowledge, atomized and sprayed across a vast landscape of
journals, books, and reports, has not been accessible, (p. 760)
Subsequent meta-analytic studies by Shapiro and Shapiro (1982) and
Landman and Dawes (1982) found very similar effect sizes and reached the
conclusion that psychotherapy is at least moderately effective.

F.
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However, the Shapiro and Shapiro study found behavioral and cognitive
therapies to be slightly more effective than other types of therapy.
Prout and DeMartino (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of schoolbased studies of psychotherapy outcomes.

They found only 33 studies

which met their criteria for inclusion in the analysis, but reported
that the overall effect size across all treatments was large enough
(0.58) to tentatively conclude that school-based psychotherapy is at
least moderately effective.

The authors of this study found that

cognitive and behavioral and group counseling or psychotherapy were
relatively more effective than other forms of therapy.
The issues of training and experience for psychotherapists have
been raised.

Smith and Glass (1977), for example, found virtually no

correlation between therapist experience and outcome (r «* -.01).

Hynan

(1981) interpreted the findings by Smith and Glass of a modest effect
for psychotherapy as a demonstration of the effects of relationships,
not techniques.

He pointed out that, with very minor exceptions, the

specific techniques of psychotherapy are not effective and the training
of the therapist appears to be inconsequential to the outcome of
therapy.

Following these assumptions Hynan argued for a number of

advantages in graduate training of counselors or therapists when one
assumes that the techniques of psychotherapy are ineffective.

These

benefits are (a) alleviation of anxiety in beginning therapists, and (b)
making patients responsible (and giving them the credit) for any
improvements they might make.
It should also be pointed out that meta-analysis as a technique for
reviewing research is not without its critics (e.g., Eysenck, 1978).

r.
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entire journal issue has been devoted to an examination of the pros and
cons of the meta-analysis procedure (Garfield, 1983).
Special Education
While school psychologists are not directly responsible for special
education programs, they are a part of the system which identifies and
recommends these programs for certain children.

The literature in a

wide array of educational publications has in the last few years
publicized the apparent fact that special education programs for most
handicapped children are no more effective than regular education
programs.

Cegelka and Tyler (1970) found in their review of 40 studies

that measures of student academic achievement Indicated that mildly
handicapped students in regular classes performed just as well as, or
better, than similar students placed in special education classes.
Blatt and Garfunkel (1973) reached the same conclusion in their review.
Using meta-analytic methods, Carlberg and Kavale (1980) concluded that
special education placement was inferior to regular class placement for
students with below average intelligence.

Glass (1983) also reviewed

special education efficacy studies and concluded that there is little
evidence substantiating the benefits of special education programs for
students with mild handicaps.

Reschly (1988) reviewed the literature

regarding special education programs for learning disabled students and
concluded that, "If It could be shown that the eligibility determination
is reliable and valid or related to differential instructional
effectiveness, then t.hose services could be justified.

However, there

is no convincing evidence to support those assertions" (p. 463).

F
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Some (Hallahan, Keller, McKinney, Loyd, & Bryan, 1988) have
criticized the technical adequacy of the dependent measures and/or the
experimental designs of many of the special education efficacy studies,
and Marston (1987) found preliminary evidence that some special
education programs may work if they are analyzed using curriculum-based
assessments.

Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence raises serious

questions about special education effectiveness.

This view seems to be

dominating the media and is stimulating the dismantling of special
education programs for the mildly handicapped (e.g., Reynolds, Wang, &
Walberg, 1987; Will, 1986).

Once again, action is being recommended

before a consensus has been formed among the researchers and those who
are involved in special education about the issues being examined and
debated.
Summary of ?gycho-Educational Treatments
It has not been convincingly shown that interventions normally
employed by school psychologists, consultation, counseling, and program
recommendations, have been effective in helping educationally
handicapped children to improve their functioning in school.

While the

research on consultation is promising, a number of problems with these
studies prohibit any conclusions regarding overall effectiveness.
Likewise, the latest review of counseling outcome research shows only a
very modest positive effect which is probably a measure of the effects
of relationships rather than specific techniques.

Special education

programming for most handicapped students has not been shown to be
effective.

While it is premature to conclude that school psychology
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intervention services are ineffective, it is safe to say that school
psychologists have yet to demonstrate the value of these services.
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CHAPTER 3
REASONS FOR THE FAILURES OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
So far, a particular point of view of the influences on, and the
history, practices, and failures of school psychology has been
presented.

The intent of this presentation was to examine the current

crisis in the profession while hinting at some of the reasons for the
crisis.

In Chapter 3 the reader will be presented with criticisms of

metaphysical realism (or extemalism), notions of objectivity, the
typical distinction between facts and values, laws of behavior, and
theories of the person, as these ideas are found in the behavioral and
social sciences.

Following this, the more practical problems of

semantics, diagnostic categories, application of research, and
measurement in school psychology are addressed.
Also in this chapter an attempt is made to explicate a number of
reasons for the current state of crisis in school psychology.

Reasons

rather than causes are dealt with in this paper because, following
Phillips' (1980) analysis, behavioral science cannot yet establish
causes for complex phenomena.

Furthermore, Robinson (1985) pointed out

that causes are purely natural phenomena and can be contrasted with
reasons which entail agency and usually speak of the agent's motives,
desires, expectations, and purposes.

To speak of causes is appropriate

when the topic is some aspect of one of the natural sciences.

Referenc

to reasons is more appropriate when we speak of the psychological and
social sciences.
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Philosophical Reasons
The first set of reasons for the failures of school psychology are
those which relate to the dominant world view of scientific psychology.
This world view is founded upon basic assumptions about the relationship
of the observer to the observed, the nature of objectivity, the
antagonism between facts and values, the laws of behavior, and theories
of the person.
Externalism
The first reason for the failures of school psychology is that like
much of scientific psychology in general, school psychology has
subscribed with little or no question to the assumptions of the
philosophical externalists as defined by Putnam (1981).
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of
mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete
description of "the way the world is." Truth involves some sort of
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external
things and sets of things. I shall call this perspective the
externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a
God’s Eye point of view. (p. 49)
Putnam associated the externalist view with metaphysical realism, a view
which is explicated and defended by, for example, Bunge and Ardila
(1987).
Putnam (1981) presented a number of arguments against externalism.
One of his arguments was that the externalist adopts a correspondence
theory of truth, that is, the notion that our perceptions are true if
they correspond with what really exists externally to our perceptions.
The problem with this position is that no one knows what really exists
outside her/his mental representations.

Such knowledge requires that

the knower have access to both the mental representation and the real
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object.

Putnam refers to this as the God's Eye point of view, which of

course is impossible to attain.
Borrowing from Hume and Kant, Putnam (1981) pointed out that we do
not have access to objects, only to our sensations and perceptions of
objects.

Thus, to assume that our sensations/perceptions of objects are

the "things in themselves" is mistaken.

Our sensations/perceptions and

our mental representations are internal to us.

In order to decide

whether or not one's map or idea is the "true" representation of reality
would require one to have the God's Eye view, which is an impossibility.
In the history of any discipline there are a multitude of examples
wherein we can demonstrate numerous plausible representations or maps of
an object or phenomenon (Kuhn, 1970).

Intelligent human behavior is an

example from the school psychology discipline for which there are many
differing views (discussed in earlier chapters).

However, there is no

way that we can demonstrate or prove that one particular representation
is the correct one for all time.

In science one can offer hypotheses

and subject them to tests of verification.

However, the results of the

tests are also objects which, like other objects, are represented in
human thought.

These representations are subject to the same

limitations as all representations.

To assert that a particular

representation is the correct one is to also assert that one has a kind
of prior knowledge in which one can recognize a true representation when
one comes across it.

That is, one is asserting an isomorphism between

the representation and the object.

This implies the God's Eye point of

view in which one can separate from one's mental processes and from the
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external object and see the correct correspondence.

Such a view is

unsupportable.
All one can do is choose a similarity or map which is rationally
acceptable for the time being.

Rational acceptability is, according to

Putnam (1981), a function of the values of the community and what
members of the community are willing to accept as rational.

The

characteristics of a desirable system of rational procedure (which he
also listed as the desiderata for a moral system) are as follows:
• • • (1) the desire that one's basic assumptions, at least, should
have wide appeal; (2) the desire that one's system should be able
to withstand rational criticism; (3) the desire that the morality
recommended should be livable, (p. 105)
The wonderful products of the physical sciences— in contrast to the
behavioral and social sciences— cannot be denied.

Some thinkers,

though, have seriously questioned the connections between the "pure"
sciences and their products.

Feyerabend (1987), for example, argued

that the products of science are as much, and in many cases more, the
result of social processes which are outside the realm of the scientific
research endeavor.

Furthermore, the sociology of scientists appears to

be

such that many of the products of the physical sciences are unrelated

to

the metaphysical view of externalism (Feyerabend, 1987, pp. 25-39).
The metaphysical realism of Newtonian physics has also been

challenged by what is described as the most successful theory ever
produced in science (Davies & Brown, 1986), quantum theory.

Wheeler

(1981) described the theory and some of its implications as follows:
We used to think of the universe as "out there," to be observed as
it were from behind the screen of a foot-thick slab plate of glass,
safely, without personal involvement. The truth, quantum theory
tells us, is quite different. Even when we want to observe, not a
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galaxy, not a star, but something so miniscule as an electron, we
have, irt effect, to smash the glass, to reach in, and install
measuring equipment. Bohr's principle of complementarity,
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminism, and the lesson of
"phenomenon" tell us more. We can install a device to measure the
position, x, of the electron, or one to measure its momentum, p,
but we can't fit both registering devices into the same place at
the same time. Moreover, the act of registration has an
inescapable consequence for what we have the right to say about the
electron then and in the future. The observer is inescapably
promoted to participator. . . . In some strange sense, this is a
participatory universe, (pp. 17-18)
Oppenheimer (1956) criticized psychological science for continuing to
use the Newtonian analogy of science when physics had moved on beyond
the mechanistic paradigm.

Thus, the God's Eye view of metaphysical

realism was, and still is, a useful metaphor for classical physics.

As

the range of matter to be explained has increased, however, it has
become necessary to include information about the observer.

The

inclusion of such information has eroded the validity of the God's Eye
point of view.

As will be discussed below, the application of the God's

Eye view metaphor to psychology faces another major obstacle not usually
found in the science of physics, that of intentionality.
It has not been established directly how, as a group, school
psychologists view metaphysics, epistemology, and the nature of
objectivity.

Actually, very little mention of philosophical assumptions

can be found in the school psychology literature, with a few important
exceptions (Bass, 1987; Lauer, 1969; Phillips, 1987a, 1987b; Shinn,
1987) which will be discussed in more detail later.

However, the

position of most school psychologists can be inferred from statements
made in the school psychology literature about science (e.g., that the
purpose of science is to "describe reality" [Phillips, 1982, p. 25]).
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Skinner (1953) clearly believed that the "basic characteristics of
science are not restricted to any particular subject matter" (p. 11) and
that the consummate function of a science is to control that which it
studies.

In spite of changes in the paradigms of physical science,

control and prediction remain the standards for scientific knowledge for
physics and for other sciences which would emulate physics (Rychlak,
1981).

Rychlak very pointedly exposed the science of psychology as

being out of touch with the historical developments in physics:
This now leaves us with two rather interesting developments:
First, other considerations besides predictive efficiency may
determine the choice of one theoretical view over another at any
given time. Second, it is within the realm of possibility that
more than one view of the cosmos may function jointly and
efficiently at any point in time, or even for all time. Empirical
data may be amenable to diverse points of view. . . . Despite the
reasonableness of this conclusion, based upon the experiences of
our brother scientists, whom we were once only too pleased to
emulate, psychologists have disregarded the lessons of history and
persisted in patterning themselves after a nineteenth-century brand
of physics. The science of modern psychology is essentially
Newtonian, (p. 118)
Summary of Externalism
To summarize, the God's Eye view of reality, also known as
externalism, is unsupported because it requires the observer to become
free of her/his mental representations so as to compare them with the
"real" objects which are external to her/him.

The most basic of the

sciences, physics, now entertains the highly successful quantum theory
which acknowledges that the observer participates in bringing about the
effects which are perceived in an experiment.

Very basic notions of

experimental control in psychology reflect an outdated, mechanistic view
that the experimenter can be isolated from die world she/he studies.
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Accepting the criticisms of externalism, however, forces a criticism of
our views of objectivity, which is taken up next.
Objectivity
The evidence that school psychologists generally adhere to
scientism was presented earlier.

The basic tenets of scientism are

essentially the same as those of externalism in the sense that both
subscribe to the belief that external reality can be known through more
or less objective methods and that behavior can be described and
explained causally.

Objectivity, of course is understood to mean that

any influences of the observer on the phenomenon of interest can be
overcome, to varying degrees, by employing increasingly rigorous
experimental controls (Bunge & Ardila, 1987, pp. 77-78).

At least one

dictionary definition of objectivity described it as follows:

"Of or

having to do with a known or perceived object as distinguished from
something existing only in the mind of the subject, or person thinking"
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1960).

Bunge and Ardila spoke of, for

example, "good experimental designs [that] keep the observer at arm's
length, precisely in order to maximize objectivity" (p. 74).

They

defined a description as objective if it is an approximately true
statement of fact rather than of fiction (p. 34).

Such a statement, of

course, implies a prior knowledge of that which is true, or the God's
Eye view.
Feyerabend (1987) asserted that objectivity is older than science
and originated when different cultures came into contact, each of which
held its own views as lawful and correct.

He distinguished between

material objectivity, which is tradition-independent truths, and formal
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objectivity, meaning tradition-independent ways of finding truths.
However, Feyerabend pointed out, both notions of objectivity are
problematic because each is defined differently in various cultures.

In

the rise of science in the western world the scientific, or formal,
notion of objectivity has not been sustained.
As science advanced and produced a steadily increasing store of
information, formal notions of objectivity were used not only to
create knowledge, but also to legitimize, i.e. to show the
objective validity of, already existing bodies of information.
This led to further problems: there exists no finite set of
general rules that has substance (i.e. recommends or forbids some
well defined procedures) and is compatible with all the events
leading to the rise and progress of modern science. Formal
requirements defended by scientists and philosophers were found to
be in conflict with developments set in motion and supported by the
same group. To resolve the conflict the requirements were
gradually weakened until they disappeared into thin air. (p. 9)
Feyerabend went on to give examples of scientists who undermined the
boundary between subject and object yet advanced their science (e.g.,
Einstein's relativity theories).

He concluded " . . .

that the idea of

a science that proceeds by logically rigorous argumentation is nothing
but a dream" (p. 10).
What Feyerabend (1987) did was to show that conceptions of reality,
truth, objectivity, and science have changed and evolved and cannot be
understood outside their historical and cultural contexts.

These

concepts have served various purposes at different times, one of which
has been to defend the status quo and to defeat competing views.

Kuhn's

(1970) analysis of the history of science similarly proposed that
scientific thinking is governed by paradigms which serve a local (in
time and culture) purpose.

A paradigm influences what is of importance,

what is likely to be perceived, and what is evaluated as positive or
negative.

j_—

When the paradigm no longer meets the needs of the science, a

----------- ....

L*
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

78

crisis occurs and a revolutionary change in the paradigm is likely to be
imminent.
The notion of objectivity is an integral part of the attempts to
make psychology a science of the causal mechanics of behavior.

The

desire to make psychology more objective was what led J. B. Watson to
develop and advocate behaviorism (Baars, 1986, p. 45).

Two major

problems with the attempts in psychology to achieve objectivity have
been in (a) the quite restricted range of phenomena investigated, and
(b) the unimportance of variables to which experimental psychology has
been interested (Krathwohl, 1985, pp. 23-24).

Indeed, Michael Wapner

(1986), in an interview, interpreted Koch's (1959) volumes on the
accomplishments of the science of psychology as having shown the
enterprise is bankrupt and has trivialized the whole human experience.
More recently, Koch (1981) made similar pronouncements after further
study of the discipline of psychology.

He indicated his belief that

psychology was never successfully severed from philosophy and " . . .
that psychology is not a single or coherent discipline but rather a
collectivity of studies of varied cast, some few of which may qualify as
science, while most do not" (Koch, 1981, p. 268).

Koch also spolce of

the moral bankruptcy in psychology when a particular paradigm is
presented as the final preemption of human nature.

He also criticized

psychological research as being too narrowly fixated on methodology.
contrast, anthropologists and sociologists often use less objective
methods of inquiry and seek more holistic views at the risk of
subjective biases.
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Summary of Objectivity
Notions of objectivity in psychology are based upon the
insupportable God's Eye view of reality and have produced a large body
of research which has been judged by some to be trivial and bankrupt.
By admitting only observable behavior as data, experimental
psychologists have missed a significant aspect of what it is to be
human, that is, to interpret sentences, to build constructs, to have
purposes.

Ironically, this internal nature of the person has shown

through in rigorously controlled experiments (Bransford & Franks, 1971;
Bransford, 1979).
Facts and Values
If the arguments criticizing the externalist's (God's Eye) view and
those examining objectivity are coherent, then the assumed distinction
between facts and values must also be questioned.

Putnam (1981)

defended the notion that since our conception of what i£ cannot be
compared to an unconceptualized true reality, then our conception of
what is true results from what the community of scholars within a
discipline accept as rational at a particular time in the history of the
discipline.

The rational criteria accepted by the community, in turn,

is a reflection of the values of the community.

As the empirical world

is constructed within a discipline, the standards of rationality (and
the values underlying these standards) are altered.
From a long tradition of metaphysical realism and the God's Eye
view has developed a tendency to conceptualize realistic and subjective
as opposites.

Putnam (1981) said the following about this common

bipolar construct:
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But in fact, metaphysical realism and subjectivism are not simple
'opposites'. Today we tend to be too realistic about physics and
too subjectivistic about ethics, and these are connected
tendencies. It is because we are too realistic about physics,
because we see physics (or some hypothetical future physics) as the
One True Theory, and not simply as a rationally acceptable
description suited for certain problems and purposes, that we tend
to be subjectivistic about descriptions we cannot 'reduce' to
physics. Becoming less realistic about physics and becoming less
subjectivistic about ethics are likewise connected, (p. 143)
If facts tend to be of those kinds of things which can be reduced to
physical descriptions and values tend to be those which can not be so
reduced, and the metaphysical realist's God's Eye view is indefensible
concerning either material or non-material things, then talk about
values is not all that different from talk about facts.

Both can be

subjected to standards of rationality which have evolved in human
cultures.
MacIntyre (1984) traced the history of (and the breakdown of)
standards of rationality in ethics.

He noted that it was in the

transition from a classical philosophy of mankind to a mechanistic one
that facts and values became separated:
The notion of 'fact' with respect to human beings is thus
transformed in the transition from the Aristotelian to the
mechanist view. On the former view human action, because it is to
be explained teleologically, not only can, but must be,
characterized with reference to the hierarchy of goods which
provide the ends of human action. On the latter view human action
not only can, but must be, characterized without any reference to
such goods. On the former view the facts about human action
include the facts about what is valuable to human beings (and not
just the facts about what they think to be valuable); on the latter
view there are no facts about what is valuable.
'Fact' becomes
value-free, 'is' becomes a stranger to 'ought' and explanation, as
well as evaluation, changes its character as a result of this
divorce between 'is' and 'ought', (p. 84)
MacIntyre (1984) went on to argue that the application of a
mechanistic technology of humanity has been deceptive and self-deceptive

L ______
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(on the part of social scientists) because such a program has not
resulted in real achievement.

What it has produced is numerous

bureaucracies based upon the mechanistic program which claim value
neutrality and expertise.

The expertise is derived from the mechanistic

sciences of humanity and made up of a body of value free 'facts'.
But in every case the rise of managerial expertise would have to be
the same central theme, and such expertise, as we have already
seen, has two sides to it: there is the aspiration to value
neutrality and the claim to manipulative power. Both of these, we
can now perceive, derive from the history of the way in which the
realm of fact and the realm of value were distinguished by the
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. . . . And
the legitimation of the characteristic institutional forms of
twentieth-century social life depends upon a belief that some of
the central claims of that earlier philosophy have been vindicated,
(p. 87)
The central claims of which MacIntyre (1984) spoke, of course, were
those which established the sciences of humankind in the image of
Newtonian physics and which always hoped to be based upon law-like
generalizations which govern social behavior.

A very crucial question,

then, is have we been able to produce the law-like generalizations about
social behavior from which technical expertise can be claimed?

Does the

school psychologist have available to her/him laws of behavior from
which accurate predictions can be made and effective control of behavior
can be derived?
Summary of Facts and Values
If one accepts the argument thus far, that our conceptions of truth
are based upon what we can rationally agree is true, rather than what we
discover to be true, then truth is a function of our rational processes.
These processes, in turn, have evolved out of the values inherent in our
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histories and cultures.

Rationality, then, is equally applicable to

what we have falsely dichotomized into facts and values.
Laws of Behavior
MacIntyre (1984) argued that there are four kinds of systematic
unpredictability in human affairs which will always render
generalizations about human behavior subject to numerous counterfactuals.

The first kind of unpredictability stems from radical

conceptual innovations.

By their definition they cannot be predicted,

yet these innovations occur frequently.

The second kind of

unpredictability has to do with the inability to predict one’s own
future actions insofar as these depend upon future, unmade decisions.
Only an omniscient being does not need to make decisions because all is
known and decided ahead of time.

Human beings are not omniscient;

therefore, human beings must decide among alternatives and their future
decisions, and their subsequent behavior, can not be known ahead of
time.
MacIntyre's (1984) third source of unpredictability came from the
game theoretic nature of social life.

That is, people are often

Involved in transactions with others in which one person is trying to
maximize the predictability of the other while minimizing her/his own
predictability.

To further complicate matters, each person is engaged

in more than one complex game at a time.

As MacIntyre humorously put

it, "Not one game is being played, but several, and, if the game
metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that
moving one's knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across

[.
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

33

the net” (p. 98).

He concluded that the totality of determinate,

enumerable factors in a situation can not be known prospectively.
Compare this game theoretic nature of social life to the
observations of Kelly (1955) that psychologists frequently report that
their scientific aim is to predict and control human behavior.

What

many psychologists omit from their formulations, Kelly reminded, is that
their experimental subjects and their clients have similar aspirations.
Psychological perspectives on humankind too often depict the person as
some mindless entity endlessly seeking to gratify basic urges.

They

ignore the richness of human social interactions.
The fourth source of unpredictability in human social life
explicated by MacIntyre (1984) is that of pure contingency.

There are

simply too many elements which could have an influence upon the outcome
of some human endeavor.

MacIntyre cited the action of bacteria which

produced the cold which Napoleon had at the battle of Waterloo, which
caused the decision to send in the Guardd Imperiale two hours too late.
MacIntyre (1984) also admitted four kinds of predictable elements
in human life.

The first element is our tendency to structure

activities around regular schedules.

The second element includes the

numerous statistical regularities of human life, many of which are
independent of causal knowledge.

Third, there are the causal

regularities of nature which affect human decisions and behavior.
Fourth, MacIntyre admitted to some generalisations about human affairs
which do have more or less predictive power.

His example was of the

causal connection between social class and educational opportunities in
Britain and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

i
I_________
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Goodman (1983) examined the problem of defining a law as it is used
in the sciences and concluded that a law is a statement which has
reached a certain level of acceptance even though complete evidence of
its accuracy can never be obtained.

The problem with the inductive

process is that we cannot foresee the future at which time a
counterfactual may invalidate an induction.

But the same problem holds

for deduction.
I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their
conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are
justified by their conformity to valid inferences. But this circle
is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular
inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with
each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are
unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule
we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the
delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only
justification needed for either. . . . All this applies equally
well to induction. An inductive inference, too, is justified by
conformity to accepted inductive inferences, (p. 64)
The processes by which we construct scientific (or other) knowledge are
not governed by axiomatic rules but by judgments and standards which
have evolved linguistically in our particular culture.

In the natural

sciences of physics and chemistry these process.es have yielded
scientific knowledge from which emanates very powerful predictive and
manipulative capabilities.

The behavioral and social sciences, in

contrast, have failed to produce the judgments, standards, or linguistic
practices which seem necessary for predictive and manipulative power.
After examining a number of the pros and cons of the covering law
model, Robinson (1985) concluded that it leaves something to be desired
as a source of explanations.
not been forthcoming.

However, other, more desirable models have

One of the unfortunate consequences of the

L
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covering law model is that the social sciences, including psychology,
can not claim any reliable covering laws from which accurate predictions
can be made.

The best psychologists can offer are what Robinson refers

to as explanation sketches, which are of a functional or teleological
nature.
Iverson (1986) found the basic assumptions of the deterministic and
value-oriented models incompatible.

Determinism assumes an

unsupportable God's Eye view of the person and ignores intentionality.
While the value-oriented model acknowledges human intentionality, such a
view conflicts with deterministic notions of objectivity.

As Putnam

(1981) hinted, until school psychologists become less realistic about
psychometrics and less subjectivistic about values their practices will
continue to be contradictory.
Summary of Laws of Behavior
In summary, the covering law model has not worked well in
psychology because no relatively exceptionless laws of behavior have yet
been formulated.

Human behavior has not yielded to the predictability

hoped for by those who have sought to pattern psychology in the image of
the natural sciences.

Without laws of behavior from which accurate

predictions of human behavior can be made, the image of the school
psychologist (and others) as expert is in error.
Theories of the Person
In addition to the philosophical problems which are at the
foundation of psychological science there are also deficiencies in the
theoretical views of the person which have dominated experimental
psychology.

F

While there are a number of very rich psychodynamic
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personality theories which are often adopted by school and other applied
psychologists, the view of the person which has emerged from
experimental psychology has been quite narrow and incomplete since the
behaviorists revolted from the introspectionists.

The three

metatheories which have dominated experimental psychology have been
introspectionism, behaviorism, and cognitivisim (Baars, 1986).

The

major figure in nineteenth century introspectionism was Wilhelm Wundt.
It was his version of introspectionism, and Titchener's systematic self
observation, against which the behaviorists revolted (Baars, p. 6).

The

resultant image of humankind which dominated most of experimental
psychology has been quite sterile.
As has been alluded to earlier, the behavioristic model of the
person has influenced the thinking of school psychologists, who are
usually trained as scientist-practitioners, a training model which
continues to be recommended (Martens & Keller, 1987; Schover, 1980).
One major problem with the behavioristic view of the person is that it
focuses only on one of the three traditional (Huxley, 1945) aspects of
the person, the body, while excluding mind and spirit.

Earlier, a quote

from B. F. Skinner (from Evans, 1968, p. 7) revealed his program for
making psychology a part of the science of biology.

Skinner (1953)

objected to inferred "inner states," such as mind and spirit, not
because they do not exist, but because they are not relevant in a
functional analysis.

Keschly's (1988) call for reduced levels of

inference and the use of behavioral assessments and interventions is an
example of a similar attitude in school psychology.

F
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Heshusius (1982, 1989a) found similar missing features of the
person in the models implicit in special education institutions.

The

mechanistic view of humankind has guided not only science but has
provided a cultural worldview which influences our thinking, perceiving,
and acting.

Special education, Heshusius argued, has been shaped by

this worldview.

Evidence of such a worldview is easily seen in the

"rules, regulations, objectives, measurements, prediction, and control—
external, quantifiable child behaviors" (1982, p. 7) which are an
integral part of special education.

This view was adopted from the

Newtonian, mechanistic view of the universe, which produced in the
social and behavioral sciences a view of the person as reactive/passive
and governed by stimulus control.

In this view accountability is a

realistic goal and the diagnostic-prescriptive model of remedial
teaching is pervasive.

The mechanistic view resulted in a closed-system

theory of the person, a conviction which is not supported in the face of
the inability of the social and behavioral sciences to formulate any
covering laws free from major counterfactuals.
Harre (1984) was more explicit in his criticism of both the
experimental (behavioristic) psychology conception of the person and
that of the more recent cognitive movement:
Two images of human psychology compete for our attention. Academic
psychologists, particularly those who work in the 'experimental'
tradition, make the implicit assumption that men, women and
children are high-grade automata, the patterns of whose behavior
are thought to obey something very like natural laws. Quite
recently, thoughts and feelings have been reincorporated into the
general ontology of psychology, but much of the subsequent work in
cognitive psychology has preserved the automaton conception. It is
assumed that there are programs which control action and the task
of psychology is to discover the 'mechanisms' by which they are
implemented. Lay folk, clinical [and school] psychologists,
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lawyers, historians and all of those who have to deal in a
practical way with human beings tend to think of people as agents
struggling to maintain some sort of reasoned order in their lives
against a background flux of emotions, inadequate information and
the ever-present tides of social pressures.
I shall try to show that the great differences that mark off
these ways of thinking about human psychology are not ultimately
grounded in a reasoned weighing of the evidence available to any
student of human affairs. They turn in the end on unexamined
political and moral assumptions that show up in the choice of
rhetoric, in morally and politically loaded ways of speaking and,
more particularly, of writing. Although these profoundly different
ways of interpreting and explaining human thought and action have
their origin in preferred linguistic forms rather than any
compelling facts of the matter, they do have profoundly different
practical consequences. They carry with them very distinctive
stances as to the moral, political and clinical problems with which
modern people are beset, (p. 4)
This quote sums up the problems faced by school psychologists who are
trained in the scientist-practitioner model, including its mechanistic
view of the person, and their subsequent experiences in the world of
persons who do not normally behave as automatons.

The mechanistic

worldview which has prevailed in most of experimental psychology has, at
best, been of little practical use.

At its worst, such a worldview has

impeded the school psychologist in understanding and helping clients.
School psychologists and other applied psychologists who come from a
tradition of the scientist-practitioner model frequently think about
their clients with mixed metaphors.

Harrd provided an analysis of an

example of a research article entitled, "Self Focus, Felt
Responsibility, and Helping Behavior" (Duval, Duval, & Knealey, 1979),
in which the mechanistic view of the human is imposed upon the moral
agent view.

Such unexamined metaphysical and moral/political

presuppositions are problematic throughout experimental psychology and,
it is hypothesized, are responsible for much of the confusion in and

i-
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inadequacies of school psychology.

We simultaneously treat students as

automatons and as moral agents, two incompatible approaches.
In the literature on experimental psychology much has been written
about the operant technique of "shaping" behavior.

Skinner (1953, 1971)

has been the most outspoken advocate of the use of operant conditioning
to improve the lot of mankind.

By reinforcing successive approximations

of a behavior the experimenter can usually "bring a rare response to a
very high probability in a short time" (Skinner, 1953, p. 92).

In such

an experiment, however, the mechanistic view of the subject of the
experiment must be contrasted with the purposive behavior of the
experimenter or shaper of the behavior.

Thus, even in the rather

isolated conditions of the laboratory one may not be able to escape the
contamination of the mechanistic metaphor with that of the teleological
(Hallberg, 1975).

Here we may note Skinner's (1971) remark that

behavior modification (the technology of behavioristic theory) tends to
be used mostly on the relatively powerless members of the community, and
that when behaviorally oriented therapists have psychological problems
they tend to seek out therapists who incorporate intentionality into
their theoretical views (Lazarus, 1971; Norcross & Prochaska, 1984;
Watkins, Campbell, Lopez, & llimmell, 1987; Wynne, 1988).
Summary of Theoretical Reasons
To summarize the reasons submitted to this point for the failures
of school psychology and the science on which it is founded, the
viewpoint of metaphysical realism, or the God's Eye view, which is so
prevalent in psychology, is unsupportable.

This viewpoint has, in turn,

been the supporting assumption for a notion of objectivity which cannot
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be defended.

Not surprising then is the continual discovery of new

threats to the validity of psychological experiments (e.g., Borg & Gall,
1983; Krathwohl, 1987; Orne, 1969; Westland, 1978).

Another reason for

the failure of school psychologists, and other applied psychologists, to
live up to their claim of expertise is the failure of the science of
psychology to discover any covering laws from which accurate predictions
of human behavior can be made.

If psychologists are better than non

psychologists at predicting and controlling behavior, and there is
little or no evidence that they are, then this accuracy must be the
result of factors which are not explained by the science of psychology.
It has also been shown that the model of the person implicit in
twentieth century experimental psychology has been that of a passive,
reactive, automata.

This mechanistic model of mankind has been

competing with less influential psychological models and common-sense or
folk models of the human being as goal oriented and purposeful.

.School

psychologists, with little or no discussion of the issue of an
appropriate model of the person, have vacillated between these views.
The results have been a neglect of the purposive nature of human
behavior in much psychological research and in many of the applied
practices of school psychologists.

It is unlikely that school

psychologists will ever succeed in serving their clients by thinking of
them as automata.

But the tremendous desire to be scientific has led

many in the discipline of psychology to make the error of pervasively
applying the mechanistic model to humankind.
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Practical Reasons
The next set of reasons for the failures of school psychology are
those which appear to be the result of wrong turns made in the
development of the profession.

These paths have led to dead ends in the

psychologist's attempts to help children think, feel, and act better in
school.

These unproductive aspects of practice include semantic

problems, failed diagnostic categories, research application problems,
and measurement problems.
Semantic Problems
School psychologists typically use and proliferate various
psychological and educational concepts which may be responsible for
practice failures.

Twenty years ago Lauer (1969) wrote about the

tremendous expansion of school psychology services and the concomitant
problem of an appropriate model of practice.

At that time she

recognized several approaches to school psychology which were aligned
with the various divisions within the parent discipline of psychology,
experimental, behavioristic, social, and developmental.

She pointed out

the need for school psychologists to make choices in line with modern
science while reflecting the values inherent in the liberal social
tradition.

She discussed the problem in the school psychology

profession of the tendency to reify constructs:
Concepts such as problem, neurosis, disability, and retardation
probably were created so that we could talk about certain
observable behavioral processes. But like many category words they
have come to be accepted as if they referred to some "thing" which
a person could "have." (p. 244)
Advocating for a general semantics (Go) orientation she urged school
psychologists to look not for an entity or "thing" for which a child is
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referred, rather they should examine relations among entities and look
for distress among these relations.
Lauer (1969) further urged school psychologists to consider that it
is not just the child's behavior which prompts a teacher to make a
referral.

Rather, the teacher's decision to refer is also affected by a

number of complex factors including " . . .

her [sic] coping power, the

circumstances under which she is trying to teach, her own value system,
or her prediction about what kind of a problem would gain the attention
and service of the psychologist" (p. 246).

By focusing upon the

disharmonies among relationships, the psychologist, Lauer argued, is
more likely to generate plans and interventions for that which is most
amenable.

She implied that our current system of trying to remediate

highly abstract, reified "things" is unlikely to be successful, a
prediction which (in Chapter 2 it was argued) was accurate.
Lauer (1969) pointed out that school psychologists have come to use
nouns to describe arbitrary degrees of deviance, a practice which has
led us to talk about these deviations as though they were naturally
occurring phenomena.

That which we label abnormal is not inherent in

nature but the product of a social process which varies greatly from
place-to-place and group-to-group.

Lauer proposed the following general

semantics solution to this problem:
As an alternative, the GS-trained psychologist might consider
helping the school to concentrate upon those judgments which .limit
the range of what is considered normal. By helping the in-groups
gain greater capacity for including and caring for an ever-widening
range of human variability, we can cease supporting a social system
which solves its problems by segregating its own casualties and
begin to create a society which solves its problems by preventing
them or coping with them. (p. 249)

L
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Our thinking about problems needs to be examined from the GS point
of view, Lauer (1969) argued.

Problems can be solved only

metaphorically because (a) problems do not exist as "things,” (b)
solutions do not exist as "things,” and (c) that which is perceived as a
solution by one person may be seen as an injustice by another.

The GS

point of view is that problems are disharmonies in ongoing
relationships.
If the psychologist hopes to instigate changes which others will
evaluate as "solutions," it behooves him [sic] to become wellacquainted with what those others would regard as salutary changes.
If he writes recommendations on a psychological report without
first involving his clients in the solution-making process, he may
find his best clinical judgment to be unappreciated, (p. 251)
Lauer (1969) also saw the removal of a "problem" child for
counseling or special education services as an approach which denies the
teacher and the class their share of the responsibility for coping with
the problem.

This tradition of segregation promotes and sustains the

belief that " . . .

behavior can be viewed as independent of a system of

human interrelatedness and that it can be dealt with independently” (pp.
252-253).

Such a practice in the public schools prevents self-

examination and change, while promoting defensiveness, denial, coercion,
and/or segregation.

When school psychologists "take on" the problems of

the school they may be missing an opportunity to educate school
personnel about participant observation and self-evaluation.
Diagnostic Categories
Reschly, Genshaft, and Binder (1987) found that school
psychologists typically spend about two-thirds of their time providing
services for classifying and segregating handicapped students.
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Dissatisfaction with segregated special education programs, has brought
forth a revolution in the provision of services for special education
students which Reschly (1988) believed will necessitate either a change
in or a “substantial reduction in school psychological services” (p.
460).

He pointed out that it is the system of classification and

services for mildly handicapped students which has failed, a system with
which most school psychologists are intimately involved.
Reschly (1988) noted, as did Lauer (1969), that the classifications
made by school psychologists are restricted to matters of degree along a
continuum.
. . . classification criteria will always and inevitably involve
arbitrary, artificial distinctions at the margins. There will
never be, and indeed cannot be, clear distinctions of kind (e.g.,
handicapped vs. non-handicapped, SLD vs. low achiever, EMR vs. slow
learner) when the critical dimensions are broad continua with fine
graduations of competence, (p. 462)
Reschly addressed many of the issues raised in Chapter 2 of this paper.
He concluded that the training received by school psychologists and the
instruments used in school psychology have little relation to effective
intervention strategies.

Reschly argued for an approach which evaluates

the effectiveness of school psychology assessments according to the
success of the interventions produced therefrom.

He failed to specify,

however, just how success is to be defined and who will decide when
success has been achieved.

Success is defined differently by

psychologists of different theoretical orientations (Rychlak, 1981, pp.
189-191).
Reschly (1988) clearly believed that a behavioristic model of the
person will prove to be the most successful (again, without defining
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success).

In the future, he predicted, assessments with reduced levels

of inference will have the best chance of yielding effective
interventions.

He advocated for precise behavioral counts which can be

used as a baseline for estimating the effectiveness of the
interventions.

Furthermore, he strongly recommended the use of " . . .

the powerful behavioral technology and the increasingly rich knowledge
base of interventions for learning and behavioral problems . . . "
470).

(p.

He failed, however, to reference these remarks about the power of

behavior technology, thus, implying that this technological power is a
well accepted fact about which there is little or no debate.
Behavior modification programs have demonstrated considerable
success while the programs are in effect; however, there has been very
little documentation of the comparative effectiveness of these programs
once they are terminated (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt, 1984).

The

latest research agenda in behavior modification, then, concerns the
maintenance and generalization of effects, and the acceptability of the
intervention by those who must implement it (ilartens & Meller, 1990).
Until the research supports the maintenance and generalization of
behavioral changes once the program has been terminated, school
psychologists are not ethically bound to select behavioral techniques
over other competing techniques in helping a client change a behavior.
Application of Research
The next practical problem in school psychology has to do with the
application of scientific finding in school psychology.

Having made the

claim that they are scientist-practitioners raises the expectation that
one will witness technology in action, the application of the laws of
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psychology to persons in the school.

Before the technology can be

applied, however, long-lasting generalizations in basic psychological
and educational research must be found, a state of affairs which has not
been realized (Phillips, 1980).
Even if one believes that the behavioristic project has produced
useful generalizations, the complexities of application are apparent.
The difficulties of implementing behavior modification programs in the
schools was discussed by Rosenfield (1981) who concluded that "there is
no question that implementing a behavioral program involves changing not
only the child's behavior but that of the teacher as well" (p. 425).
Nowhere in Rosenfield's chapter did she discuss the ethical question of
whether or not the psychologist should secure permission before changing
the teacher's behavior.

Reschly's (1988) apparent assumptions about the

richness and power of behavioral technology, therefore, assert (among
behaviorists) a conmon-sense fact, not necessarily a scientific one, and
he assumes both a scientific and an ethical consensus among
psychologists which in all likelihood does not exist.
Phillips (1987a, 1987b) recently began a long overdue discussion of
the relationship of the philosophy of science to the practice of school
psychology.

He conjectured that very little research in school

psychology is conducted by practitioners.

Shinn (1987) verified

Phillips' hypothesis, having found that practitioners seldom publish
research in the school psychology journals and they spend relatively
little time on research activities.

Phillips (1987a) further surmised

that the practical application of research results in school psychology
is "indeterminate" and "unpredictable" (p. 226), and not well understood
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(1987b).

Phillips (1987b) elaborated on the practitioner's dilemma as

follows:
The predicament of the practitioner also needs to be taken into
account. In the day-to-day variations of practice, the problem for
the practitioner is to make good use of science in the swampy
lowland where practice is perplexing and messy, and where many of
the most challenging practice issues are, as well as on the high,
hard ground where science can be more readily applied, (p. 245)
Unfortunately, Phillips (1987b) and Shinn (1987) failed to explicate in
their discussion just where this "high, hard ground" is in the practice
of school psychology "where science can be more readily applied"
(Phillips, 1987b, p. 245).

Their failure to recognize or acknowledge

the weaknesses in the scientific foundations of the practice of school
psychology is unfortunate.

Their opening of a dialogue about

philosophical issues, however, is a refreshing and welcome advent.
Measurement Problems
It has been frequently pointed out in this paper that school
psychologists devote much of their time to the administration and
interpretation of tests.

The purpose of these assessment devices is to

provide some relevant information about the child of interest.

Sy

definition, standardized, norm-referenced tests are those which have
standardized procedures and which have been administered to
representative samples of the population relevant to the purposes of the
test (Anastasi, 1976).

What a particular test score tells us is where

in the array of the reference groups' scores it falls.

Thus, this time-

honored, nomothetic approach of administering tests is based upon the
notion that we can learn something important about the individual by
comparing her/his score with that of a similar group of persons.
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underlying assumption is that reliability and validity coefficients
based upon group, aggregate data provide an appropriate way of inferring
the degree of consistency with which an individual will demonstrate the
trait measured by the test (Lamiell, 1982).
Lamiell (1982, 1987) challenged the assumption that the stability
of an individual’s scores can be based upon group data.

He argued (as

did Mischel, 1969, before him) that the foundation of personality
psychology, the perception of the relatively stable and continuous
behavior of individuals, has not been supported by the vast empirical
literature.

The argument Lamiell made which is relevant to school

psychologists is that the basic framework, the nomothetic or individual
differences approach, has restrained our understanding of the individual
person within the ecological context.

The nomothetic approach to

personality study only tells us something about the individual's
relative standing.

Changes in the standing over time are not

necessarily due to changes in the individual, rather the individual's
score may change over time because of variations in the array of scores.
We are not measuring the person, instead we are_measuring the gaps
between persons.

Thus, Lamiell (1982) made the following remarks about

the dominant empirical strategies in the field of personality research:
All of those strategies result in attempts to treat as a
statistical problem what is actually a problem of measurement.
Given the aggregate statistical indices generated within those
strategies, it is for all intents and purposes, never possible to
infer how consistent or inconsistent any one individual has been in
her/his manifestation of any one attribute over time or across
situations, (p. 52)
If the problem of assessing personality is viewed as one of measurement
rather than statistics, then it should be possible to describe
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personality at the level of the individual and also address issues of
personality development.
An attempt has been made here to point out that weaknesses in
personality measurement approaches have made it quite difficult for the
school psychologist to make strong hypotheses about a child's
personality based upon test scores.

The stability of the child's traits

across time and situations is not amenable to assessment with
standardized instruments because these measuring devices indicate trait
stability relative only to scores of other children.

Thus, the

variability actually observed in the classroom or home may not be the
same as the variability found on the child's relative standing
test.

on a

The study of a child's personality is not well served by

comparing her/his score to those of others.

Rather, as Lamiell (1982)

stated "personality is a phenomenon based ultimately in accumulated
information about an individual's actions, interpreted or rendered
meaningful within a context provided by the perception and construal of
t

that individual's alternative possibilities for action" (p. 53).
Summary of Practical Reasons
To summarize, some of the practical problems which may account for
the relative lack of success in the explicit goals of school psychology
practice, first was noted the semantic problems which reflect a tendency
to reify our constructs.

By making our constructs into "things" we have

briefly enjoyed the delusion that we were practicing deterministic
science.

Second, it was found that dissatisfaction in the educational

community with special programming has exposed the rather arbitrary
selection of diagnostic categories used by school psychologists.

L_
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reason for creating school psychology, the diagnosis and placement of
special students, is now threatened with elimination.

Again, our

tendency to create "things" and subject them to scientific analysis
modeled after the physical sciences has failed us.
A third problem examined was the discovery that much of school
psychology practice has not been touched by the science of psychology.
In spite of the advocacy for scientific training in school psychology
programs, little is known about how scientific is the day-to-day
practice.

The complexities of practice have rendered it an unexplored,

"swampy lowland.”

The conceptual problem is that we have imagined the

practice of school psychology to be founded upon firm principles of
deterministic science.
scenario.

There is little support for this imagined

It does not seem to have occurred to school psychologists

that the difficulties in translating scientific findings into practice
may be related to the mechanistic model of human beings which emanates
from most branches of our science.

The science of psychology lures us

into the mechanistic model, but the applications of this science are
thoroughly resisted by the purposive, moral agents we find outside the
laboratory.
The final practical problem in school psychology examined was the
problem of nomothetic, individual differences research upon which many
of our measuring instruments are founded.

The basic problem here is

that we are not measuring aspects of the individual, rather we are
measuring the gaps between individuals.
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CHAPTER 4
A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
A review of the basic arguments regarding the practice of school
psychology may help to provide a rationale for a revised set of concepts
by which the profession may be guided.

The essential arguments include

the following:
1.

In Chapter 1 a review of the history of school psychology found

that it was invented to identify students who, it was believed, could
not profit from the regular education program.

A more or less implicit

goal in the segregation of deviant students was to remediate their
problems so that they could be returned to the regular education fold,
or, if their problems were irremediable, to provide an alternative
educational program.
2.

It was argued in Chapter 2 that the school psychology

discipline has been unable to justify the use of most of its diagnostic
categories and the profession has not shown that the primary remedial
programs, those of special education, have accomplished their intended
purposes.
3.

Chapter 3 attempted to explain that school psychologists, like

most psychologists, have made a commitment to the science of psychology,
yet this science has been unable to produce any covering laws from which
accurate predictions of human behavior can be made.
If, as it has been argued above, school psychology has not achieved
its goals, then perhaps there is something wrong with the goals of the
profession, or the strong commitment to scientific psychology has not
been fruitful, or both problems have contributed to the school

K
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psychology crisis.

This author believes that both the goals of school

psychology and the conception of science which predominates in
experimental psychology are at fault, and both are due for revision.
What follows in this section is a collection of concepts which can
serve to guide the practice of school psychology.

The first seven

concepts provide a philosophical foundation upon which school psychology
practice may be based.

The remaining five concepts are more specific to

an alternative practice of school psychology when the preceding
foundational concepts have been adopted.
Basic Assumptions in the Practice of School Psychology
That school psychologists seem relatively unconcerned about the
assumptions which undergird their practice has already been addressed in
this paper.

It was proposed that many of the failures in the practices

of school psychologists can be traced to unexamined philosophical
beliefs.

In an effort to correct this conceptual deficit, very basic

ideas which support a renewed approach to school psychology practice are
offered in this section.
1.

A foundational concept in the renewed practice of school

psychology is that existence is an undivided whole.

Bohm (1980)

elaborated on the notion that Western culture has a deeply imbued
reductionistic bias which produces a fragmentary world view.

He saw in

modern physical theory a new focus upon wholeness:
So, in approaching the question in different ways, relativity and
quantum theory agree, in that they both imply the need to loolc on
the world as an undivided whole, in which all parts of the
universe, including the observer and his [sic] instruments, merge
and unite in one totality. In this totality, the atomistic form of
insight is a simplification and an abstraction, valid, only in some
limited context, (p. 11)
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The science of psychology, while trying to emulate physics, lags
far behind as it continues to segregate subject from object (Riegel,
1979).

The consequence of this segregation is that psychology looks at

the static rather than the dynamic qualities of the person.

In school

psychology we need to emphasize the complex, ever-changing connections
among the things in which we are interested.

Analysis serves, at best,

only a temporary, local purpose but can never tell us precisely how
things are related.

When we focus upon the particular parts we are

unable to gain insight into the whole (Bohm, 1980, p. 25).

All

meaningful integrations, including those of science, require that the
subsidiaries (the particulars) be organized into the focal (the whole)
by a person (a mind) who performs the integration (Polanyi & Prosch,
1975, pp. 63-64).

However, it is the perceptual act of organizing and

not the focusing on particulars which results in what Polanyi and Prosch
(1975) have termed tacit knowledge.

Such knowledge requires an active

mind which focuses upon the gestalt, not the individual parts; attending
only to the parts causes the whole, or the meaning, to be lost.

It is

by immersing ourselves in a local setting, by organizing the parts to
form a meaningful whole that we can hope to offer a point of view which
will be useful to our clients.

We need, as Lauer (1969) suggested, to

view the child as part of dynamic systems and we cannot adequately
understand the child apart from those systems.
2.

This model of school psychology practice accepts that knowledge

is constructed through the dialectical process.

Constructionism, a term

denoting an active mind which builds more than discovers knowledge, may
be thought of as a way in which the person organizes her/his world
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(Glasersfeld, 1984).

In this paper, the definition of the act of

construing follows that of Kelly (1955):
By construing we mean "placing an interpretation": a person places
an interpretation upon what is construed. He [sic] erects a
structure, within the framework of which the substance takes shape
or assumes meaning. The substance which he construes does not
produce the structure; the person does. (p. 50)
Experience is organized by the person, and, if this organization
serves its purpose it is maintained.

If a construct does not hold up or

serve its purpose it might eventually be altered.

Glasersfeld (1984)

pointed out that in the metaphor of evolution the "real" world does not
directly enhance the survival of the fittest, it eliminates those
organisms which are unfit.

He believed that the so called "real" world

also sets the limits of our mental constructions by eliminating those
which do not fit (Glasersfeld, 1984).

In Kelly's (1955) theory, the

limits or boundaries of a construct represents its range of convenience.
The usefulness of a construction, however, does not logically tell one
how the world is in terms of a correspondence between the construct and
the "real" world.

Putnam (1981) reminded us of the futility of the

correspondence view of knowledge and emphasized constructionism in
science:
If the notion of comparing our system of beliefs with
unconceptualized reality to see if they match makes no sense, then
the claim that science seeks to discover the truth can mean no more
than that science seeks to construct a world picture which, in the
ideal limit, satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability,
(p. 130)
Piaget (1962) offered a constructivist theory of intellectual
development.

Intelligence develops, he believed, through a process in

which the child interacts with the environment to construct internal
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operational structures.

Riegel (1979) presented a developmental theory

which is also constructivist in nature, but which, in contrast to Piaget
(1962), placed more emphasis on the disequilibrium experienced by the
person as a result of crises in a number of possible dimensions.

The

most significant changes come about, Riegel thought, as the result of
asynchronies in individual-psychological and cultural-sociological
developments.

The person continuously changes as part of a dialectical

process of interaction with the environment.

Harr£ (1984) noted the

language games typically played between mothers and infants, a
dialectical process which may be important in the child's development of
a theory of the self.

Mead (1934) believed that the process of dialogue

makes thought a social possibility (Kohlberg & Wertsch, 1987).

He

viewed the presentation of conflicting points of view and their
synthesis through dialogue as the underlying process from which
knowledge is constructed.

Mead also saw the internalization of the

dialogue, in the form of inner speech, as an important aspect of
cognitive development in children, especially in the construction of a
sense of self.
Another psychological theory which explicitly subscribed to the
constructivist assumption was that of Kelly (1955).

He used the

philosophy of constructive alternativism as the basis for his theory of
personal constructs.

Kelly's philosophy took the long range view of

humankind, the view across the centuries rather than the decades.

His

philosophy was based on the assumption that the person is already in
pursuit of goals or purposes and that no explanation of this movement
was necessary.

He believed that people view the world through

i.
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transparent patterns or templates in their attempt to anticipate events.
Kelly defined constructs as the patterns or templates with which people
try to make sense of the world.

Constructive alternativism emphasized

that there are always different ways of construing an event and that, in
the absence of a unifying system of constructs, events can be profitably
and simultaneously construed from multiple construct systems.
Although absolutely objective knowledge appears to be out of reach,
a quasi-objectivity may be attainable as a result of the dialectical
process of constructing knowledge.

A long history of criticism and

response to criticism imbues most forms of organized bodies of knowledge
and leads to a reduction in uncertainty (Cronbach, 1982; Krathwohl,
1987).

Although the truth which is sought after must ever remain

elusive, the social dialectical process of knowledge construction
provides us with a scaffolding upon which we can raise ourselves.

In

school psychology, then, knowledge of the child ought to emanate from
the social dialectic among those who have experienced and developed a
personal knowledge of her/him, namely, parents, teachers, and others.
Each one of us, then, constructs our own personal knowledge of the
universe.

Polanyi (1962) argued convincingly that all knowledge is

based upon mental operations (assumptions, intuitions, insights, etc.)
which are not and cannot be formalized.

"The relation of a subsidiary

to a focus is formed by the act of a person who integrates one to
another" (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 38).

All knowledge carries with

it, he argued, an element of conviction on the part of the knower.

This

conviction emerges as an assertion about the knowledge or the
assumptions upon which the knowledge is founded.

All knowledge is, from
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this perspective, personal and cannot successfully be separated from the
knower.

Except where specified in this paper, personal knowledge refers

to any of the constructions created by a person.

Personal knowledge may

occasionally be analyzed into constructs, thoughts, beliefs, myths, or
theories, depending upon the purpose of the analysis.

Ultimately,

however, such analyses are best thought of as parts of a larger whole—
the person— which is, in turn, a dynamic part of a larger whole.
3.

An additional concept important in the practice of school

psychology is the recognition that social knowledge is a function of
social consensus.

"Knowledge reaches out beyond the individual case,

beyond the subjective meaning of some limited fact pattern, and
interlaces with the meanings of an ever-broadening community" (Rychlak,
1981, p. 92).

Just as a construction of the natural or the social world

is subject to the limitations imposed by what we regard as "reality,"
there are also constraints in knowledge construction implied by the
"criteria of rational acceptability" spoken of by Putnam (1981, p. 130).
This idea was further developed by Krathwohl (1987) who declared that
all knowledge is the product of social consensus.

He distinguished

scientific knowledge from other kinds of knowledge in three important
ways:
1.

2.
3.

The consensus in these instances is formed around the
interpretation of evidence. (You no doubt recall from your
history books that one of the characteristics of the
Renaissance— as well as a foundation of science— was dependence
on carefully gathered evidence, in contrast to the prevalent
prior practice of sitting around thinking about a subject.)
The consensus is developed within rules or norms intended to
prevent an arbitrary and unwarranted consensus from developing.
The evidence around which the consensus is developed must meet
certain criteria, (p. 14)
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That which is judged to be arbitrary or unwarranted is the result of
social forces as well as the limitations imposed by reality.
Sometimes a consensus must be formed among a group of people who
have a broad range of constructs, as for example in the school staffing.
Typically such a meeting involves teachers, parents, an administrator, a
special education consultant (former teacher), a school psychologist,
and sometimes other support personnel.

The parents often do not share

the educators' concepts and vocabulary, while the psychologist, or other
support persons, may use several theoretical systems quite different
from the teachers.

The principal may have goals for the child which

differ from those of the parents and teachers.

To further complicate

matters, each staffing participant may view the student of concern very
differently.

At least one description of the staffing process (Law,

1981) has presented it as an authoritarian imposition of preconceived
decisions, rather than a consensual process.

The complexities of

finding commonalities among the various construct systems in the
staffing makes authoritarian procedures understandable, but not
excusable.

Actually, the staffing process has the potential to provide

those who are involved a way to find a common ground and to participate
in constructing a consensus about the student, her/his problems, and
some potential solutions.

The school psychologist has an excellent

opportunity to serve as the leader in the formation of such a consensus.
By viewing psychological data as forming the basis for a number of
hypotheses, the psychologist can ask those who know the child best, the
parents and teachers, to verify (or nullify) each of these hypotheses.
This process of validation can function to create a consensually
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validated theory of the student.

It can be argued that the emergent

theory of the student provides a more objective view than any of the
individual, pre-staffing theories taken alone.

The staffing process can

provide the opportunity to reduce some uncertainties about the student.
In keeping with the idea that what counts as knowledge is a
function of social consensus, the school psychologist's views about
students, their abilities and disabilities, appropriate programs and
remedial procedures, is best seen as one particular point of view which
must compete with other points of view.

In Chapter 3 it was argued that

psychology has not achieved the status of the physical sciences in that
it has no accepted covering laws from which accurate predictions of
behavior can be made.

The psychological knowledge which we possess has,

at best, been able to rule out certain kinds of knowledge as false;
however, positive, relatively exceptionless, laws of behavior have not
been forthcoming.

Therefore, school psychologists and others in the

staffing process can claim, at best, to have knowledge which has only
weak authority.

For example, when a school psychologist offers an

explanation of a child's behavior there are no grounds for claiming that
this interpretation is the absolute truth.

Only when this explanation

meets the formal and informal criteria of legitimacy held by the social
group (e.g., staffing or conference participants) can one declare it to
be knowledge.

It is possible, of course, that the group consensus may

be such that explanations provided by the psychologist are taken to be
infallible.

Such naivete, however, is best discouraged from the outset

by the school psychologist who is aware of the .limitations of
psychological knowledge.

f.
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Some might argue that the part of school psychology which is based
upon mathematical models deserves the status and authority of scientific
knowledge.

However, it had better be remembered that a mathematical

prediction does not predict behavior, rather it predicts other numbers
which are, of course, based upon a measurement operation.
for example, is used to predict an achievement score.

An IQ score,

But the

correlations between these two measurements are never perfect, and the
errors associated with the measurement operations can be predicted by no
rule (see Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 30, for a similar discussion of the
limits of mathematical predictions based upon Newtonian mechanics).
Thus, psychometric theory does not tell us the meaning of any deviations
from the expected correlation.

In a staffing, then, psychometric theory

does not provide the psychologist with knowledge from which an
authoritative explanation of a student's underachievement can be made.
The prudent psychologist would also do well to remember that
intelligence and achievement tests were originally validated by
teachers' judgments (Gresham, Reschly, & Carey, 1987).
4.

Personal knowledge, that is a person's thoughts, beliefs,

constructs, theories, myths, or other internal cognitive and evaluative
operations, exerts a major influence on that person's behavior.

This

concept has been defended by a number of writers (e.g., Baars, 1986;
Beck & Emery, 1985; Ellis, 1962; Kelly, 1955; Mahoney, 1974; Maultsby,
1984; Meichenbaum, 1977).

While common sense psychology accepts the

notion that what a person thinks affects the person's behavior, during
the behaviorist's domination of twentieth century experimental
psychology this concept was largely ignored.
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Harr£ (1988) dealt with the objection some would have to the fact
that a person's constructs are largely unobservable and, therefore, not
an appropriate project for psychological investigation.

He described

the positivists' attempt to reduce explanation to prediction and made
the following observations about the essential uses of theory in
explanation:
For prediction we need to know only facts of the same kind as those
we wish to predict, in this case observable symptoms. But to
explain we need to know the causal mechanism that produces the
symptoms. In general the entities that make up the causal
mechanism are of a different kind from those we can ordinarily
observe, and are known in some other way than that by which we know
the kinds of things we can observe as regular antecedents of the
disease states. We can see now why positivists prefer to reduce
the notion of explanation to prediction. Taking explanation
seriously calls for the use of the theoretical imagination to
create ideas of beings which are often yet to be observed, (p.
139)
The causal mechanisms of interest to school psychologists and their
clients had better include personal constructs which influence the
observable elements of human behavior.
Since human behavior appears to be a function of environmental
contingencies and personal constructs, the prediction of human behavior
is going to be at least partially dependent upon variables internal to
the person which are not directly observable.

While environmental

contingencies are theoretically observable, the internal personal
knowledge of the person of interest is not.

The best evidence for a

person's construct system comes from the person's expressions, verbal
and nonverbal.

Such information is vulnerable to any number of errors

and distortions, intentional or otherwise, by the person.

The

behaviorists have typically dismissed self-report data because of this
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unreliability.

However, to ignore this data results in a very

incomplete understanding of the person.
When the ever-changing flow and often non-public nature of personal
knowledge is considered, the improbability of accurately predicting
human behavior is revealed.

Even in the process of sharing about

ourselves we are changing, possibly as a result of the act of sharing
(Rogers, 1961) and possibly because of the ways in which our memories
change (Riegel, 1979).

Intentionality, personal knowledge, and

rationality consort to liberate the person from at least some of the
natural-causal conditions that would otherwise severely limit behavioral
possibilities.

None of the dominant theories in psychology adequately

accounts for personal knowing or the various forms of human agency and
"thus, none of these schemes describes, let alone explains, human
action" (Robinson, 1985, p. 68).
The wholistic school psychologist attempts to understand the client
by asking the client directly or indirectly to share personal knowledge.
Interviewing and storytelling are, in addition to more traditional
techniques, ways of gathering information from which inferences can be
made about the client's personal knowledge.

One of the most productive

things a school psychologist can do is to ask a client to verify these
inferences.

If, for example, a school psychologist infers that a school

phobic child is thinking how horrible it is to be separated from one's
parents, she/he might simply present this idea to the child ("it is
pretty awful to be away from your Mom and Dad").

If the child agrees

with emphasis then information about this child's personal knowledge
concerning separation has been gained.
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5.

Another major concept important to the practice of school

psychology, and an important aspect of constructivism explicit, or
strongly implied, in Piaget (1962), Polanyi (1962; Polanyi & Prosch,
1975), and Kelly (1955), is best expressed by Glasersfeld (1984):
Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed)
assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the
experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal
directedness, in this context, has, of course, nothing to do with
goals in an "external" reality. The goals that are involved here
arise for no other reason than this: A cognitive organism
evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends
to repeat certain ones and to avoid others. The products of
conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and
are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve
that purpose, (p. 32)
Glasersfeld went on to point out that purposiveness, as David Hume
(1748/1963) affirmed, presupposes an assumption of regularity of
experience.

One feature which Hume left out of the account of

experience, however, was the role of human action.
person is the seat of purposive action.

The construing

Purpose projects our

constructions of past experiences as expectations into the future.

The

fundamental assessments of similarities and differences is the result of
operations performed by the cognizing person "and can never be explained
as a given fact of objective reality" (Glasersfeld, p. 34).
Bruner (1986) also argued for a constructivist view which, by
tradition, divides the world into two spheres, that of the natural world
and that of the human social world.

The former is more likely to be

characterized in terms of logic and science, while the latter .is
discussed in narrative or story form.

We tend to construct the natural

world in causal terms and the human world in intentional terms.
Sometimes, Bruner believed, there is overlap in these constructions.
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Animism, for example, attributes intentions to objects most people would
discuss in terms of causality.

Radical behaviorists, on the other hand,

speak of causality and deny intentionality in human behavior.

By and

large, however, there is much consensus in our culture about how the
world is divided.

This consensus, like all others, is a function of the

preferences of those who participate in forming the consensus and does
not indicate an absolute "truth”; rather, it appears to be the result of
the historical forces which have fostered the development of modern
technocracy (Barrett, 1986).
More than one version exists of the processes by which a person
constructs reality (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Goodman, 1978;
Kelly, 1955; Piaget, 1950; Polanyi, 1962; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).

What

is salient in this paper is the general concept that the human being
constructs reality, that is, forms personal knowledge about the self and
the world.

Virtually all of the people a school psychologist interacts

with have the capacity to perceive and to construct knowledge.

At

present there are no theories which can adequately explain just how the
person gets from the subsidiaries to the focal,,a feat which meets the
criteria of a miracle, that is, something which is beyond the laws of
nature (Flew, 1979).

A pertinent example of such a miracle is the

child's capacity to get meaning from the printed word, an act which we
take for granted but cannot explain.

We observe the print (the input)

and the child's statements of understanding (the output) and these are
the subsidiaries, the parts.
completes the whole.

It is the child who connects the parts and

And our observation of the parts in this scene are

integrated by our own act of perception or dwelling in the parts from
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which we create a whole (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975), in this case, our
understanding of a child's act of reading.

Polanyi and Prosch (1975)

summarized their view of the personal act of knowing as follows:
We therefore recognize and study the coherence of living things by
integrating their motions— and any other normal changes occurring
in their parts— into our comprehension of their functions. We
integrate mentally what living beings integrate practically— just
as chess players rehearse a master's game to discover what he had
in mind. We share the purpose of a mind by dwelling in its
actions. And so, generally, we also share the purposes or
functions of any living matter by dwelling in its motions in our
efforts to understand their meaning, (p. 45)
6.

The concept of a person in school psychology will inevitably

mean a being with some sort of moral status (Taylor, 1985).

Modern

behavioral science has attempted to portray the person as a
representation of a particular set of facts, most of which can be
reduced to quantities.

What is missing from this description is that

things matter to the person as they cannot matter to animals or
machines.

Taylor expressed it this way:

. . . What will appear evident is that there are matters of
significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have
no analogue with animals. These are just the ones I mentioned
earlier, matters of pride, shame, moral goodness, evil, dignity,
the sense of worth, the various human forms of love and so on. If
we look at goals like survival and reproduction, we can perhaps
convince ourselves that the difference between men and animals lies
in a strategic superiority of the former: we can pursue the same
ends much more effectively than our dumb cousins. But when we
consider these human emotions, we can see that the ends which make
up a human life are sui generis. And then even the ends of
survival and reproduction will appear in a new light. What it is
to maintain and hand on a human form of life, that is, a given
culture, is also a peculiarly human affair, (p. 102)
While cognitive psychology has restored thinking to the model of
the person, the school psychology practitioner will restore the
emotional, moral, and spiritual qualities of the person.

£

According to

'
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Taylor (1985), in the predominant behavioral and social science view of
the person the capacity to plan is what makes a person an agent.
Generally, human beings are superior to animals in their power to
achieve these ends, a difference which separates humans from animals.
Some sophisticated machines, however, are superior to humans in
achieving goals; thus, the representational view of the person places
human beings along a continuum assessing strategic superiority of goal
attainment.
The contrasting view, the one which makes the most sense to the
author, who is a practicing school psychologist, understands the person
to have peculiarly human goals and purposes.

These purposes are

characterized by a certain sensitivity to standards.

"The sense of self

is the sense of where one stands in relation to these standards, and
properly personal choice is one informed by these standards" (Taylor,
1985, p. 105).

Consciousness and language are essential to the

expression of these purposes and standards, but are also imbued with
them.

"The subject according to the significance perspective is in a

world of meanings that he [sic] imperfectly understands.

His task is to

interpret it better, in order to know who he is and what he ought to
seek” (Taylor, p. 112).
Taylor (1985) expressed his belief that the prevalent view of the
person which emerges from modern social and behavioral science
paradoxically seeks to place the scientist above human significance in
the realm of pure, austere truth, very much like the self-denial which
has been passed down through the ages from many spiritual traditions.
The spiritual yearning of human beings to rise above the merely human
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cannot be denied (Huxley, 1945).

The search for certainty, however,

will not be successful in the alternative, or significance, view of the
person.

The moral questions of the person in the significance view are

never settled with any finality but evolve through dialogue.

Likewise,

assumptions about a larger order of nature or of the spiritual tradition
cannot be taken for granted.

The natural science, or representative,

view of the person assumes a significance-free natural ordering in the
universe.

Religious traditions assume a significance view which is

larger than, but includes, that which is significant to persons.

To the

school psychologist, then, a person is one to whom many of the aspects
of life matter.

It matters to most persons whether or not they are

replaced by machines.

There is no evidence that it matters to machines

whether or not they replace persons.

Just as teachers are moral agents

whose practices are driven by values (Goodlad, 1988), so too are school
psychologists.
7.

A model for the practice of school psychology would be

incomplete without a basic statement about the purposes of education.
In keeping with the prior assumptions about wholeness, the construction
of knowledge, social consensus in knowledge creation, the influence of
personal knowledge, purpose in human life, and the significance view of
the person, the goals of education had better emerge from a dialectical
interaction between the student and the significant persons in the
student's life.

Usually parents, other family members, close friends,

and teachers play, or have the potential to play, the most significant
roles in the life of a student.

Community interests are represented by

the teacher, usually an employee of the locally elected school board.
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The student's self-interests are initially represented by the parents
and gradually, as the child develops and can participate in the
dialogue, more so by the student.

Community and self-interests are the

focus of the dialectic between the student and the teacher.

The outcome

of this dialectic, taken at any particular moment in time, is unlikely
to be identical for any two students when we consider (a) the numerous
influences on educational outcomes, some of which have been addressed by
educational researchers, and (b) the dynamic, evolving nature of the
dialectical process between student and teacher(s).
What is needed by the school psychologist are some personal
philosophical goals which are superposed over the merely social and
economic goals of education (e.g., National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983; Graham,

1989). While each

person must find meaning for

her/his own life (Merton, 1955), this meaning is dynamic and emanates,
at least partly, from the socialdialectic.

The school psychologist,

like all humans, is faced with constructing meaning and purpose for
her/his life.

Dialogues with students, parents, teachers, and others,

cannot help but be affected by the psychologist's personal search for
meaning.

Therefore, school psychologists who subscribe to the proposed

model will explicate their own life's guiding myths, philosophies,
and/or purposes.

Such explication need not be a formal thesis, rather

it might take the form of rather simple statements of the overriding
goals of her/his life.
This author, for example, believes that the purpose of his life is
to love and to learn.

Research and clinical experience with persons who

have had a near-death experience (NDE) has found that loving and
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learning have become the paramount goals in the lives of those who have
been brought back from clinical death (Moody, 1983).

Many of the

persons who have experienced clinical death for a brief time and been
subsequently revived report that love and knowledge are the primary
qualities of life which were carried over into the NDE.

Whether or not

NDEs are "real" experiences is unlikely to be resolved by science.

The

effects of such experiences on persons, however, can and are being
carefully described by researchers (Greyson, 1985; Ring, 1980).

It is,

however, the meanings persons construct for these and other remarkable
life events which shape their life goals and purposes.

The overlap and

commonalities among those concerned with educating children can serve as
starting points in the neglected dialogue concerning the purposes of
education.

The materialistic and economic purposes of education, as

mentioned earlier, have dominated the educational debate and helped to
produce educational philosophies and practices which often distress
teachers and students and, paradoxically, interfere with the attainment
of even the materialistic and economic goals (Cunningham, 1982; Elias,
1989; Kaiser & Polczynski, 1982).
Thus, the overriding purpose of education should be to facilitate
the student's search for a personal meaning for life.

Educators can

facilitate by helping the student learn various means for moving toward
these goals and purposes.

Educators also help by participating in the

dialectical process out of which the student evolves meaning and
purpose.

This evolving meaning in the life of the individual adds to

the totality of consciousness, a theme explored in more detail by Jung
(1963) and his student, Edinger (1984).

L

The school psychologist can
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serve by joining the dialogue when it is perceived to have become
unproductive or problematic.
A Revisioning of the Practice of School Psychology
Here begins the design of a new purpose and way of practicing
school psychology.

Based upon the concepts of wholism, constructivism,

the social-consensual basis of knowledge, the personal act of knowing,
purposiveness, the significance view of the person, and personal life
meaning as the purpose of education, a series of concepts governing the
practice of school psychology will be presented.
1.

The purposes of school psychology are to enrich, through

dialectical encounters, the personal knowledge of students, teachers,
parents, and others, in a school or educational setting so as to
facilitate (a) their coping with stress and (b) their achievement of
educational goals.

"Enrichment” may best be thought of as an

enlargement or expansion of the client's personal knowledge so as to not
only explicate but also to facilitate the attainment of the client's
goals or purposes.

At times the school psychologist may serve multiple

clients whose goals are in conflict.

For example, the school phobic

child does not want to come to school, while the school authorities and,
perhaps, the child's parents want her/him to attend.

Ideally, in this

and similar situations, the school psychologist will enrich the personal
knowledge of each client by helping each party to empathize with, or
construe the construction processes of, the other (which is an example
of Kelly's, 1955, sociality corollary).

Ultimately, the political

process will determine who will be the client, and who, therefore, will
be expected to adapt to the demands of the environment.

In this
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example, the child (and possibly, the parents) will be identified as the
client and will be expected to adapt.

The psychologist can help through

the dialectical process if the client(s) allows it.
The school psychologist functions in a highly politicized,
nonscientific setting in which common-sense psychology prevails.

It has

been argued in Chapter 3 that scientific psychology cannot justifiably
claim any covering laws from which accurate predictions can be made and
it was also concluded that explanations from psychologists are not
necessarily better than those of nonpsychologists.

Therefore, the

school psychologist had better take each encounter with another person
as an exploration of that person's theories, myths, and constructs with
a view to helping that person achieve self-selected goals within her/his
own system of beliefs.
The school psychologist is uniquely qualified, by interests and
training, to offer explanations and interpretations of behavior from the
perspective of established psychological theories.

Because these

formulations do not have the status of natural laws or natural science
theories, the school psychologist cannot claim expertise in the same
sense as can a physicist or chemist.

Keeping the limits of

psychological knowledge in mind, however, the psychologist can offer
theories which are subjected to the dialectical process and which are
traditionally viewed through the skeptical framework of the science.
Thus, while psychological theories are generally quite limited and have
not produced "laws of behavior," they are potentially very helpful in
organizing information.

The theories in psychology have largely been
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derived from and must compete with common sense theories of behavior
(Fletcher, 1984).
Perhaps the most important function for the school psychologist is
to assist in explaining human actions from psychological theory.
Because no single scientific theory will be able to provide reasonable
explanations of all actions, the school psychologist had better be armed
with an array of theoretical points of view.

Because scientific

theories are subjected to conceptual and empirical testing, they are to
be preferred.

Sometimes, however, no scientific theory will adequately

explain an action and the psychologist must rely on a common sense
theory or create a new theory.

The evaluation of the explanations of an

action takes place in the dialectical processes among those who have
defined the action as a problem.

Although the explanation process

begins with the application of one or more theories, it is through
dialogue and social consensus that we reach an understanding of the
action.

At the same time, we may also have expanded or altered the

theory, or theories, in order to accommodate the action we want to
explain.

Thus, theory construction is an inevitable, progressive

process in the practice of school psychology.
The school psychologist may also assist with the evaluation of the
problem from the point of view of the client's own theories.

By

engaging the client in a dialogue the school psychologist may have the
opportunity to encourage the testing of hypotheses which emanate from
the client's personal theory.

There is no way of deciding ahead of time

whether a hypothesis will bear up to dialectical or demonstrative
scrutiny.

Therefore, the school psychologist had better take seriously
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a client's hypotheses by giving equal weight to all hypotheses before
they are tested.

To reflexively rule out a client's hypothesis because

it is not derived from a scientifically accepted psychological theory
risks not only error, but also risks rapport with that client.

The

psychologist may also assist by encouraging the client to engage in a
conceptual analysis of her/his personal, often common sense, theories
(Fletcher, 1984).

Analysis of tacit concepts and theories of clients is

a major tactic of Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1963) and Personal
Construct Psychology (Kelly, 1955).
Stress is defined by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as " . . .

a

particular relationship between the person and the environment that is
appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and
endangering his or her well being" (p. 19).

Thus, stress is a multi

faceted concept which includes one or more personal constructs and a
syndrome of resulting emotional responses.

This conception of stress is

useful in understanding the kinds of problems for which the school
psychologist's services are sought.

It has been this author's

experience that stress usually sets the stage for referrals.

When a

teacher, parent, child, or principal perceives that her/his capacity to
cope with a problem is exhausted, the school psychologist is often
consulted.

If the potential client is coping adequately, then the

school psychologist is rarely called upon.

An advantage to viewing

problems from the conceptual framework of stress is that we can focus
upon an ongoing process and may be less likely to depend upon the weak
and relatively useless labels and categories upon which we have depended
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in the past.

This is similar to Lauer's (1969) recommendation that we

focus upon strained relationships.
2.

There are two main ways in which a school psychologist may

enrich a client's personal knowledge.
collaborative consultant.

One way is by serving as a

Another is by providing explanations of human

actions.
Collaborative consultation is characterized by an interactive
communication process which emphasizes the equal participation and
status of those engaged in the transaction (Sileo, Rude, & Luckner,
1988).

It is a model which calls for the consultant to serve as a

facilitator of the problem-solving process (Berkowitz, 1973).

By

leading the client to explicate, examine, and test her/his personal
theories, myths, and constructs, the school psychologist engages in a
process which results in changes in the personal knowledge of the
client— and the school psychologist.

Any changes made by the client or

the school psychologist are the result of choice, not imposition.
Choices are made as a part of the give and take in the dialogue between
the client and the school psychologist.

Other more specific ways of

facilitating coping and enriching a client's system of constructs are to
be found in the literature on psychotherapy.

While no system of

psychotherapy has demonstrated consistent superiority (Smith & Glass,
1977), it is important that the school psychologist adopt or formulate a
theoretical approach with which to assist clients in coping and
attaining goals.

If one perceives that a situation exceeds one's

capacity to cope, stress will result.

A theoretical system which can

encompass the largest variety of human problems will help to prevent
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such stress in the school psychologist.

The application of "techniques"

without a theoretical system to organize the processes of interpreting,
explaining, and influencing the problem is liable to inhibit the
dialogue among those concerned about the problem.
An explanation is " . . .

a speech-act which makes use of a

discourse which, in its literal meaning makes reference to beings which
are not capable, often, of being observed.

In many cases these beings

are the components of causal mechanisms" (Harrd, 1988, p. 140).

Harr£

noted that every explanatory regress makes use of causal mechanisms but
must end with "causal powers."

In physics, for example, no further

mechanistic explanation for the behavior of quarks is available;
therefore, at this level of explanation one must make reference to basic
powers or dispositions.

The work of the school psychologist often

requires explanations which make reference to causal mechanisms or
powers.

These explanations must be subjected to the criteria of

rational acceptability of the participants in the dialogue.
Each kind of knowledge (e.g., physical, psychological, social,
spiritual), and the varying levels of each kind of knowledge, may
require different conceptual and methodological approaches to
understanding and explaining its objects of interest (Harr£, 1988).

One

level or type of knowledge cannot be reduced to a lower level, nor can
it be entirely understood or explained without reference to adjacent
levels (cf., Jacob, 1973, p. 307).

In school psychology we are better

off trying to explain a problem of interest in the terms which
facilitate a dialogue among the interested parties.

Attempts to reduce

emotions, for example to neurophysiology, while interesting, are not

*.

u
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appropriate when the participants in the dialogue want, let us say, to
better understand the appraisals which are underlying the emotions.
Likewise, an explanation of an emotion from a behavioristic framework
may be unsatisfactory to the participants because it ignores personal
knowledge and purposes.
The kinds of questions being asked determine the level(s) of
organized knowledge most appropriate for answering the questions.

The

construct "levels of knowledge" as applied in school psychology must be
defined in terms of the person asking the question.

To impose a

particular version of the organization of scientific, or other,
knowledge on a client for whom this concept is alien risks disrupted
communication and loss of rapport.
An example regarding levels of explanation for the school
psychologist would be the question of why a particular youngster is so
much more physically aggressive than other youngsters of the same sex
and age.

By referring to age and sex the client has already broadened

the question from the social and developmental psychological levels to
that of the biological.

Thus, the levels of organized knowledge most

likely to provide acceptable answers are the biological (e.g., hormones,
brain dysfunction), the sociological (e.g., family, group, neighborhood
dynamics), and the developmental.

An explanation is unlikely to be

accepted by those who posed the question if it uses a level of knowledge
organization similar to that implied in the question.

Stating that a

youngster is more aggressive because there is a greater chance of his
engaging in hitting others, for example, is unlikely to be accepted as
an explanation.

Such answers are likely to be seen as redescriptions of

I;
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the problem.

Thus, one problem with some behavioristic accounts of

behavior is that the behavioral statements simply redescribe the
behavior of concern, they do not explain it in an acceptable way to
those most likely to be asking the questions, teachers and parents
(Harr£, 1988).

Nor does saying that Johnny hits other children because

of certain contingencies of reinforcement adequately explain the
behavior for most parents and teachers.

They understand that his

hitting follows some pattern, but usually want to know why this pattern
exists, or if you will, why the contingencies of reinforcement are
different for Johnny than for Billy, who does not hit other students.
They are more likely to accept a plausible biological or sociological
explanation than a prediction that Johnny is more likely to hit other
students (cf., Harrd, p. 139).

In the process of attempting to change

behavior, however, behavioristic psychology may play a role.

The school

psychologist may, for example, explain Johnny’s hitting behavior as the
result of his desire for attention.

Using knowledge of the

contingencies of reinforcement one might attempt to help Johnny achieve
his goal in a more acceptable way by changing tjie contingencies of
reinforcement.

If the explanation is accepted by the teacher or

parents, change will be facilitated.

If the explanation is viewed as

unreasonable it is unlikely that the school psychologist will succeed in
encouraging changes in the reinforcement schedule.
Often questions asked of school psychologists are at the level of
semantic generalizations.
student is so mean.

For example, a teacher might ask why a

The teacher has induced from samples of observed

behavior, or other sources, a generalization (and prediction) of
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"meanness."

Such generalizations are conceptually very rich and imply

several levels of knowledge about the child.

However, the question the

teacher is asking is at the level of personality psychology and makes
assumptions which may not be justified.

Meanness becomes an internal

trait which takes on a life of its own and influences the thinking and
behaving of those who subscribe to it for this particular child.

While

the behaviorists have argued for the authority of observable behavior,
they may have inadvertently taught that it is conceptually much easier
to communicate and form a consensus about behavior we can actually
observe.

It is unlikely that a consensus can be formed among those who

have knowledge of the child, including the school psychologist, when an
evaluation has been conducted, which concludes that he is, indeed, mean.
This label has the same problems as other labels used in psychology and
education; they tend to be arbitrary and absolutistic.

When a consensus

cannot be reached about the client's problem it is preferable to
redescribe the problem in more basic terms and try again.
It is important to view the attempt to explain unwanted behavior as
a part of the process of changing it.

If an explanation is accepted by

those who must deal with it, changes in ways of thinking and evaluating
the behavior may result.

It was postulated earlier that cognitions and

evaluations influence behavior; if this is true, an explanation which
had not previously been considered, if it is accepted, is likely to
result in changed behaviors.

For example, we are usually less severe in

our judgments of those who committed a wrong act unintentionally than
with those who premeditated the act.

An explanation which develops a

v,

L
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non-intentional explanation of the perpetrator's behavior will probably
result in action far different than might otherwise be expected.
3.

The school psychologist advocates for a democratic approach to

decision making.

More explicitly, the school psychologist promotes

unitary democracy (Mansbridge, 1983) in the pursuit of solving problems
and making decisions about clients.

The school psychologist must

function, then, to build a consensus about the nature of a problem and
the proposed actions to be taken to solve the problem.
defined, after Mansbridge, as " . . .

A consensus is

a form of decision making in

which, after discussion, one or more members of the assembly sum up
prevailing sentiment, and if no objections are voiced, this becomes
agreed-upon policy" (p. 32).

A consensus must be forged out of a system

of relationships in which equality, mutual respect, and empathy prevail
among the participants.
a common interest.

The purpose of a unitary democracy is to create

In school psychology this common interest is most

often the educational and psychological well-being of a student.
Those persons who are intimately connected to the problem under
scrutiny have mental representations of the issues which had better
become a part of the dialogue regarding any agreed-upon resolutions.
Searching for a client's (which may sometimes be plural) personal
knowledge, implied or otherwise, is an essential part of the dialectical
process through which some kind of consensus might be reached.

If the

client has difficulty expressing a theory about the issue, then the
school psychologist is obliged to help find ways for the client to
express her/his theory.

If the client does not possess a theory about

the issue, then it is incumbent upon the school psychologist to aid the
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client in formulating a reasonable theory.

In so doing, the school

psychologist is likely to advocate for her/his favorite theoretical
view.

The client, however, is not obligated to accept the school

psychologist's help in this endeavor, and the client had better take
part in assessing the reasonableness of the theoretical explanation of
the issue.

Reasonableness is a consensual judgment of the those taking

part in the dialogue.
While consensus is the goal in a unitary democracy there is always
the danger that conflicts will be suppressed for the sake of unity.

The

school psychologist must be alert to the possible suppression of
personal knowledge which may be useful in finding a solution to a
problem.

The school psychologist can frequently ask participants in a

problem-solving dialogue if the developing consensus "makes sense" or is
reasonable.

Also, the school psychologist can ask at various stages

with which parts of the consensus the participants feel least
comfortable.

Interactions should encourage the sense of equal status

among participants.
The process of consensus formation in decision making, then, can be
summarized as follows:

(a) the evolving solution is explicated by

someone; (b) after discussion, dissenters' objections are sought out;
(c) objections are heard and considered by the group; (d) modifications
to the solution are proposed so as to account for the objections; (e)
the dissenters are asked if they can “live with" the modified proposal.
These steps are repeated until no further objections are offered.
Although consensus formation is not a perfect solution to decision
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making it offers many advantages not found in other processes
(Mansbridge, 1983).
The unitary democratic transaction described above is best viewed
as an ongoing, flowing process.
permanently resolved.

Few, if any, problems become

They resurface with the same child or a different

child and once resolved are soon replaced by other problems.

The

wholistic view exposes the practice of school psychology as a never
ending process of interacting with others in identifying problems and
experimenting with solutions derived through consensus.
4.

Taking the wholistic view encourages the school psychologist to

expand current conceptions of what counts as knowledge.

The school

psychologist also recognizes the unjustified restrictions upon knowledge
construction inherent in notions such as "objectivity" and "experimental
controls."

Current conceptions of science and appropriate research

methods are too restrictive for the school psychologist.

The school

psychologist values the traditional psychological and educational
knowledge which has been accumulating over the decades, such as that
typically found in textbooks and training programs for school
psychologists, but such knowledge (usually reductionistic) is best
viewed as only one particular construction of reality.

Traditional

school psychological knowledge, some of which was examined in the first
three chapters, must compete without any authoritative status.

That is,

what we think we know in school psychology is open to question, is never
sacred, and serves only until more appealing ways of knowing have been
invented.
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While the traditional methods of knowledge construction via
scientific methodology will continue to be applicable under some
conditions, other ways of approaching problems must be found.

Many of

the research problems in psychology have not been addressed because of
the difficulties in isolating and quantifying variables.

The school

psychologist will value an extensive variety of research points of view
which serve many different purposes.

Case histories and qualitative

studies are two particularly neglected research orientations which had
better become a part of the knowledge construction in school psychology.
5.

In keeping with the view that human beings have goals,

purposes, a "telos," the school psychologist moves toward the telos of
good practice.

The "good" practice of school psychology evolves from

theoretical reasoning about what the telos of school psychology is and
it is governed by the practical reasoning about right action in
particular circumstances (cf., MacIntyre, 1984).

What it means to

engage in a virtuous practice was further elaborated by MacIntyre:
To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only
with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have
preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements
extended the reach of the practice to its present point. It is
thus the achievement, and a fortiori the authority, of a tradition
which I then confront and from which I have to learn. And for this
learning and the relationship to the past which it embodies the
virtues of justice, courage and truthfulness are prerequisite in
precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they
are in sustaining present relationships within practices, (p. 194)
Practitioners of school psychology must sustain the dialogues about
theories of the person, of education, of learning, of stress, and of the
telos of humankind in order to consolidate an evolving theory of the
appropriate practice of the profession.

Such a theory can emerge from
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the ethical traditions, both explicit and implicit, of school
psychology, but it must be founded upon a theory of the person as a
moral agent.

Any view which implies that the person is a machine or

automaton makes a code of ethics for school psychologists meaningless.
As MacIntyre (1984) has reminded us, each person becomes a
character in history, each person is the hero of a story.

But stories

have a message or moral and the moral of the story of the life of a
school psychologist has a purpose.

The virtues to be found in the

practice of school psychology were aptly discussed by MacIntyre as those
to be found in any practice of the good life:
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions
which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the
goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the
relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the
harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter,
and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and
increasing knowledge of the good. . . . We have then arrived at a
provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life
for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and
the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable
us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.
(p. 219)
In this author's personal experience, school psychologists have
sometimes subscribed to a theory of the person which has been
contradicted by their own personal narrative about who they are and what
they are about.

It is time we put this nonsense aside and began

discussing what the purpose of school psychology is in a more open,
unembarrassed way.

We may have vague notions about what justice,

courage, and truthfulness are in the practice of school psychology, and
we have a code of ethics which subscribes to some outdated notions about
the nature of science and objectivity which have been addressed in this
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paper.

What is needed now in school psychology is a critical

examination of some of the profession's basic assumptions and a
subsequent revisioning of notions of practice.
It is hypothesized that if such a critical examination took place
and subsequent revisions came about, the ancient virtue of humility
would ascend into prominence among school psychologists.

If the

arguments put forth in this document withstand public scrutiny, then the
view of the school psychologist as technician must falter.

In its place

can be resurrected a model of the school psychologist as a moral leader
who assists others in constructing meaning in their lives, a model
proposed for educational administrators by Smith and Blase (1987).
Their summary provides an appropriate conclusion for this chapter:
In summary, a concept of moral leadership is based on the
significance view of what it means to be a person. Relationships
among people are not played out against a background of scientific
findings, expertise, prediction and control; rather, these
relationships are mediated by a sense of membership in a community
of moral discourse. To participate in this community one must
realize the need for reasoned discussion or dialogue. The
administrator who desires the compliment of being called a leader
is one who recognizes, and encourages others to recognize, this
situation, who is willing to risk himself/herself in an open
dialogue with others, is reflexively aware of standards that go
beyond a performance criterion, and who strives to keep our
traditions alive through debate and discussion. This perspective,
which is quite different from the image of the educational leader
as expert, seems especially appropriate for public school
leadership, (pp. 43-44)
In summary, in this chapter an attempt has been made to organize
and justify a number of concepts from which a better practice of school
psychology may emerge.

Assumptions about (a) the wholeness of the

universe, (b) the construction of knowledge, (c) the social consensus of
what counts as knowledge, (d) the strong influence of personal knowing,
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(e) purposiveness in human behavior, (f) the significance view of the
person, and (g) the search for a meaning for the student's life as the
purpose of education, were made explicit.

These assumptions provided

the foundation for a conceptual model of the appropriate practice of
school psychology.
following:

The major concepts of this system included the

(a) the purpose of school psychology as an enrichment of the

personal knowledge of clients, (b) the view that enrichment is
accomplished through collaborative consultation and the provision of
explanations, (c) the advocation of unitary democracy, (d) the promotion
of an expanded view of knowledge construction in school psychology, and
(e) the opening of a dialogue about the virtues in the practice of
school psychology.

This model obligates the school psychologist to

practice humility and moral leadership in the schools.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MODEL EXEMPLIFIED
The purpose of this chapter is to give examples, through case
histories, of ways in which the model of practice proposed in Chapter 4
can be realized.

While no specific formula can prescribe practice from

a model or theory, it may be illustrative to describe specific practices
in narrative form and explain how they exemplify the model.

It is the

author's intention that the reader will be able to imagine a school
psychologist practicing her/his profession in such a way that the basic
assumptions and principles of practice can be inferred and will be found
to closely match those delineated in Chapter 4.

The case histories

presented in this chapter are based upon composites of actual clients in
order to protect the identity of specific persons.
While convenience might be achieved by presenting divided aspects
of school psychology practice, e.g., assessment, diagnosis, remediation,
the underlying assumption of wholeness advocated in Chapter 4 would be
violated.

Therefore, the following case histories will be presented as

stories which describe the school psychologist's involvement with a
client.

Although the subsidiary parts of practice may be pointed out,

the focal point of each case will be the relationship between the
client(s) and the psychologist.

Diagnosis and remediation can be

separated only artificially in a human relationship.

The tasks we

classify as diagnostic may, as will be shown, have an effect on the
client which is often ignored in the literature of school psychology.
However, stories told by experienced practitioners, usually in rather
informal situations, indicate that a diagnostic evaluation is frequently

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

137

a dialectical process which affects the student and the school
psychologist.

Almost all human relationships can be viewed as

dialectical in nature with resulting changes in the persons who
participate in this relationship.
Case History 1
The first case history will demonstrate just how the school
psychological assessment process may result in unexpected, but
productive, changes in a student.

The client in this case was a 6 year

old girl, Jane (a pseudonym), enrolled in a regular first grade class in
a small city school.

Her first grade teacher and her mother were very

concerned about Jane's poor progress in reading, writing, and math.
Jane's older siblings had learning problems in school, so the mother
worried that Jane would find school work to be very frustrating.

The

family moved to the school district from another state where Jane had
been evaluated at some kind of clinic.
may be developing "dyslexia."

The mother was told that Jane

Due to her experiences with her older

children, this parent was quite knowledgeable of the terminology and
remedial techniques for learning disabilities.

She requested an

evaluation and remedial services for her daughter.
Because of her age, Jane was seen on five different occasions for
relatively short periods of time in order to avoid tiring her.

During

the evaluation Jane was initially polite and quite motivated to do well
on the evaluation tasks.

In subsequent evaluation sessions Jane

gradually became more willing to test the psychologist to find out just
what were the behavioral limits.

On several occasions, she tried taking

test materials or beginning to work on tasks before the directions were
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completed.

Often, V7hen Jane became frustrated with a task, although

persistent, she asked the examiner to help her.

Each time she was told

that such help was not allowed, that the psychologist wanted to see how
well she could do without help.

Jane continued to ask for help, and,

eventually, began to demand it.

At one point she threatened to not be

the psychologist's friend any more if he did not help her.

The

psychologist, however, patiently and consistently refused to help her.
As the testing progressed, the psychologist began to form some
hypotheses about Jane.

She appeared to be a youngster with little

tolerance for frustration.

Jane also seemed to lack confidence in her

abilities to solve perceptual-motor problems.

It was inferred that Jane

construed herself as unlikely to succeed on academic tasks and that many
of these tasks were beyond her coping capacity (that is, they were
stressful).
Jane experienced much more success on most of the intelligence test
items than on those in the achievement battery.

Without violating test

manual directions, she was given appropriate feedback at the end of each
subtest on the intelligence test and the psychologist acted truly amazed
at the few successes Jane managed on the achievement tests.

He

congratulated her on beginning to learn how to read and suggested that
it would not be long before she would be reading bigger words and
thicker books.

He praised her on the letters and words she had learned,

even though it was obvious to the author that she was far behind most of
her classmates.

Jane seemed pleased with her performances even when

some of them were normatively inferior.

It appeared that Jane had not
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yet learned to evaluate her performance relative to that of her peers
and the psychologist was not about to encourage her to begin doing so.
Jane appeared to enjoy most of the evaluation time with the
examiner, as do most youngsters in the early grades of school.

On

several occasions when Jane saw the author in the school corridors she
asked if she was going to get to work with him.

There were a number of

additional signs that Jane looked forward to the testing sessions.
A staffing was held after all the diagnostic testing was completed
and the school officials and the parent decided to place the child into
a special education classroom for instruction in reading, writing, and
math.

The illustrative point of this case, however, occurred at the end

of the staffing when the mother commented on the changes she observed in
her daughter during the weeks when the testing was being completed.

The

mother reported that her daughter suddenly began showing much more
interest in reading and demanded that her mother take her to the library
almost every day.

She not only showed more interest in reading but was

also attempting to read more books of greater difficulty than ever
before.

The mother attributed the change in her daughter’s interest in

reading to something that happened as a result of the daughter's
interaction with the psychologist.
Of course, no cause-effect relationship can be demonstrated to the
satisfaction of a community of scholars regarding the dialogues between
the psychologist and the student.

Thus, it is unlikely that a

deterministic formula could ever be derived which could predict the
outcome of the dialogues between this student and the psychologist.
What seems most pertinent in this case is that the mother observed
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desired changes in her daughter and construed these changes to be the
result of some positive interaction between the psychologist and the
student.

The mother had no proof that her construal was correct, nor

did she seem motivated to test her belief.

In essence, the mother

created a myth, an untested explanatory story, to account for the
changes in her daughter's attitude toward reading.

While this myth

cannot be rationally construed to match some unconceptualized "true"
version of what influenced this child's change in attitude, it may have
served several valuable functions for Jane's mother (Feinstein &
Krippner, 1988).

One function may have been to organize into a coherent

whole this mother's experiences of her daughter and the mother's
perceptions of Jane's vulnerability in school and her need for
understanding.

It could be that the psychologist's experience with Jane

matched the mother's ideal of how she wanted others to interact with her
daughter.

The myth may also have been a reflection of the mother's

strong desire to find someone who could understand and help her
daughter.

The psychologist hypothesized that this search for expertise

was an important part of the mother's belief system.

Thus, an effort

was made to help the mother also view the resource teacher, a truly
competent educator, as potentially more helpful to Jane.

The

psychologist explained to the mother that he had learned some of his
ways of interacting with students from observing this teacher utilize
patience and encouragement with her students.
This case demonstrates several of the features of the proposed
model of school psychology.

First, the act of reading is not an

isolable part of a person which can be dissected and studied apart from
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the life of the child.

Second, this case also demonstrates the personal

construction of knowledge by the child, the mother, and the
psychologist.

The mother and the psychologist utilized a belief system

to make sense of their experiences, and the student made changes in a
belief system which resulted in a new pattern of behavior.

Third, the

strong influence of personal construing on behavior can be seen in the
child's increased interest in reading.

No conscious efforts were made

to remediate the child's attitude toward reading.

We may infer that the

child actively construed something which happened during the testing
(or, in some other setting) which prompted a change.

If the mother's

interpretation was correct, the child probably reconstrued her "self" as
a reader.

Perhaps she could more clearly foresee herself reading

difficult books, a possibility which would illustrate the purposiveness
of behavior.

This hypothesis could be tested with a number of

individual case studies or possibly with groups of unmotivated or
discouraged readers.

The psychologist in this case, nevertheless,

experienced a strengthening of his belief in encouraging students to
expand their constructs of themselves as readers.
Although the details of this staffing were not presented, the
unitary democratic process was exemplified.

Jane's mother was the

unifying force in forging a consensus that her child was handicapped in
receiving an education and in need of special education instructional
services.

The staffing participants were in harmonious agreement about

the child and the appropriate educational approach for her.

Staffings

do not always run so smoothly and often discussion, debate, and
compromise are required to reach consensus,

in her qualitative study of

jE
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the staffing process, for example, Law (1981) found that the parents
were often confused by professional jargon and authority and were not
equal participants in these meetings.

Since the implementation of the

model proposed herein, the author has perceived greater power sharing
and less reliance upon authority in staffings.

The author's school

psychology practicum and intern students are often assigned the task of
observing staffings specifically to identify anti-democratic processes.
Case History 2
The second case involved a 10 year old boy who was referred to the
psychologist because of his explosive temper and frequent fighting.
This boy, Tom, was the oldest of three children, all of whom lived with
their mother.

The boy's parents had divorced two years prior to the

referral, but he maintained regular contact with his father.

Tom's

teachers believed him to be of more than average intelligence, but his
schoolwork was generally only average.

His teachers reported that he

was caught fighting with other students, mostly on the playground,
several times a week.
Tom was seen on three occasions at one week intervals.

During the

first session Tom appeared nervous, tense, and quite defensive.

He

answered questions in a very abrupt fashion, revealing as little as
possible about himself.

Thus, the psychologist theorized that Tom was

embarrassed about his troubles and did not want to discuss them openly.
An indirect approach was taken, mutual story telling (Gardner, 1971), in
which the child was asked to tell a story, preferably one which he had
not heard, read about, or seen before.

A story with a beginning, a

middle, an end, and a moral or lesson was requested.

5----

L _____________
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Tom's story was about a high school football player who had become
very angry about being penalized by the referee.

The football player

became so angry that he aggressively argued with the referee until he
was kicked out of the game and sent to the locker room.

The moral to

Tom's story was "that you shouldn't get so mad.”
The second part of Gardner's (1971) mutual story telling technique
requires the clinician to rapidly diagnose the child's problem and
retell the child's story so that the protagonist "works through" some
psycho-dynamic problem.

The author, however, subscribes to a more

direct cognitive approach to the solving of emotional and behavioral
problems.

Therefore, following Ellis' (1962) Rational Emotive Therapy

(RET), some inferences were made about the child's anger producing
beliefs.

Namely, it was hypothesized that Tom sometimes strongly

demanded that people behave or events happen exactly the way he thought
they should.

RET theory would predict that an effective challenge to

Tom's irrational demands would produce the following:

(a) his demands

would be changed to preferences, and (b) a significant reduction in his
anger would occur.
The psychologist retold Tom's story as follows:
boy who really loved to play football.

Once there was a

Sometimes, however, when things

did not go his way, he became so angry that he lost his temper and got
into trouble.

During one of the most important games of the season the

young man drew an official's flag for clipping.

The football player

truly believed that he did not clip his opponent and instantly became
upset.

He argued with the referee to the point that he was kicked out

of the game.

Of course, he was sent to the locker room, still feeling
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angry and also feeling guilty that he had let his team down.

While he

was in the locker room he saw the old janitor who took care of the
stadium.

When asked what had happened, the football player recounted

the events and how the referee had made him feel angry.

The old janitor

was very wise and explained to the football player that he was acting
both very small and very big.

The football player did not understand

what the janitor meant, so the janitor explained that he was acting very
small because he was acting like a baby who throws a temper tantrum in
order to get its own way.

He was acting very big because he was trying

to make things happen just by demanding them, much like God demanded
things and got them in the Bible stories.

Right away the football

player could see that he was not a baby and that he was not God, he was
an almost grown-up person.

He also realized that, unlike God, he could

not get what he wanted just by demanding it.

The wise old janitor

suggested to the football player that he practice turning his demands
into wishes and wants.

Demands are for babies and God, the janitor

explained, but wishes and wants tell what humans are usually willing to
work hard to get.

The football player took the old janitor's advice

and, using his imagination, practiced having something go wrong on the
football field, and followed this with wishing that it had not.
could picture himself staying calmer.

He

He even began wishing instead of

demanding off the football field and found that he did not make himself
angry nearly so often nor so strongly as before.

The moral of this

story is that if you want to stop upsetting yourself so much with anger,
change your demands into wishes.

5---- ■

}•
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What followed for this youngster cannot be proven, according to
currently accepted criteria in experimental psychology, to have been the
result of this story telling encounter.

However, teachers and the boy's

mother reported that there was a dramatic decrease in the number of
fights and temper outbursts.

Follow-up sessions with this youngster

found him to be only slightly more open about his problems.

When asked

how things were going in school, he did mention that he was "doing
better on the playground" and playing more football with the other boys
in his class.

The story telling took place in the late fall and

subsequent follow-up conferences during the year found this youngster
continuing to successfully manage his temper and to solve conflicts more
constructively.
The power of stories and myth to teach morality and practical
lessons is well documented (Bagarozzi & Anderson, 1989; Campbell, 1968,
1972; Feinstein & Krippner, 1988; Murray, 1960).

Myths and stories can

be seen as expressions of knowledge which have been constructed by the
community or by the person and they also demonstrate the purposiveness
and meaning in human action.

In this example the youngster was able to

express something about his recurrent problem through the medium of the
story.

Likewise, the psychologist used the story to communicate an

expanded view of the problem, one which included hypotheses about which
of the fictitious football player's beliefs were contributing to his
anger problem.

The psychologist's story also challenged the

hypothesized problematic beliefs and offered new ways for the student to
think about anger arousing situations.

L_
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Two aspects of the proposed model of school psychology practice are
prominent in this story.

First, the psychologist attempted to enrich

the student's personal knowledge through the dialectical process of
mutual story telling.

Second, an explanation of anger and an

alternative way of reacting via the stories were provided to the
student.

Undergirding these two themes is a set of moral assumptions

about what is right in human behavior.

Tom indirectly indicated his

moral problem concerning anger and the problems which accompany his
temper outbursts when he formulated a moral for his story, namely that
one should not "get so mad."

Implied in this moral was the goal of

learning to control his temper.

The psychologist provided a kind of

moral leadership in teaching Tom one way he could reach his goal.
Case History 3
The next story demonstrates the futility of assuming the
mechanistic model of the human being.

An intelligent 16 year old girl,

who will be called Janet, was referred to the author because of
recurrent behavior problems in several of her classes.

This youngster

suffered from a neurological disease which caused her some embarrassment
in school.

A number of medications had been prescribed by her physician

to reduce the symptoms of the disease, but the medications usually
produced unwanted side effects.

The girl's parents and physician

believed that the latest medication she was taking was responsible for
the behavior problems.

Janet was very knowledgeable about her disease

and had read extensively about the medications given to her.

In an

initial conference, Janet's mother revealed that her greatest concerns
were about Janet's low self-esteem and embarrassment aboxit her disease.

!__

-
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The first couple of sessions with Janet were quite stimulating and
educational for the psychologist.

Janet shared her rudimentary

knowledge of her disease and theories about how the medications help to
reduce her obvious symptoms.

Probing also found several self evaluative

beliefs to which Janet subscribed.

When the rationality of these

beliefs was challenged, Janet was able to quickly discern that her
beliefs about herself were nonsense.

She and the psychologist

formulated new, more reasonable beliefs for her to practice.

Janet

responded quite well to this approach to her self-downing.
At the third session the psychologist asked Janet if she would like
to learn more about the psychological aspects of her disease by reading
more about it.

She indicated much interest in this proposal and a

search of the psychological literature was conducted.

Interestingly,

one of the first articles found by the psychologist was a review of the
literature comparing medication and behavior modification treatments for
Janet's disease.

This review concluded that both approaches were

equally successful compared to no-treatment control groups.

Janet was

able to read and understand most of this research paper as indicated by
our subsequent discussions of the article.
Quite interestingly, however, Janet appeared to become anxious as
she and the psychologist discussed this research.

She refused to

believe that there could be any psychological aspects to her symptoms
and tried to support her position with an explanation about how the
neurotransmitters at the synapses were not properly controlled and,
therefore, only medication could help her.

She v;as equally resistive to

any attempts to reduce the severity of her symptoms with stress
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management.

Various arguments were presented by the psychologist about

possible ways in which psychological variables might affect her disease
and a number of attempts were made to encourage her to at least try some
of the techniques discussed in the research article.

All the coaxing

and arguing were unsuccessful in persuading this very bright teenager to
attempt to reduce her symptoms by tried and proven behavioral methods.
The point to be made by this story is that behavioral techniques
(e.g., Bandura, 1969) are often presented as a set of principles based
upon laboratory research which has uncovered some very basic laws of
human behavior.

Furthermore, it is frequently inferred that when these

techniques are appropriately applied, they will cause very predictable
outcomes which are the result of these laws of behavior.

The problem

with this very mechanistic model of humankind is, of course, it ignores
that human beings are agents with purposes.

This case demonstrates that

the model of humankind with which we approach our clients is not just a
philosophical problem.

Janet was not about to passively submit to the

techniques of behavior modification, and even if she had it would have
been the result of her choice to submit.

Ironically, Janet's own

mechanistic model of her disease may have served to defend her from the
mechanistic techniques of behavior modification.
This case is reminiscent of many in which this author has wanted to
help a client by applying the technology of behavioral science but was
frustrated by the "lack of cooperation" of the client.

Looking back, it

is possible to discern patterns in this author's career in which the
issue of mechanical versus purposive natures of humankind has had very
practical consequences.

Early on, a very deterministic/mechanistic
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orientation was taken by the author toward the problems presented to him
in the schools.

Theoretically perfect solutions to these problems were

not difficult to prescribe.

After all, the laws of behavior were seen

to be universal, with the puzzling exception that the author was often
unable to explain the ways in which these laws governed his own
behavior.

It was a rare occasion indeed, however, when this

psychologist was able to apply behavioral technology.

Almost always

people, parents, teachers, or students, refused to allow the technology
to be implemented, or some unexpected variable ruined the scientific
application of the principles.

Increasingly frustrated, this author

sought help from the experts in behavioral technology.

Many

consultations were made with psychologists who published journal
articles and/or presented workshops on behavior modification.

None of

them were able to offer any behavioral technology which was helpful in
securing willing, passive, stable clients to whom the behavioral
technology could be applied.
On one occasion the author was presented with what seemed the ideal
opportunity to demonstrate to a child care worker the power of
behavioral techniques.

A 3 year old boy refused to help clean up messes

he had made at the day care center and was non-compliant in other ways
also.

While the day care worker observed, the author used physical

guidance of the youngster coupled with verbal praise to reinforce his
behavior.

The author took the boy's hand and placed it upon a block,

moved his hand to the container, then helped the child release the block
over the container.
the author.

This was immediately followed by verbal praise from

The 3 year old boy quickly caught on to this activity,
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that is, his behavior v?as shaped and soon he was putting blocks into the
container without assistance.
him.

He beamed whenever the author praised

When the container of blocks was nearly filled the author was

quite gratified and felt a renewed confidence in the "laws of behavior."
Unfortunately, when the container was full and there were no more blocks
on the floor, the boy very adeptly dumped the blocks out of the
container back onto the floor.

The youngster appeared very pleased with

his behavior and was anxiously looking to the author for more praise and
a resumption of the game.
This story illustrates the weakness of the mechanistic model of the
person who exists outside the confines and controls of the behavioral
laboratory (see Page, 1982, for an example of a laboratory study of
adult operant behavior which found that people have intentions which are
not accounted for in the operant model of the person V--- The

-year old

boy and the psychologist obviously had differing goals and purposes and
this episode generated some valuable hypotheses about the child's
constructs.

The power and occasional utility of behavioral technology

are not being denied.

However, the model of humankind which includes

the purposiveness of human behavior is much more inclusive than and can
easily encompass the mechanistic model inherent in behavioristic
psychology (cf., Hallberg, 1975; Miller & Martin, 1988).
Case History 4
The following story demonstrates how the negative knowledge which
emanates from psychological and educational research (Westland, 1978)
can combine with a school psychologist's experiences to initiate changes
in a traditional educational practice.

A fourth grade boy was referred
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to the psychologist for an evaluation by his mother.

She was concerned

because her son seemed to be developing a negative, uncaring attitude
toward school.

His grades were gradually declining each year and the

mother was encountering difficulties in motivating her son to go to
school and to complete his homework.

The teacher had also noticed a

gradual decline in the boy's school work and attitudes toward school
over the few months he had been attending her class.
Keeping in mind that this case occurred in the first year of this
author's career, a complete battery of psychological tests was
administered to this youngster.

Having been trained to put the most

faith in objective data, testing was viewed by the author as the logical
approach to discovering what was ailing this youngster.

This boy was

found to function with average intellectual abilities and his academic
achievement was only slightly below the expected level (determined, of
course, by the boy's IQ score).

Observations of the youngster's

behavior in the classroom and during testing suggested no obvious
problems.

A relatively subjective sentence completion test revealed

nothing out of the ordinary.

Frankly, the psychologist was stumped!

Out of desperation the author decided to simply visit with the
youngster, a process this author would now refer to as a dialogue.
About midway through the first dialogue the author asked the student
about where he had attended school for the previous grades.

In the

process of relating his school career, the boy became very clearly
embarrassed when he revealed that he had "flunked" kindergarten.

While

the author knew, from a search of the student's cumulative file, the boy

S l --------------

L__

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

152

had "repeated" kindergarten, he was alarmed to discern the strong
negative feelings which the youngster associated with this setback.
The author immediately began a search of the literature on the
effects of grade retention.
very mixed results.

This search was conducted in 1975 and found

Most of the researchers concluded that retained

students did not gain academically when compared to nonretained
students.

A minority of the studies found some' academic superiority for

students who were held back one year.

However, some of the studies

found that students who were retained in grade developed more negative
self-concepts as learners when compared to similarly achieving but
promoted peers.

Incidentally, a subsequent review by this author in

1985, and reviews by other school psychologists (Dawson, Raforth, &
Carey, 1990) have reached the same conclusions, namely, that retention
does not seem to improve academic achievement and it may hurt the
child's self-concept.

Of course, these conclusions are generalizations

which do not strictly apply to individual cases.

However, there is no

body of knowledge from which one can make accurate predictions regarding
the effects of retention for the individual student (Smith & Shepard,
1987).

This case certainly sensitized the author to the ways in which

grade retention can be construed by the affected child.

The continuing

use of grade retention as an alternative for students (Dawson, Raforth,
& Carey) testifies to the traditional consensus among educators about
the effectiveness of this practice.

It has been observed by this

author, however, that the short-term effects of retention are often
positive.

When a student repeats a curriculum it is almost always

easier the second time around.

Perhaps even the following grade will be
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relatively easier.

The rather unique perspective of a rural school

psychologist who follows students from preschool to adulthood often
gives a different picture.

Many times retained students are referred

for an evaluation to help in the original decision for retention.

If

the child is retained, however, he or she is often referred again
several years later because of school failure.
The problem with the traditional consensus about grade retention is
that it is short-sighted and unchallenged.

It is a relatively

inexpensive, from the educator's perspective, option for the child who
is struggling in school and it often seems to be helpful in the first
year or two.

However, this author has adopted a view which challenges

the educationally orthodox consensus about retention.

The consensus is

challenged at every opportunity with the result that hardly any
referrals for students being considered for retention are received
anymore.

Of course, students continue to be retained in the author's

school districts, but teachers and principals who believe that retention
is a beneficial option for students simply do not consult the
psychologist.

Whenever parents or educators ask the author about

retention they are told (a) that the research demonstrates that
retention is not helpful for most children, (b) that some children
develop poor self-concepts as an apparent result of retention, and (c)
no one seems to know how to accurately predict which students will
profit from retention.
The stance this author has taken toward retention is based on
reviews of research and many experiences like the one described above.
Thus, long-term follow-up of children and controlled studies of

L ___________
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retention liave served to shape the author’s theories about grade
retention.

These theories do not fit the consensus of opinion among

most educators and, thus, creates a dilemma for the psychologist.

The

model proposed in this paper recognizes that knowledge is the product of
consensus and advocates for a unitary democracy in the decision making
about students.

The retention issue demonstrates that unitary democracy

is not always an attainable goal.

That is, disagreements about the

effects of retention contribute to conflicts and lack of consensus in
staffings when holding a student back for a year is proposed. Such
conflicts do not, however, negate the value of unitary democracy.
Instead, they point out the value of the dialectical approach to
constructing knowledge for the sake of making decisions.

The school

psychologist has a point of view to add to the dialogue.
Of course, there are various ways of contributing to the dialogue.
The psychologist can continue to wait for referrals in which retention
is the issue and voice a point of view.

When this approach has been

taken by the author, no counter arguments have been offered by those
supporting retention.

The problem with this approach is that often this

psychologist is simply not invited to participate in the dialogue.
Various other ways of entering the dialogue have been found,
however.

In some cases the author has sought out the school

administrator and initiated a dialogue about retention.
positive effect in one school.

This has had a

The principal now discourages retention.

Importantly, this principal is very open to alternative ways of meeting
the needs of struggling students.

In another building the principal has

i
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been less receptive and, coincidentally, is less open to regular
education alternatives to special education.
Another approach taken by this author is to frequently bring up the
retention issue when he is asked to speak to a group of parents or
teachers.

The three major points mentioned above about retention are

presented and the audience is invited to participate in a dialogue about
retention.

Invariably, some of the members of the audience will know of

examples wherein retention was helpful over the long-run, while others
give counter examples.

The important point stressed by the author to

these groups is that we are unable to predict with any certainty which
youngsters will benefit from retention.

The only other counter argument

which has ever followed this point has been that school officials simply
do not know what to do with these students, they do not have any other
alternatives.

The author's reply is that there are a number of ways

regular education can be restructured to accommodate low achieving
students (Graden, Zins, & Curtis, 1988).
There is presently an attempt in the state of Iowa to find new ways
of providing educational services to needy students other than in
traditional special educational programs (Overview: Implementing
improvement in the special education service delivery system for Iowa
students, 1989).

Part of this movement is to find alternatives within

regular education classes for students who have been served in programs
for the mildly handicapped.

As pointed out in Chapter 2, special

education programs, although they are more expensive, have not generally
been shown to be more beneficial than regular education programs.
However, in order for teachers of regular classes to accommodate these
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mildly handicapped students very basic changes in educational philosophy
and practices would seem to be in order.

The answer to the problems of

retention and the education of mildly handicapped students may be very
similar in that both are putting pressure on the traditional, age-graded
ways of educating students.

The same challenges made of the basic

assumptions in school psychology can be made of education in general
(McGraw, 1984).
Case History 5
The next story brings us back to the problem of the separation of
mind and spirit addressed in the Cain and Abel myth presented in the
Preface.

A kindergarten girl who attended a private school affiliated

with a Christian church was referred because she was struggling with the
academic work in kindergarten.

The girl, whom we will refer to as Beth,

was slow in achieving developmental milestones and exhibited mild
developmental delays in large and small muscle coordination.
Intellectual testing placed her at about the tenth percentile in overall
academic aptitude.

Near the end of her kindergarten year Beth was still

having trouble correctly writing her name.

She could count and had

mastered very rudimentary addition using concrete objects.
read her name and those of a few of her classmates.

Beth could

Measures of her

academic achievements in kindergarten were generally compatible with
measures of her aptitudes.
very likeable child.

Beth was described as a happy-go-lucky and

She related quite well to most of her classmates.

Beth received language therapy from the Area Education Agency speech
pathologist.

I'
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Only in the last couple of months of kindergarten had the teacher
and Beth's mother noticed what they thought was frustration in the
child.

Beth's attention to academic tasks had worsened and she overtly

resisted some school activities.

She had begun to complain about school

to her mother and occasionally did not want to come to school.

When the

author interviewed Beth's mother it was evident that she had suspected,
perhaps unconsciously, that Beth was slower in many ways than her peers.
The year before, Beth's mother had sometimes helped in Beth's preschool
classroom and had seen that her daughter could not do as much as most of
her peers.

Also, Beth had two older siblings, and one younger.

The

mother sensed that Beth had not developed as quickly as her older
children, and the younger child (by two years) was rapidly catching up
with and even surpassing Beth in some skills.

The mother knew that her

third child was developmentally slow, and she was very frightened about
what might happen to Beth in the school system.
When all the requested testing was completed a staffing was
arranged with the parents, the teacher, the speech pathologist, the
school psychologist, and the school principal.

Everyone involved in the

staffing knew that Beth's mother was very emotional about the issues
which were to be discussed.
tense.

All the staffing participants appeared

In this school, contrary to most others served by the author,

the teachers typically began the staffing by focusing upon the child's
accomplishments.

In spite of this positive approach, the mother asked

early in the staffing if her daughter was ready for first grade.

The

teacher reluctantly predicted that first grade would be very difficult
and frustrating for Beth.

Eventually, the staffing participants turned
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to the psychologist for the results of the psychological testing.

All

the test scores were translated into percentiles and the psychologist
explained that a percentile score could be viewed as a child's relative
standing on a test when compared to one hundred typical children of the
same age.

Thus, it was explained, Beth's IQ score was at the 10th

percentile, meaning that she would have scored better than 10 out of 100
children her age, and 90 would have scored better than Beth.
the staffing seemed disturbed by these scores.

No one in

As a matter of fact the

teacher agreed with these estimates of Beth's relative standing.
It was not until the psychologist explained the "meaning” of the
scores that real distress appeared on the faces of the teacher and the
parent.

Although the psychologist had already met privately with the

parents one week prior to the staffing and related the same information,
the mother became upset and cried again at the staffing.

Not only did

the mother cry, but also the father, the teacher, and the principal.
The "meaning” of the IQ scores, of course, had to do with the diagnostic
label, mildly mentally disabled, and the child's eligibility for special
education services.

Under federal legislation governing special

education (Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975;
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Section 504) a school psychologist is
required to notify parents and school officials of any handicapping
conditions identified as a result of assessment (L. D. Bartlett,
personal communication, April 6, 1990).

In addition to legislation, the

school psychologists ' code of ethics (National Association of School
Psychologists, 1984) and current practice dictate that a school
psychologist is obligated to relate to the parents and school the
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diagnostic label and the child's eligibility for any special education
or related services.
It occurred to the psychologist that the parents and educators were
jointly subscribing to a set of beliefs which were contributing to the
group's emotional distress and which were interfering with the process
of considering educational options and selecting those which might best
meet the child's needs.

One might argue that such emotional reactions

are a necessary part of the adjustment and grieving process.

A counter

argument, however, is that the child has not died and is in no way
different as a result of the sharing of psychological test information
with the parents.

What had changed was the theory constructed by the

parents and educators of this particular child.

Apparently as a result

of the labeling a joint unspoken prognosis of dire consequences was
taking shape.

In order to test this hypothesis the psychologist led the

discussion toward a consideration of the long range educational and life
outcomes for this child.

The parents and teachers were asked whether

Beth was a different child now than she had been two weeks ago.
course, their answer was negative.

Of

Next, the psychologist pointed out

that the mental disability label did not mean anything specific about
Beth.

It was explained that the label was used primarily to officially

qualify youngsters for state and federal special education money and
services.

The prognostic accuracy of the label, it was explained, is

not good; that is, the educational and occupational attainments of
youngsters with similar labels are not specifically predictable and are
quite variable.

Further, the label simply describes what we already

know about Beth, that school is difficult for her.
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It was also hypothesized by the psychologist that the parents and
teachers were unconsciously judging the value of the child as negative
because of the label.

To test this hypothesis the psychologist asked

the staffing participants what were the most important aspects of Beth's
life.

The psychologist was hoping that the religious affiliation of the

school would influence the discussion of values toward a more spiritual
direction and away from social and economic concerns about Beth's
future.

Unfortunately, it was the psychologist who had to point out to

the staffing participants that Beth was, according to their religious
beliefs, made in the image of God and that she possesses an immortal
soul.

The emotional reactions were brought to a halt by these reminders

and, at least temporarily, the parents and educators felt much less
distressed.

The atmosphere of the remainder of the staffing became much

more positive as the participants evidently altered their dire
predictions of a horrible, awful life for Beth and put her educational
problems into truly long-term perspective.
This case demonstrates the importance of opening a dialogue at all
educational planning meetings concerning the overall purpose of a
child's education (McGraw, 1984).

As quoted by McGraw, James (1980)

reiterated a major theme of this paper, " . . .

because the study of

education is hardly separable from the study of the nature of man, many
of the questions now under investigation have deep intellectual roots in
philosophy and theology" (p. 40).

She quoted Ernest Boyer (1984)

regarding the primary purpose of education, "the social and moral
imperative of education is to help all students see the connectedness of
things, an insight that touches the very foundation of morality— social

L
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and religious" (p. 41).

It is this author's opinion that few of the

professionals in the schools, however, are prepared to engage in such
discussions.

Again, from McGraw we hear that "the mistake has been to

view education primarily in terms of what can be verified through
quantitative measurement" (p. 41).
Most of the fundamental assumptions of the proposed model for
school psychology are evident in this case.

Beth's story demonstrates

the connectedness of her educational problems to those around her and to
other aspects of her life, and it shows the futility of trying to
isolate one part of a child's life from other parts.

We can also see

that the "meaning" of Beth's IQ scores are the result of educational
dialogues which have constructed the notion of mental disability, a
concept which is not a description of nature but is a creation of
humans.

The dialogue concerning Beth's IQ scores did not stop with the

currently accepted construct of mental disability, rather the dialogue
was continued within the staffing and given a new meaning (namely, that
Beth has trouble with some school learning).

The construction process

in the staffing produced a conception of Beth that served the purpose of
the staffing— to plan an appropriate educational program for her.

The

social consensual nature of knowledge was demonstrated in the group's
emotional reactions to their construing of the mental disability label
as a prognosis of hopelessness.

It was again present in the

reconstruing of the label provided by the psychologist.

The emotional

reactions which followed the construing and reconstruing were examples
of the influence of thoughts, beliefs, theories, etc., on the behavior
of persons.

A belief which reflects the significance perspective of the
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person, that humans seek meaning for their lives, is evident in the
psychologist's attempt to shift the group dialogue to explore global
life-purposes for this child in addition to vocational and economic
goals.

This shift matches the proposed aim of education put forth in

the model.
The elements of the appropriate practice of school psychology are
also alive in this story.

The psychologist attempted to enrich the

personal knowledge of the staffing participants by offering an altered
view of Beth's educational problems.

In a sense, collaborative

consultation was evidenced in this case.

The psychologist proposed a

point of view which was shared by the staffing participants, that Beth
possesses an immortal soul, which is not normally considered in a
staffing, and he downplayed the authority of psychological knowledge.
Thus, an attempt was made to equalize the status of psychological and
theological knowledge and to encourage equal participation in the
problem-solving process by all participants in the staffing.

No

explanations of Beth's learning problems were offered in this meeting,
primarily because no strong explanations emerged from the evaluation
data.

Instead, the staffing participants focused upon creating a

consensus about Beth's academic aptitudes and getting on with designing
a program for her.
The action of a unitary democracy was evident in the group's
acceptance of various descriptions of Beth.

Had someone disagreed with

a particular description the process would have taken a different turn.
Disagreements are best dealt with, in this author's opinion and
experience, by rational dialogue and compromise.

L
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parent had objected to the idea that Beth has trouble learning, she
might have been asked for specific examples of Beth's learning.

These

examples would, then, have to be incorporated into the theory of Beth's
learning potentials which were being constructed in the staffing
dialogue.
By encouraging a much broader conception of Beth, the psychologist
sought to expand what counted as knowledge in this staffing.

When the

staffing participants were reminded that Beth is more than an economic
unit the focus was shifted from societal expectations of Beth to an
exploration of the meaning of Beth's life.

Moral leadership in this

case consisted of inviting the group members to consider alternative
purposes for Beth's education, purposes which would include the
significance of Beth as a person and the significance of her life within
a larger theological tradition.
Case History 6
Next, a story about the future practice of school psychology will
be told.

This and the following "future case history" are best seen as

goals rather than as predictions, goals deduced from the model rather
than predictions based upon any hypothesized exceptionless patterns.

A.

school psychologist who practices from the proposed model will ask
certain kinds of questions of clients whenever the child's education is
discussed.

When questions of curriculum (that which is taught) are

forthcoming, the psychologist will ask, "how will this content (skill,
information) help the child find meaning in her/his life?"

The goal of

such a school psychologist is to keep the focus on the long-range,
wholistic view of the child's life.

When questions of technique emerge,
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this school psychologist will ask, "What do we know, as a group, about
this child that might help us to find a strategy which will ensure that
this child reaches her/his goals."

It is understood, of course, that

society circumscribes those goals, yet there are many ways a person may
find meaning in her/his life.

The questions about technique does not

make sense without the question about curriculum.

The goal of the child

is inseparable from the route the child takes to achieve it.
Typically, this author consults about techniques while leaving
curriculum relatively unquestioned.

Thus, an unrealized, yet deducible,

practice of the school psychologist who subscribes to this model is to
take part in more dialogues about curriculum.

It is conceivable that

some of the traditional curricular goals may not be appropriate for some
students.

How long, for example, must a child endure a host of

unsuccessful techniques for the teaching of some basic academic skill
before teachers, parents, the student, and others begin searching for
more achievable goals?
Again, it has been this author's experience that when the
traditional educational curriculum is judged to be inappropriate for a
student, the educational team typically focuses upon "vocational" or
"self-help" goals.

Examples of such goals include check writing,

reading warranties, comparative shopping, and personal hygiene skills.
It is also usual for the education team to make curricular decisions
with little or no solicited input from the child.

Typically,

psychometric data and the collective wisdom of the education team
provide the basis for curricular decision making.

The current model

advocates for input from the child via interviews and observations.

r.
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.
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younger the child the more inferences must be drawn from interviews and
observations.

In the end, educators cannot give a child a meaning for

her/his life.

But educators may help the student attain some of the

requisite skills which may be needed on her/his journey.

The following

tells a future story about how this author would like to practice school
psychology, a future this author will be promoting in dialogues with
colleagues.
A third grade teacher requested help from the author concerning a
student, Robert, who was not mastering basic reading skills.

The

teacher reported that Robert just could not hear the sounds in words
and, thus, was unable to decode even the simplest vocabulary words.
Robert had been receiving remedial reading help since first grade, so
the author asked to meet with the classroom and remedial reading teacher
together.

Meanwhile, an appointment was made with the classroom teacher

for the author to observe Robert during reading instruction.
The observation found Robert and four other students working at a
table with the classroom teacher.

The children were taking turns

reading, or attempting to read, vocabulary words from a list on a large
tablet situated near the teacher so that all five students could easily
see the words.

Robert's responses were not usually even close to the

correct pronunciation, occasionally his initial sound was correct.
Although Robert was not the only youngster having difficulty with this
task, his performance was far below that of the other group members.
The teacher had previously informed the author that this group, the
Darth Vaders, was the lowest reading group in all of third grade (there
were two other third grade classes in this school).
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Later in the observation session, the teacher read a story to the
group, a story on which they would eventually be working in reading
group.

During this time Robert was very attentive.

Later, when the

teacher asked the group questions about the story, Robert's hand was up
each time.
correct.

He was called upon several times and his answers were always
His performance on this listening comprehension task was much

better than any of the other Darth Vaders.
A subsequent meeting with Robert's teachers revealed that they were
aware of his good listening skills but were very concerned about his
decoding abilities.

The remedial reading teacher had worked with Robert

for two and one-half years and had used numerous techniques to
facilitate his learning of letter sounds.

This teacher was very

experienced, with over twenty years of teaching at the elementary level,
and was considered to be very competent.

She had tried drills of

various kinds, some with extrinsic rewards, word families, competitive
games requiring letter-sound associations, and many other approaches to
teaching phonics to Robert.

However, he had shown little or no gain in

his knowledge of these associations.

After further discussion, the

psychologist requested another meeting with the teachers and Robert's
parents.
Robert's mother, but not his father, attended a meeting with the
teachers and the author.

The mother was quite aware of Robert's reading

problems because of frequent contact with Robert's teachers, past and
present.

She explained that Robert's father also had a severe reading

problem which he never outgrew.

The author shared his observations

about Robert's apparently good listening skills and all agreed that he

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

167

liked to listen to stories and seemed to learn from them.

The mother

told how Robert frequently liked to help his father, who worked as a
mechanic, repair engines.

He demonstrated some skill at being able to

use tools to take motors apart and put them together again.

Robert's

teachers also were aware of his good visual-spatial reasoning abilities.
As a group, it was decided that the psychologist would work with
Robert in an attempt to generate some ideas about ways of remediating
this student's reading problems.

A referral form was signed by Robert's

mother and a follow-up meeting was scheduled for three weeks.

The

author intended to observe, interview, and evaluate Robert in that time.
The author conducted further observations of Robert in the regular
and remedial reading rooms, none of which revealed any new information.
Interviews with Robert found him to be pleasant, friendly, and
cooperative.

He was aware that reading was difficult for him and

admitted that he did not like to read aloud, but that he did like
looking at the pictures while others read.

Robert was very interested

in cars, trucks, and other mechanical things.
the classroom computer.

He also liked to operate

When Robert was shown a mechanical teaching

device, he was much more interested in how the thing worked than in the
contents of the lessons.

Robert liked to talk about his experiences

helping his father work on cars and trucks.

He appeared to have some

rudimentary vocabulary appropriate to the auto mechanic field.
When Robert was asked in what kinds of things he was most
interested, it was no surprise that he wanted to be a mechanic like his
father.

He also had an uncle in the U.S. Navy and thought joining the

Navy for a while might be fun.

Of a large number of activities
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suggested by the author, Robert liked computers, video games, puzzles,
making things with tools, recess, bike riding, some math, adventure
movies, and a few TV shows.

He said he did not like reading, spelling,

school in general, writing, cleaning liis room, playing with his little
sister, riding in the car, sports, or swimming.
one friend with whom he regularly played.

Robert reported only

His comments indicated that

he was not a particularly popular youngster and that he often was last
to be chosen at recess for kickball or football teams.

Most other

questions about Robert's distant future seemed silly to him and yielded
little useful information.
Next, the author asked Robert questions about reading.

While

acknowledging that he did not like to read, the author asked Robert
whether or not he thought his teachers and parents would ever let him
give up on learning to read.

Robert answered, "no", and understood that

as long as he was in school teachers would be asking him to read.

Thus,

it was mutually agreed that Robert was not going to be allowed to stop
learning to read.

The author, however, admitted that no one could make

Robert learn to read, that all his teachers and parents can do is try to
teach him, but that he, Robert, was the one who must do the learning.
Robert acknowledged, with a smile, that he understood that he was
largely in control of his learning.
The author led the discussion in another direction by inquiring
about what went on in Robert’s mind when he tried to read difficult
material.

Robert had difficulty expressing anything but his dislike for

these situations, so the author began hypothesizing about what kinds of
ideas might be going on in the student's head.

Robert vigorously agreed
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that he often told himself that the reading was too hard, that he could
not do it, that it would be awful to fail, and that he was a lousy
student because he could not read well.

The author challenged each of

these beliefs by asking Robert if he could prove them all to be true.
After some discussion Robert agreed to change his beliefs to the
following:

reading is hard, but not too hard; I can read better now

than I could last year; it is bad to fail, but it is not the end of the
world; and I am not as good a reading student as some, but I will
probably get better at reading if I keep trying.

After saying these new

beliefs aloud a few times, Robert agreed to read some passages for the
author.
Robert began with some very easy, pre-primer paragraphs which he
read with about 90% fluency and he was able to answer all comprehension
questions easily.

The level of difficulty of the passages was gradually

increased until Robert was reading with only about 70% fluency on
material selected from an end of first grade reading text.

He was

capable, however, of answering three out of four comprehension questions
at this level.

Observations of Robert found his level of activity and

his distractibility to increase with the level of reading difficulty.
He acknowledged that it was harder for him to concentrate when the words
became more difficult.
Next, Robert was asked whether he could think of any sayings
(thoughts, beliefs) he could tell himself, when the reading became more
difficult, that might help him concentrate better and try his very best.
In the spirit of the prior conversation about his thoughts during
reading, Robert suggested that he could tell himself to "pay attention,
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do your best."

These sentences were written down on an index card for

Robert to tape on his desk.

He was also asked to think of any pictures

he could draw next to the sentences that would help him remember to pay
attention and do his best.

Robert chose to draw a picture on his card

of a boy sitting at a desk, with a smile on his face, looking at a book.
He agreed to look at this card just before each time he was asked to
read.
Next, a discussion was initiated with Robert concerning his
difficulty in sounding out new words.

This conversation was difficult

for Robert, probably because this activity was his greatest source of
frustration.

However, it eventually became clear that concentrating

upon the individual letters and remembering all the different sounds was
very intractable for him.

Sometimes he used pictures to figure out

words, but often there were few, if any, pictures to help him.

It also

became apparent that Robert's frustrations often led to high levels of
anxiety and to his giving up on trying to decode a passage.

Although

Robert did not directly express that he sometimes used context clues to
decode words, it was apparent that he occasionally did so.

When it was

pointed out to Robert that he did possess some strategies for figuring
out words he seemed to feel better about his endeavors.

It was proposed

that the author would try to persuade Robert's teachers and parents to
focus more on helping him learn how to better use his contextual way of
decoding words and to eliminate or greatly reduce his phonics lessons.
Robert thought this proposal was a good idea.
It was decided by the author that it was important for the school
principal to attend the upcoming parent-teacher meeting.

This idea was

«!
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shared with Robert’s teachers and parent, all of whom agreed.

The

principal was able to attend the meeting at which the author reported
his experiences with Robert.

All present believed that the author's

findings were consistent with what they knew of Robert, and they were
receptive to the author's theory that Robert lacked some fundamental
skills which were necessary for success in learning phonics.

When it

was proposed that Robert's reading curriculum be altered to focus more
on contextual and structural approaches to word decoding, all present
agreed that this approach was worth a try.

However, when the author

proposed that such a change in Robert's reading curriculum would mean
that the current reading materials would not be appropriate and that any
changes made this year would necessitate changes in future grades, the
principal became visibly uncomfortable.
The principal was thinking about the resistance from Robert's
future teachers who, not being familiar with his educational history,
would probably not welcome the additional burden of preparing a separate
set of curriculum materials for and spending additional time with this
youngster.

To further complicate the issue, the remedial reading

teacher claimed to have several other third grade youngsters who also
seemed to use context and structural clues better than letter-sound
associations in word decoding.

At that point the author suggested that

the problem with Robert and these other youngsters be presented to the
faculty, as a whole, at the next building meeting to solicit their input
to the curriculum problem.

The principal agreed to this idea and put

the issue on the agenda for the faculty meeting two weeks away.
Meanwhile, all conference participants agreed to replace the traditional
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phonics instruction with a contextual/structural approach for Robert
while keeping him in his present reading group.

Robert's classroom

teacher expressed some uncertainty about what materials she could use
with Robert, but the remedial reading teacher offered to help her plan
lessons and find materials appropriate for Robert.
Two weeks later at the faculty meeting, the author, with help from
the two teachers involved, presented Robert's case.

Very quickly

several of the teachers reported that they currently or in the past had
students like Robert who did not seem to profit from traditional phonics
instruction.

A show of hands revealed that almost all the teachers

remembered having such students in their classrooms.

When the proposed

change in curriculum for Robert was presented several of the teachers
questioned whether it was practical to change the curriculum for only
one student.

Others countered that it was the teacher's job to fit the

curriculum to the child.

One teacher suggested that there were probably

enough students with similar problems to justify the creation of an
alternative reading curriculum for such students.

The discussion

continued with various proposals and counterproposals, and, ultimately
with help from the principal, a compromise agreement was reached.
principal agreed to form a committee to study the problem.

The

He asked for

one teacher from each grade, the remedial reading teachers, and the
school psychologist to form a committee, study the issue, and make a
recommendation to him in two months.
The committee was formed and the author volunteered to conduct a
search of the educational psychology and reading literature for
information which might be helpful to the committee.

Other

1
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subcommittees dealt with the search for a model program, finding
appropriate educational materials, and the transitions these youngsters
would have to make from grade-to-grade.

Eventually, the committee

pulled together all their information and spent several sessions working
out an agreement which was presented to the principal as a set of
specific recommendations.
While Robert never caught up with his peers in reading, his
attitudes toward reading improved quickly.

Eventually he was put into a

new reading group with two other third grade students.

This reading

group became a prototype for an alternative reading curriculum in the
schools which not only approached decoding in less traditional ways, but
also made other modifications in the reading curriculum and in the
traditional reading instructional methods.

It was agreed that this

alternative curriculum was to be experimental with a careful monitoring
of several aspects of reading as well as regular assessments of
attitudes toward reading and school.

Attempts were made to make the

reading content more personal and relevant to each child.

Eventually,

writing began to creep into the reading curriculum and the teachers
realized that they had embarked upon a whole-language approach for these
students.

The author continued to consult with teachers of the students

in this special group, primarily to collaborate about ways of assessing
progress.

The principal was initially reluctant about all the changes

taking place for these students.

However, the constant monitoring

provided her with reassurance that the new approach would not continue
if the students failed to make some progress.

She eventually became

quite enthusiastic about the project and was instrumental in diffusing
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the program within the building and, later, to other buildings in the
district.
This case study illustrates a number of features of the proposed
model.

Aspects of constructivism, purposiveness, and the consensual

nature of social knowledge are evident in this story.

The author's

attempts to enrich the clients (in this case the clients ranged from a
student to a school building staff) and the democratic approach to
decision making were exemplified.

One may also see the potential for

assessing and utilizing the personal theories of the child in
understanding his problem and in formulating a new approach to teaching
him reading.

Implied in this model is the idea that students should be

an integral part of the assessment and planning process in education.
The values, purposes, and ideas of the student should compete freely
with those of the teacher, the principal, and the school psychologist.
Educators and school psychologists do not have relatively exceptionless
laws of behavior from which they can accurately predict and control
behavior.

Therefore, they had better consider all relevant points of

view in the dialectical and consensual knowledge formation process.
Education is something we do with, not J^o, a child.
The long terra impact of the changes in the reading curriculum for
students like Robert is difficult to assess.

Reading, like other parts

of the curriculum, is not something that can be given to a student.
Rather, what a student learns in school is the result of a dialectical
process between student and teacher, student and materials, and student
and student.

Without covering laws which clearly specify the

relationships between the relevant relationships educators cannot

r
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accurately predict, much less control, the outcome of these
interactions.

However, educators and school psychologists can make the

process more collaborative and, thus, more likely to be perceived by
everyone involved as something over which they have some control.

An

increased perception of control may improve motivation and frustration
tolerance in some students.

It is, at least, a hypothesis worth

testing.
Case History 7
The next, and last, future case study will present a common moral
dilemma for the school psychologist.

While this situation is a frequent

occurrence in the practice of most school psychologists, the resolution
to the conflicting values is not widely talked about among
practitioners.

This case highlights the struggles which must be faced

by school psychologists who work in a very tradition-governed
institution, the school, wherein the educational practices are being
increasingly scrutinized and criticized.
A referral was received from a group of sixth grade teachers on a
boy about whom they had become increasingly concerned.

The boy, Tim,

had begun the school year academically behind most of his classmates and
he had made very little progress during the first seven months of the
year.

He was reported to be very disorganized, to rarely turn in

assigned work, to often exhibit socially inappropriate behavior, and to
rarely pay attention in class.

A review of Tim’s cumulative folder

revealed that he had moved to the local community at the beginning of
fourth grade.

According to teachers' comments on his past report cards,

since starting school he had difficulty paying attention, completing nis

L _____________
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work, and making friends in each grade.

Although Tim had apparently

never been evaluated by a psychologist, he had received counseling from
the elementary guidance counselor during the last half of fourth grade
and for all of fifth grade.
these counseling sessions.
average.

There were no reports in his file regarding
Tim's grades were generally slightly below

He was the oldest of three children.

sisters, ages four and two.

His siblings were two

A group intelligence test administered in

fourth grade indicated that Tim functioned with average academic
abilities.
An interview with the elementary guidance counselor revealed that
the focus of her counseling with Tim was primarily on social skills.
She saw Tim individually and in a group to work on teaching him how to
make and keep friends.

She reported that Tim seemed to learn the social

skills lessons quite well in the counseling session, but did not use
them in class or on the playground.

The counselor described Tim as

being somewhat odd in his interactions with other children.

He was

often reluctant to approach other children, and when he did he
frequently said unusual things or asked embarrassing questions.

She

dismissed him from counseling at the end of fifth grade, primarily
because he was going to sixth grade at the middle school.

She put his

name on a follow-up list for the middle school counselor but had no
information about Tim since he completed fifth grade.
The middle school counselor told the author that she had checked on
Tim several times during the school year and was concerned about his
progress.

She had initiated several discussions among the sixth grade

teachers about adjustments they could make and interventions they could
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try to help Tim socially and academically.

The teachers began an

assignment sheet on which Tim was responsible for writing down his
assignments each day.

However, Tim rarely could find his assignment

sheet, so the teachers began initialing the sheet at the end of each
class period, and the guidance counselor checked his assignment sheet at
the end of each day.

If Tim had failed to complete his assignment

sheet, he was not allowed to leave school at the end of the day until
the sheet was correctly filled in and initialed by each teacher.

While

there was some improvement, it became necessary for the counselor to
contact the parents and ask them to check Tim's assignment sheet each
afternoon and to see that he completed his homework assignments.
For about two weeks this system worked fairly well.

Then, Tim

began to turn in fewer assignments and to lose his sheet more often.
Attempts to contact the parents were not very successful.

The counselor

felt that the parents did not want to be bothered about Tim's school
problems anymore.

Meanwhile, as Tim began to slip academically, he also

became increasingly socially withdrawn.

He was rarely seen interacting

with other students and, when he did interact with them, it usually
involved conflict.
A conference was set up by the author to meet with Tim's teachers
and parents.

Although telephone contact had been made and a follow-up

letter sent, the parents failed to attend the conference.
reiterated most of the above information.

The teachers

When asked by the author what

they expected from a psychological evaluation, the teachers admitted
that they wanted Tim put into the learning disabilities (LD) program.
They felt that he needed one caring person to look after him each day.

[-
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They believed that he would feel more comfortable about coming to school
if he could work regularly with Miss Smith, the LD teacher, who was
known for helping students keep up with their assignments and prepare
for tests.

When it was pointed out by the author that, at this point,

there was no evidence that Tim was LD, the teachers asked if he might
not qualify as a behavior disordered (BD) student.
The dilemma which the author faced in this case is not at all
unusual.

Basically, regular education teachers witness the apparent

success of students who are placed into special education programs for
the mildly disabled.

The success is apparent because the research

literature cited in Chapter 2 strongly suggests that mildly handicapped
students score just as well on standardized measures of achievement
whether they are placed in special education instructional programs or
not.

This research also indicates that formal measures of self-concept

do not improve, and may actually deteriorate in some students, upon
placement in special education.

While the author had cited this

literature to the district special education teachers and encouraged
them to conduct local studies of the effects of special education
placement, no interest was shown among the staff in conducting such
research.

Notoriously, students with mild handicaps in Tim's school

district usually began to receive better grades (when these grades were
assigned by the special education teacher) and to pass their courses
each year after being placed into special education.

Often these

students had been predicted to be school drop-outs, a prediction which
was rarely true for those placed in special education classes.

Usually,

these students were seen, after placement in special classes, to
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"belong" to the special education teacher to whom they were assigned.
This arrangement was most often satisfactory to everyone involved.

The

regular education teachers no longer felt responsible and were no longer
embroiled in the daily conflicts of educating these students.

The

parents usually felt satisfied because their children were "passing"
school, and the parents usually had only one teacher with whom they had
to deal when school problems arose.

Most of the students exhibited

signs of being less distressed about coming to school; a few overtly
expressed that they liked school better.

The school principals were

usually satisfied with the special education programs because the
conflicts were fewer and the secondary school drop-outs were diminished.
At least one principal, however, was disappointed to learn that once
these students were placed in special education they were likely to
remain in the program until high school graduation.

He sincerely

believed that the special education program would "fix" these students.
The dilemma faced by the school psychologist in this case is many
faceted.

First, the mechanistic view of humanity is behind the

principal's expectation that the students identified as handicapped can
somehow be "fixed" by the appropriate remedial treatment.

The

mechanistic view is also evident in the research cited in Chapter 2 on
the effects of special education which has traditionally focused upon
standardized achievement scores, and standardized measures of selfconcept.

From the mechanistic view the issues of special education can

be settled by referring to physicalistic measures utilizing grams,
centimeters, and seconds.

Little or no reference is made to more

qualitative criteria which are much more difficult, if at all possible,
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to measure on a universal scale.

Even some of the quantifiable

variables, such as school drop-out rates and measures of teacher,
parent, and student satisfaction, are rarely seen as dependent variables
in these studies.
Perhaps even more important are the moral questions which emerge in
an examination of the practice of placing students into special
education.

One may begin with the most obvious question, is it good to

segregate handicapped students from their regular education peers?
Following this, we should ask, do school officials (including the school
psychologist) have the right to segregate certain classes of students?
If such segregation eases the burden of the school without improving
upon the education of the student, is it an ethical practice?

Which

school outcome variables are of most importance, and to whom are they
most important?

Questions concerning the true functions of the school

emerge quickly when debates about the effectiveness of special education
are allowed to take their logical course.

We are soon confronted by the

deep-seated, usually unspoken, beliefs about American public education.
Where one decides to terminate the questioning process has
relevance to individual cases such as Tim's.

If the author decided to

adopt the shared beliefs of the sixth grade teachers, he would have
gladly conducted an evaluation of Tim to determine his eligibility for
special education programming.

On the other hand, if he included in the

debate the growing consensus among special education researchers, that
programs for the mildly handicapped are not working, then he would
resist conducting an evaluation for placement.

Instead, he would

advocate for adjustments in the regular education program for this

[
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student.

However, in so doing, he would be denying this youngster

access to a program which, by local standards, may very well be
successful.
At another level of analysis, we may want to ask whether the
learning of specific academic skills which are measured by standardized
achievement tests (or curriculum-based assessments), or the learning of
specific, observable behaviors, are the most important educational goal
in this youngster's life at this time?

If we view special education

placement as a way of protecting this youngster from the stresses of
regular education, what difference will such a placement make in the
long run for this student?

Will he be over-protected and, thus, denied

opportunities to successfully solve his problems?

What resources, if

any, are available in the schools to help this student achieve a
meaningful life?

Perhaps the long-term goals of this youngster had

better be assessed by an educational team, which would include the
child, and recommendations made accordingly.
not make such important decisions.

One person alone should

Through the give-and-take of the

dialectical process many of the relevant value positions can be
presented as the final decision will be value based and not mechanistic
or limited to functional, lawful principles.

Ideally, a synthesis of

the varying points of view can be created and a consensus achieved from
which an educational program for Tim can emerge.
Thus, this case cannot be completed at this time because the author
is unable to predict just what value positions would emerge in such a
case.

Drawing upon recent past experience with cases which share some

elements with Tim's, the author would predict that Tim would be
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evaluated by the Diagnostic and Educational team, including the child,
the parents, teachers, a special education consultant, a school social
worker, and the school psychologist.

It is very likely that Tim would

be viewed by this team as functioning with a Behavior Disorder and
recommended for a non-traditional special program.

That is, placement

in a traditional special education program for academic or behavioral
remediation would probably not be recommended.

Instead, a program of

interventions specially designed for Tim would be recommended.

One of

these interventions would include regular, daily contact with a caring
adult who would develop an abiding, personal relationship with Tim.

The

research on the effects of psychotherapy, cited in Chapter 2, suggest
that when people improve in psychotherapy it is more likely the result
of a relationship than of any special technique.

Also, this special

person, probably an aide in one of the special education programs, would
have access to all kinds of consultants with whom she/he could form
relationships which might be of benefit to Tim.
An individual educational plan (IEP) for Tim would not resemble the
typical goals and objectives seen in most acadejnically or behaviorally
oriented programs.

Rather, the caring person in charge of Tim's daily

educational program would keep an individual educational diary (IED) in
which daily notes would be recorded concerning aspects of Tim's behavior
which were thought to be theoretically important.

Out of weekly

meetings of a core educational team, including the school psychologist,
would emerge a theory of Tim gleaned from patterns found in the IED,
additional comments of the caring person in charge, and observations of
others.

Strong efforts would be made to involve the parent in these
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weekly review and planning sessions.

As long as Tim did not fit into

the educational mainstream the IED process would probably prevail.
It should be pointed out that another of the typical moral dilemmas
faced by the school psychologist is that there are very legitimate
differences in her/his perspective and that of the classroom teacher.
The major difference is that while the school psychologist is usually
concerned about a particular child, the teacher is concerned about a
group of children.

The school psychologist's recommendations often tend

toward an individualized program, the teacher usually is concerned with
protecting the one curriculum which has been designed for all children.
The sctool psychologist is often out of touch with just how much effort
is required by a teacher to manage a class of twenty-five or more
students.
resources.

The teacher is usually keenly aware of the limits of her/his
There are no easy solutions to these problems.

It should be

remembered that special education classrooms were begun in order to
alleviate some of these continuing problems.
This future case reflects a desire for flexibility in trying to
help students negotiate the schooling process.

By taking a wholistic

rather than a mechanistic view of the student the educational team will
attend to more than just narrow academic and behavioral skills.

When

school psychologists in the future use terms like "meaning of life" in
regard to a student, the concept of learning will take on a much broader
significance.

Instead of referring to the ansr/ers to questions on some

achievement or college entrance test, they will be talking about
facilitating the creation of consciousness in a human being.
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Implications for Training
The alternative model for the practice of school psychology
presented herein calls for a revision of the training of school
psychologists.

Traditional course work in Psychological Foundations,

Educational Foundations, Assessment/Interventions, Statistical Analyses
and Research Design, and Professional School Psychology (Fagan, 1990)
would continue to form the foundation of a school psychologist's
education.

Any new approach to the practice of the discipline must be

founded upon and inclusive of effective past practices.

However,

ineffective practices or outmoded practices need to be deleted (e.g.,
changing from verification of eligibility for funding to developing
change strategies).

Further, we should not assume that school

psychology practice is homogeneous.

A practice in school psychology

will be a function of the dialogue between the service provider and the
consumers of those services.

If an educational agency is expecting a

school psychologist to provide traditional assessment and remediation
services, then the person who is hired for such a position needs to be
prepared to provide those services.

Hopefully, the school psychologist

in such a position will engage her/his clients in dialogues from which a
revised practice, such as the one presented in this thesis, will evolve.
In order for the school psychologist to provide an alternative
practice, she/he needs to be exposed to a background of experiences
which have not often been included in school psychology programs.

An

exposure at the graduate level to the dialogues concerning the history
and philosophy of science is essential for school psychologists who have
identified themselves as scientific practitioners.

A critical awareness
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of the basic assumptions of the science of psychology upon which
practice is founded is necessary in order for the practitioner to
understand the limits of the profession’s scientific knowledge base.
With the strong hold that empiricism has had as a base for
scientific psychology, training programs will neea to identify levels of
fact, value, and myth in the training so that the various philosophical
roots of practice based on fact, value, purely theoretical possibility,
or myth will be understood by the trainee.

Just as it is important to

know when to use a behavior modification technique, it will be important
to know when to use value consensus building or to critically develop a
situation specific theory to guide trial and error approaches.
Following the conclusions presented in Chapter 3, it is important
for school psychologists to be familiar with narrative as a form of
assessment and remediation.

The communication of information through

stories and myths can have an impact upon school psychologists and their
clients (Bagarozzi & Anderson, 1989; Campbell, 1972; Feinstein &
Krippner, 1988; Gardner, 1971; Murray, 1960), yet these traditionally
important forms of discourse are, to this author's knowledge, rarely a
formalized part of the school psychologist's training curriculum.
In order to practice, the school psychologist must have a knowledge
base.

This base needs to incorporate learning and development in

cognition, morality, social behavior, and motor systems, as well as
effective information processing strategies, memory systems, and meaning
in life.

These individually centered types of knowledge will then need

to be reconstructed in group settings like classrooms, reading groups,
family systems, peer systems, and school cultures.

And finally, the
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knowledge must be translated into language understandable to a child, a
parent, a teacher, or an administrator so that the knowledge becomes
inserted into the dialectical process between co-equal participants.
Another important aspect of school psychology training is
collaborative consultation.

Gallessich (1982) has outlined a curriculum

for consultation training, parts of which are already used for school
psychology graduate training.

One limiting

aspect of Gallessich's

model

is that she assumes that power is unequally distributed in a
consultative relationship.

There may be circumstances in which the

school psychologist is cast in an authoritative role in which no
opportunities are available to question theassumptions
role (e.g., when testifying in a court of law).

underlying this

However, in this

revisioned model of school psychology, the practitioner attempts at
every opportunity to equalize the power and authority in all
relationships.
To facilitate the questioning and thinking of student school
psychologists, they should be provided with specific courses in ethical
practices and moral philosophy.

Chances to experience the conflicts

involved in practice can be provided first by staging mock staffings,
with some students role-playing various staffing participants, while
other students observe and critique the staffing process.

This can then

be extended to supervised, field based practice.
Experience in schools and other practice settings is usually an
important part of school psychology training programs.

This is an

important aspect of preparing practitioners and should be expanded.
Whenever possible, opportunities to participate in the schooling process
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should be provided throughout the school psychology training program, in
addition to formal practicum and internship courses.

Student

practitioners should have the opportunity to initiate dialogues about
these school experiences throughout the training program.

Perhaps such

discussions should be "programmed" in the curriculum by the university
trainers of school psychologists.

These experiences in the schools and

the subsequent dialogues are important in expanding the constructs of
neophyte practitioners, and may serve to instill habits which promote
personal growth and professional development in experienced school
psychologists.
The importance of experiences and the dialectical processes must be
emphasized.

The future school psychologist in the revisioned model is

one who will begin practice with a strong respect for the complexities
of the person and who acknowledges that reductionism when applied to
human relationships is a potentially dangerous process which can lead to
oversimplifications and misunderstandings of the person.

What is needed

is an awareness of when to use fact, value, myth, insight, intuition,
and hope, as well as which philosophical, theoretical, and empirical
systems support each.
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EPILOGUE
In the case studies presented in Chapter 5 one may see the
potential roles and functions for the school psychologist.

The term

school psychologist can be taken literally to mean someone who applies
psychological theories in the setting of the school.

The potential

exists for the application of a number of psychological theories, only a
few of which were mentioned, to assist in organizing the information
about a student.

Ellis' (1962) Rational Emotive Therapy theory and

Kelly's (1955) Theory of Personal Constructs were mentioned several
times because they are favored by the author.

Festinger's (1957) Theory

of Cognitive Dissonance and portions of Adler's (1929) Individual
Psychology are also sometimes used by the author in understanding
clients.

Much of C. G. Jung's (Campbell, 1971) theories of the

collective unconscious, of archetypes, and of psychic development has
been useful from time-to-time in helping clients formulate an
explanation of their problems.

The developmental theories of Erikson

(1963), Kohlberg (1987), Piaget (1962), and others have been
indispensable in understanding children and in constructing appropriate
educational and psychological goals for them.

Biological theories of

behavioral disorders have also been helpful in explaining the problems
of some children (Harper, 1982).

Metabolic, toxic, and other

physiological processes have been demonstrated to affect the learning
and behavior of some children.
Anderson, Cancelli, and Krathochwill (1984) found in their survey
an array of favorite theoretical approaches utilized by school
psychologists.

E

Only 9% of the respondents, however, indicated multiple
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theoretical approaches.

It is not clear from this survey whether school

psychologists are using different frames of reference for different
problems or whether they tend to use the same theory to explain all
problems.

Given the weaknesses of psychological theories pointed out in

Chapter 2 and 3, it is difficult to justify the application of any one
theory for a majority of problem situations.

Regarding the application

of explicit theories in psychotherapy, Mindess (1988) expressed his
belief that:
Only the most fervent proponents of an approach claim universal
validity for it in an overt way. Covertly, however, we all cleave
to favorite belief systems, employ typical ways of trying to help,
and cannot rid ourselves of the notion that what seems right to us
should apply to others too. . . . Perhaps the crucial element in
psychotherapy is the reformulation of the client's suffering and
confusion into some sort of meaningful pattern that lends
significance to his [sic] distress and points to a way beyond it,
regardless of the form that significance and way may take. (p.
170)
In summary, from these few cases one can see that no single
psychological theory can possibly encompass all of school psychology
practice.

A number of theories and approaches must be available to the

school psychologist in her/his attempt to understand clients and to
explain behavior to others, and the client's own theories may be a good
place to begin searching for a suitable explanation.

Sometimes no

theory can be found to explain behavior and the school psychologist must
admit failure in trying to understand another person.

The practice of

psychology frequently must venture beyond the range of scientific
psychological theory.

If the school psychologist is courageous and

explores these frontier experiences with a student, teacher, family, or
school system, a new, personal theory may emerge.

Hopefully, the
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personal theory will be developed, publicized, and submitted to rational
and empirical scrutiny and join the ranks of scientific psychological
theory.
Too often, according to Koch (1981), psychologists have been
unwilling to face the uncertainties and ambiguities which are inevitable
when dealing with human beings:
It is as if uncertainty, mootness, ambiguity, cognitive finitude,
were the most unbearable of the existential anguishes. Under these
conditions, able and sincere inquirers become as autistic as little
children; they seem more impelled toward the pursuit and
maintenance of security fantasies than the winning of whatever
significant knowledge may be within reach! (p. 259)
Koch warned of our regressive tendency to accept almost any explanation
in order to reduce the fears associated with uncertainty.

He applauded

those who have the courage to look beyond the "'received1 concepts, our
technical constructions, our formal belief systems" (p. 265).
This thesis will end with the caveat that human beings are
difficult to understand and their behavior is difficult to predict.
Although the alert and interested observer may sometimes find patterns
in human behavior and these patterns may be helpful in producing
explanations of human action, there is no single set of scientific laws
or principles which has been found to provide either absolutely accurate
predictions of behavior or totally effective control of human behavior.
Instead, the search for the functional relations among variables in
human behavior has provided only partial understandings.

These partial

understandings or relationships are also presented in theoretical
systems which are not without competing explanations.

School

psychologists, then, can function from an empirical base only part of
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the time.

They can function from a critically reviewed theoretical

system for another part.

Eventually, however, they will find themselves

faced with problems for which reliable and valid psychological
explanations do not exist.

Rather than pretending to provide a strong

science of behavior, school psychologists would do well to acknowledge
their limitations.
Whether or not school psychologists can continue to be viewed as
important to the functioning of schools will probably depend upon how
empathic, innovative, ethical and helpful they are judged to be by their
clients.

School psychologists, as a group, certainly possess some

important intellectual capacities (Hyman, 1988) which may facilitate
problem solving.
the schools.

The school psychologist has a definite role to play in

Although significant parts of that role may be in need of

change, the fundamental act of trying to understand another person who
has sought help involves the school psychologist in that person's life
in potentially important ways.

According to Kelly (1955), when one

person tries to understand the constructs of another, the person
attempting to understand begins to play a role in a social process with
that other person.

Thus, school psychologists are, or certainly can be,

important in helping others cope with the inevitable stress inherent in
the complex social processes found in the school.
Perhaps the school psychologist can be seen as the lubricant which
keeps some of the parts of the school functioning with a minimum of
friction.

Or, perhaps the school psychologist may be thought of as the

school shaman.

Maybe the school psychologist serves as the conscience

of the school.

It could be that some see the school psychologist as a
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non-addictive tranquilizer.

In some cases the school psychologist is

viewed as a technician who repairs that which breaks down.
school psychologist is a gate-keeper.
is the scapegoat.

To some, the

Sometimes the school psychologist

Occasionally she/he is a hero.

The roles and

functions of the school psychologist are many and varied.

They revolve,

however, around a central core of helping and caring about children and
those adults to whose care they are committed.

In all roles, the school

psychologist continues to stand on rigorous and critical thinking in
utilizing psychological theory to build an understanding of the children
whom she/he serves.

It is the continuing dialogue which includes

theory, research, and practice from the discipline of psychology that
provides the school psychologist with her/his ties to the scientific
community and her/his ethics and practice standards professionally.
Contributing to the understanding of and assistance for a child is the
goal of the disciplined inquiry into the child and her/his environment.
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